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Debates on nationalism highlight loyalty and solidarity as the main benefits of a 
shared national identity, at the same time contrasting nationhood with universalist 
models of political action. This interdisciplinary thesis attempts to show nationalism 
as part of a broader project of modernity. In doing so, I defend a comprehensive view 
of nationhood, which, I argue, accounts for the recent transformation of nationhood, 
and explains the potential of national identity to open to universal values and norms. 
First, I put forward my view of nationhood, which defines nations as forms of 
political experience. I argue that nations have an ability to create a common public 
world. Second, by investigating the idea of the modern self and its relationship with 
individual autonomy, this thesis shows that modernity is characterised by a tension 
between rational autonomy and subjectivisation. This political self, I argue, develops 
in a bounded political community. Third, I argue that nations provide access to a 
common world in which everyone is recognised as moral and political agents. The 
paradoxical nature of the modern self takes advantage of the capacity of nations to be 
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Introduction 
Liah Greenfeld wrote in her essay ‗Nationalism and the Mind‘ that when she asked 
her students to draw pictograms of nationalism in one of her seminars, they came up 
with images of armed men fighting each other. However, by the end of the seminar, 
her students no longer perceived nations as inherently militant and agonistic. When 
asked to repeat the activity, they represented nations as different colours and cultures 
living side by side.
1
 This story can be interpreted in two ways. Greenfeld‘s own 
interpretation suggests that the common and predominantly negative view of 
nationalism is one-sided and inadequate - if we knew enough about nations, we 
would not think of them as inherently militant or exclusive. On another level though, 
this story can also be interpreted as an expression of two competing notions of the 
nation – one political and the other one cultural. What the students identified is that 
national differences are easier to accept if we think of nations in cultural terms as 
‗colours‘, or cuisines or different music traditions, etc. The trouble with nations is 
that they are both political and cultural. 
 Nations are valuable to us because of the way they organise social life and 
allow us to participate in shared traditions and practices that are also constitutive to 
many political communities. The shared cultural heritage of national communities 
allows us to celebrate diversity while being at home. Additionally, the plurality of 
different national identities represents a rich diversity of cultures, values and ideas of 
a good life.
2
 Nevertheless, cultural distinctiveness comes at a price. National identity 
is often formed through rejection of what is ‗alien‘ or ‗foreign‘. Nationhood is then 
                                                 
1
 Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism and the Mind: Essays on Modern Culture, Oxford, Oneworld, 2006, p. 
204. 
2
 Also within nations themselves, as every nation recognises a level of internal cultural diversity. For 
example out of different features of an Englishman, there is a particular type of Englishman that 
comes from Yorkshire. These sets of features do not contradict each other, though certain local 
identities might be associated with higher social status than others.  
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characterised by a paradoxical tension between openness and closeness, between the 
apparent plurality of national cultures and the uniformity of national identity. 
This PhD offers a critical study of the concept of nationhood that addresses 
this paradoxical tension. But instead of trying to eliminate the paradox, I will defend 
a comprehensive view of the nation, which can be described by referring to its three 
dimensions: 1) That nations are neither simply civic or ethnic, exclusive or inclusive, 
particularistic or universalistic, but instead represent a dialectic tension between 
those qualities; 2) A comprehensive view also acknowledges that nations are 
historical concepts, rather than ready-made models. National identity is not a fixed 
social phenomenon but one of the key projects of modernity. This point is 
particularly important when we consider that the world is becoming increasingly 
interconnected. Thanks to the contemporary globalised culture, the lives of 
foreigners are more accessible than ever before. The radical difference of national 
belonging seems to be becoming tamed.
3
 Finally, I will argue that 3) the paradoxical 
nature of national identity allows nations to have the capacity to be a source of 
solidarity that transcends national borders while promoting the development of moral 
and political agency. In that sense nations represent a political project of intrinsic 
moral value.  
I should state here - and this is indeed what differentiates my argument  from 
the majority of contemporary theorists of national identity - that my defence of 
nationhood is not limited to liberal nationalism. In fact, the whole point of a 
comprehensive view of the nation is to show that there is no such simple way of 
classifying nationalism. National identity has an important role in developing moral 
and political agency regardless of whether we talk about liberal or non-liberal forms 
of nationalism, as long as the society is a democratic one.  
My defence of nationhood is not uncritical as I will acknowledge some of the 
most commonly recognised problems with national identity. There are many reasons 
                                                 
3
 However, while nowadays citizenship seems more open than ever before, questions about who 
should be ‗in‘ and who should be ‗out‘ are as politically vivid as ever. Migration, asylum seekers, 
multiculturalism and the emergence of supranational bodies – all of these challenge the classical 
understanding of a liberal nation-state.  
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why political theorists may be particularly cautious when it comes to the concept of 
the nation. These can be organised into three main lines of criticism: a) That national 
identity is collectivist and undemocratic; b) That national bonds are apolitical and 
arbitrary; c) That nations are an obstacle to the moral progression of mankind.  
My thesis is constructed as a dialogue with these criticisms. I will start with 
an attempt to define the concept of the nation as a form of political experience 
(Chapter One) rather than simply an identity. In subsequent sections I will explain 
my understanding of the nation as a paradox constitutive to the modern political self. 
I will then move to responding to the critics of national identity. In particular, I will 
argue that: Ad. a) While creating a sense of belonging, nations promote individual 
autonomy. The modern self thrives on a tension between subjectivity and 
community. In that sense, modern individualism is based on a concept of bounded 
rationality (Chapter Two). Ad. b) National bonds are political; they represent 
bounded rationality which allows us to engage with ‗the political‘ through social 
practices and institutions that make the common good accessible to us (Chapters 
Three and Four). Ad. c) Nations transcend their own borders and allow us to open up 
to the universal. In this sense, universalism (particularly cosmopolitanism) and 
nationalism are not mutually exclusive (Chapters Five and Six). I will also address 
the claim that nations, and the type of subjectivity associated with them, are in 
decline due to global factors (Chapter Seven).  
While nationhood does provide a way for citizens to participate in a common 
political world through shared practices and political imagination, it can also exclude 
aliens who by the same virtue fall not only outside the borders of the community but 
also outside of the borders of what can be imagined as common. This is why it is so 
much easier to ignore the suffering of those who are alien to us – because we cannot 
imagine their pain as clearly as when this suffering is shared by our compatriots. 
Furthermore, I will show that nation-states should not be viewed in terms of 
necessity. While there probably could have been better ways of creating social 
solidarity or maintaining political values, historically it is the nation that worked. 
This does not mean that the question ‗Why can we not create a common world in 
virtue of being human?‘ is pointless. But it does mean that issues concerning the 
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limits of political community should be asked not simply in abstract moral terms, but 
in also in concrete political terms. Who is the modern individual? How does she 
express herself politically? What empowers her?  
 
Method 
‗Nation‘ and ‗self‘ are historical concepts and they should be studied in their 
historical depth. In my enquiry I am going to be drawing heavily on the history of 
ideas. Contemporary normative political philosophy has a tendency to avoid drawing 
on socio-historical arguments or history of ideas. There are indeed certain problems 
with using these types of arguments when engaging in a normative debate. First, 
interpretations of history are often difficult to verify – there might be multiple 
equally persuasive stories concerning the same concept or phenomenon. A 
philosopher is in a particularly difficult position here as she lacks the tools to 
investigate many of the claims she has to take for granted. Secondly, the relationship 
between history and history of ideas is not clear. Would individual freedom exist 
without the ideas of individuality and freedom?  
However, the above issue highlights the special position of nationhood as a 
historical concept. Nationhood, as I argue in Chapter One, would not exist without 
the idea of the nation. Nationhood exists only because some of us have a shared 
belief in the nation. This is why investigating the origins of this belief is so important 
for the understanding of the concept itself. As for the first reservation – my 
‗narrative‘ is indeed contestable. Things can be interpreted differently. One should 
say that there are actually certain ways of choosing one narrative over another. There 
are various reasons why a story can be more persuasive – coherence, simplicity, 
plausibility etc. But the purpose of the present critique is not to establish historical 
truth but to use socio-historical critique to highlight certain conceptual problems or 
links between ideas.  
Before I move on, I will introduce the key concepts in this thesis: nation, self 
and the ‗subject‘. These will be working definitions – a starting point on a longer 
journey. But they will help the reader understand some of the issues I will need to 
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address within this work. While the first two chapters expand on these definitions, 
the first part of my thesis (Chapters One through Four) addresses common lines of 
critique of the concept of nationhood. I will briefly introduce these critiques further 
in this section.  
 
What is a Nation? 
There are obvious difficulties in defining the term ‗nation‘. Like all historical 
concepts, its use has evolved and a purely semantic analysis would be pointless. 
Romantic definitions of nationhood in terms of blood, belonging and natural bonds 
present a stark contrast to the enlightenment tradition which views nationhood in 
civic terms. Furthermore, it is often difficult to state with absolute certainly whether 
we are actually dealing with nationalism in specific cases. Are the Roma a nation or 
an ethnicity? What about Jews and Silesians? Defining nationality through a shared 
characteristic is another dead end. Nations do not have to share a common language, 
territory or other cultural features. While there is a tradition of talking about national 
character (e.g. the Italians are affectionate and lazy; The English are cold and 
sarcastic), these are clearly stereotypes that do not take into the account the huge 
internal differentiation of nations. An upper middle class man from Oxford may have 
much more in common in terms of culture with his counterpart in Edinburgh than 
with someone from a council estate in Coventry. 
 Even though there doesn‘t seem to be a single unproblematic definition of the 
nation, one can aim to find some common features amongst the key 
conceptualisations. I discuss these theories in more detail in the thesis. Here however 
I will limit myself to introducing the key similarities I find. There are three 
fundamental dimensions of my understanding of the nation. These are: i) that nations 
are constituted by belief; ii) that nations provide a basis for mutual recognition 
between individuals and iii) that nations are uniquely modern. The first claim means 
that nations do not exist independently of our ability to recognise them and cannot be 
simply thought of as groups of certain inherent characteristics. The perception of 
nationality has been allowed to evolve and indeed is still evolving. The second 
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dimension is crucial for nationhood – in that nations are not only imagined but also 
that they are a way of imagining others. This is where stereotypes can become useful 
because they allow us to have access to the lives of others and care about them. In 
fact, without those pre-judgements based on a shared nationality social interaction 
would be greatly limited. Thirdly, nations are uniquely modern in the sense that they 
represent a specifically modern cultural framework. While this thesis does not 
engage in the debate about the origins of nationalism and industrialisation, I will be 
in agreement with Gellner who showed how nations became vehicles of 
modernisation.
4
 It is within the national framework that individuals were offered the 
possibility of social mobility, advancement and pride. The mobility that came with 
nationhood in the name of the shared prosperity of the people allowed individuals to 
define themselves in terms that transcended social class and local sources of 
belonging. Nationalism was, from the beginning, a force fighting other particularistic 
identities.  
I will propose to understand nationhood not simply as an identity but as a 
form of modern political experience. By this I mean that nations should not be 
simply seen as a movement inwards but as sources of bounded rationality that allow 
individual agents to define themselves morally and politically as well as to bond with 
others. This is clearly a communitarian view of nationhood. But rather than focusing 
on the roles of tested practices and traditions in forming our moral sources, I want to 
highlight the political value of the thus-constructed self in a way that allows us to 
participate in global discourse.  
Finally, one should note that while in the sense I will be using the term 
‗nation‘, it refers to communities of shared cultural and historical heritage which, 
while political, are not identical with states. National boundaries do not always 
overlap with state boundaries.
5
 There are theorists, such as Gellner,
6
 who do not 
                                                 
4
 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Blackwell, Oxford 1983. One should note here that Gellner 
also argues that neither nationalism nor capitalism could create the modern society without the role of 
the state.  
5
 Although nationality and citizenship can coincide.  
6
 ‗Nationalism is primarily a political principle that holds that the political and the national unit should 
be congruent.‘ Ernst Gellner, Nationalism, London, Blackwell, 1983, p. 1 
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make this distinction explicitly, because they regard the state as the main motor 
behind the formation of nations. But while the link between the state and nation can 
indeed be strong, they are distinct concepts.
7
 I understand nationalism as a term that 
relates to a set of modern movements, where citizenship is derived from an inclusion 
in the nation rather than in a ‗mere‘ state where citizenship is derived from cultural 
norms.  
 
Definition of the Self/Subject 
This PhD is also about the modern self and how it ‗fits‘ within the political 
framework of nationhood. I will refer to ‗the self‗ to mean the entirety of the 
subjective individual experience of a person as opposed to the life of a community. 
Since the 18th and 19th centuries the term ‗subject‘ has also gained popularity and 
we can often find it used with a similar meaning as the word ‗self‘. While I will 
indeed use these words interchangeably at times, they are often not the same. ‗Self‘ 
refers to a self-reflective part of our subjectivity, or in other words the word ‗self‘ 
denotes what we perceive when we say ‗I‘, ‗me‘ or ‗us‘. In that sense, self is 
intrinsically linked to identity. However, I will also use the term ‗subject‘ to refer 
more specifically to a modern model of the self (as opposed to the classical one).  
The term ‗subject‘ itself is notoriously ambiguous. I will list only three main 
meanings here. First, in everyday language it can mean ‗topic‘ or ‗theme‘. This is 
however not the meaning that is discussed in this work. The second, philosophical 
use refers to a self in a moment when it is directed to the world as an object of 
knowledge. In philosophy, the opposition between ‗subject‘ and ‗object‘ is 
particularly central to modern epistemology. The subject here refers to a self actively 
withdrawing itself from the world in order to know the world. This is also the 
meaning in which I will use the word ‗subject‘ - the thinking mind as differentiated 
from the objects of thought. I will use inverted commas to distinguish this meaning 
                                                 
7
 I will discuss the work of many scholars whose definition of the nation varies from mine and in these 
circumstances I will use the term nation in the meaning specific to these authors. I will however 
explain how their understanding of this term varies from mine.  
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from the first one as a ‗topic‘ or ‗theme‘. The third meaning is political and relates to 
the original Latin root of the word subjectus, which stands for ‗placed beneath‘ or 
‗inferior to‘. It is a distinct use of the word subject to the one previously described in 
that it refers to individuals as agents of actions rather than thinking selves. 
 
Is National Identity Inherently Collectivist and Undemocratic? 
This thesis addresses three traditional lines of critique of nationhood. The first one 
evaluates nations as being both collectivist and undemocratic. The two claims are in 
fact connected. It is widely accepted that democracy requires an individualist 
framework. Individualism, on the other hand – at least in the European tradition – 
generally comprises beliefs in the moral value of individual agents and the priority of 
individual interest over group ones. It presupposes then that individuals are free to 
form and express their own interests. In contrast to this, membership in a nation is 
involuntary in the sense that we are born and educated into a national community, 
and as a result acquire certain features that are hard to change. Even though ‗hard‘ 
substantive models of nationhood based on ‗soil and blood‘ are becoming a rarity, 
the concept of ‗common origin‘ remains one of the key characteristics of the nation. 
Unlike religion, we cannot choose different national identities at will. These depend 
on the acceptance of others. There are thus various forms of conditions and rituals 
that normally accompany naturalisation.  
Furthermore, while many authors highlight the importance of civic 
participation to democracy, there is something uneasy about the expressions of 
national unity. Perhaps this can be exemplified by the internal contradiction we often 
experience in all mass events – i.e. the contrast between manifesting individual 
freedom of expression and the uniformity of the masses. But there is another reason 
for concern. I will refer to authors who show that the principle of national unity was 
often used against different types of partisanship – both in the nation building 
processes (for example French Revolution)
8
 and in state building processes or 
                                                 
8
 Craig Calhoun, Nationalism, Buckingham, Open University Press, 1997, p. 79-83. 
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secession (where ethnic minorities were targeted).
9
 Expressions of national sentiment 
seem to represent not the political unity (the many in one) that we find in a 
compromise, but rather a process of social uniformity and conformity – often leading 
to xenophobia towards those who do not conform to what is seen as normal. 
 In recent years, and perhaps as a result of globalisation, the expressions of 
national sentiment in the West seem to have become more inclusive. Societies are 
more multi-cultural which also allows increased access of non-nationals to positions 
of social status. Furthermore, as I will argue in Chapters Six, the sense of belonging 
and unity brought about by the nation is not contradictory to, but interdependent 
with, individual autonomy. This is because: a) The modern self is not purely rational. 
It thrives on a tension between rationality and subjectivity (Chapter Two). b) 
National identity is not purely emotive. It transcends particular subjectivities through 
forms of bounded rationality (Chapters One and Six).  
Ad. a) In Chapter Two I will show that the modern ‗subject‘ is characterised 
by a dialectic relationship between its passive (non-reflective) and active (reflective) 
dimensions. What this means in practice is that our individual identities are equally 
shaped by our sense of distinctiveness and the social images that are available to us. 
Nations offer a positive framework for the modern self through a set of shared 
practices and strategies of forming identity. Although, the individual often asserts her 
uniqueness and sense of worth through rebelling against the perceived features of the 
national framework, the framework itself is crucial for that process.  
Ad. b) In Chapter Six I will argue that the concept of the nation itself 
provides a framework that promotes individual autonomy. This is because nations 
are constitutive to moral and political agency. In both Chapters Two and Six, I 
explain the link between self, agency and autonomy. 
 
                                                 
9
 Op. cit., p. 83-85. 
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Are National Borders Apolitical and Arbitrary? 
The second line of criticism I address in this thesis is the most complex. This critique 
ranges from theorists who attack the concept of the nation as being anti-political
10
 
and a threat to democratic life, to those who ignore issues related to national identity 
on the basis of these issues being apolitical or historically contingent.
11
 I will now 
briefly outline these two types of critique.  
 First, as national bonds are often defined in terms of ethnicity or historical 
belonging, we may think of the nation as a natural community as opposed to the state 
which is a positive or constructed one. While we can imagine a contractual beginning 
to a state, nations are ex definitione resistant to this sort of intellectual 
experimentation. Instead, nations usually have founding myths that place them in 
some sort of historical antiquity. As a result, the nation is perceived in these accounts 
mostly as a natural (pre-political) force or sentiment, which demands a certain type 
of homogeneity and unity. In contrast, politics is portrayed as a public, legal activity 
that only makes sense under the conditions of diversity.  
 Secondly, we might think of national bonds as arbitrary and historically 
contingent. This claim refers to a limited idea of political association. A political 
community is here understood as a formal relationship. Members of such a 
commonwealth are not required to share beliefs, interests or opinions about anything 
apart from the rules of living together. The purpose of politics is to create a many-in-
one while maintaining the diversity of interests. While nations do provide a basis for 
recognition of authority, they should specifically not be treated as such because they 
transform what should be a formal/civic relationship into one based on belonging. As 
nation-states are in fact never uniform, the idea of basing political identity on the 
concept of national identity can be exclusive or oppressive.  
                                                 
10
 For example: Bernard Crick, In Defence of Politics, 2
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 In Chapter Three I will draw on Oakeshott‘s, Hobbes‘s and Arendt‘s critical 
approach to nationhood to address the above issues. I argue that the idea that national 
community represents a natural bond is heavily contested and it cannot be the basis 
of a viable critique of nationalism as a political principle. In fact the very distinction 
between political and natural is useless when applied to the nation. Furthermore, 
while I agree with the claim that a political association represents a special type of 
relationship based on something more than a business-like venture, I will also claim 
that this relationship can experienced precisely because it is made available to us 
within a common language of national belonging. 
 
Are Nations an Obstacle to the Moral Progression of Mankind? 
The third and final line of criticism I will address in Chapters Four and Five is that 
nations represent an obsolete moral or political order and are as such an obstacle to 
the moral progression of mankind. This argument has been used since the end of 
modernity, in particular by different versions of humanism. It focuses on a line of 
criticism which views the nation as representing a particularistic paradigm. What 
does that mean? It means that the national principle delimits the borders of politics to 
groups of people defined by a shared identity, ethos and institutional practices. 
Furthermore, it is often argued that we owe special duties to those who are members 
of our own community precisely because they engage in a close cooperative scheme 
with us. 
 This can, however, be criticised, as national boundaries can seem morally 
arbitrary. It often seems counter-intuitive that I have special duties to a fellow 
national on the other side of my country than I do to a person living across the border 
five kilometres away from me. Furthermore, with the progress of globalisation, the 
argument from cooperation seems to lose its strength. Indeed, political action 
becomes universalised with the growth of global political movements, migration, and 
the empowerment of further minorities. National borders are arguably less significant 
than they used to be. There are two questions here: ‗Do we need nations anymore?‘ 
and ‗Are nations indeed particularistic?‘. 
 
  21 
The answer to the first question will be indirect. In Chapters Four and Five I 
argue that a universalist alternative to the nation-state is viable. Politics itself is a 
limited activity. Our political dilemmas, problems and interests do not come from a 
void or even an original position, but can only be recognised thanks to the common 
language and practices that define our being together. Politics is not merely the 
administration of problems, but a communal process of pursuing ideas of the good 
life. These ideas are, however, dependent on the community in question. Politics, in 
other words, requires practical reason. Nation, I shall argue, represents that bounded 
rationality which allows us to engage with the political through social practices and 
institutions that make the common good accessible and tangible to us, because 
nations are politically meaningful. They matter as a source of moral and political 
identity. The alternative up-rootedness does not provide a viable basis for political 
agency. 
As for the second question, I will show that national identity is not as 
particularistic as is often claimed. As I argue in Chapter Six, nations can be seen as 
key to promoting individual autonomy. There are no reasons however why our 
recognition of autonomy of others should be limited only to our fellow nationals.  It 
is true that nationalism as the historical process of nation-formation has been, and 
often still is, politically exclusive and thus anti-universalistic.
12
 In particular, the 
ethno-linguistic type of nationalism dominating the 20
th
 century is not suited for the 
global era.
13
 However, the concept of organising political communities into nations 
has proven both practically and theoretically open. This is partially because national 
citizenship can be ‗tamed‘ and made accessible. More importantly however, this is 
because nationhood expresses an ability to open up to others.  
A closer analysis of the changing role of nations and the language of 
nationhood will challenge the idea that nations are artefacts of an old era and as such 
are becoming obsolete. I will defend the political role of the concept of the nation by 
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showing its changing value in the increasingly global world. Nations transcend their 
own borders and allow us to open up to the universal. 
* 
The task I have undertaken is not limited to the history of political thought, 
even if large parts of the argument draw heavily on the history of ideas. I believe that 
political theory has a vital explanatory role in providing us - the users of political 
language - with an understanding of the general concepts that form our political 
world. Furthermore, my project relates to the current debate between cosmopolitans 
and nationalists in the sense that it attacks some of the theoretical assumptions of 
both sides. I criticise cosmopolitanism not on ethical grounds but by showing it is a 
weak political project. It does not account for the modern self, which is formed in the 
framework provided by bounded communities. My thesis also has normative 
implications. It offers a political explanation of nationhood consistent with modern 
individualism. In fact, I will argue that the nation remains the most important vehicle 
for ‗the political‘ precisely because of the concept of self that underlies it.  
This thesis is interdisciplinary in the sense that it draws upon debates rooted 
across different literatures. In particular, the core of my argument focuses on making 
philosophical use of the research on nationhood developed within nationalism 
studies. My thesis will be most useful to political theorists working in 
cosmopolitanism, globalisation and citizenship as well as to a wider audience of 
intellectuals interested in modernity and nationalism. 
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1 
Defining the Nation as a Form of Political Experience 
The bonds of nationhood are central to the way modern polities function in the West, 
and yet the concept of the nation received little theoretical attention until the second 
half of the 20
th
 Century. It is not surprising that the term ‗nation‘ itself remains 
ambiguous. The purpose of this chapter is to attempt to tackle the immense diversity 
of understandings of this complex concept. This is further complicated by the fact 
that nationalism itself is not a uniform phenomenon. The way the German nation 
came into existence is quite different than that of the French or the English. The 
historical diversity of nations and the nation-building processes has made it 
particularly difficult to conceptualise nationhood. Whether or not members of the 
same nation share a set of common features (so called national character) has been a 
subject of philosophical debate since Hume.
14
 But is has proven hard, if not 
impossible, to identify such features. Not all nations share a common language or 
territory and it is very difficult to determine how we would identify common cultural 
features.
15
 For instance, both the Jewish and Roma nations lack a common territory 
and other nations, such as the Swiss, have incorporated multiple languages into their 
national heritage. 
However, the way we perceive national identity and nationalism has been 
greatly transformed since the time of Hume. In particular, the ethno-linguistic model 
of nationalism has been affected by the diffusion of traditional sources of identity by 
global cultural and social trends.
16
 I no longer see my national identity as necessarily 
pivotal in determining my political choices and views. Increasingly we also meet 
individuals who do not have a single national identity and the conditions of making a 
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successful claim to membership in some national communities seem to have 
weakened.
17
 Even in places where ethnic identities are relatively strong, such as 
Eastern Europe, these identities develop in recognition of, and response to, the global 
processes of internationalisation.
18
 The language of national belonging has survived 
many transformations. It is not clear how much of the original vocabulary has 
remained unchanged. But as with any language, once the network of meanings 
shifted, so did the things we can express with it. We must then ask whether that 
language continues to offer a meaningful way of understanding and being in the 
world in relation to both our moral and political existence.  
 In this chapter I argue that the concept of the nation is a key form of modern 
political experience. I will defend a specific understanding of nationhood, which 
goes beyond the distinctions between ethnic and civic definitions of nationalism on 
the one hand and particularistic and universalistic visions of politics on the other. In 
that sense I am striving to go beyond the limited understanding of the phenomenon 
of the nation offered by liberal political theory, but also to offer a normatively more 
useful one than is currently found in nationalism studies. I will show that viewing 
nationhood as a type of political experience offers a more comprehensive account of 
the the nation than when the nation is discussed simply in terms of national identity. 
Furthermore, as I will show later on in this chapter, my definition of nationhood 
highlights the ability of nations to create a common world. 
In this chapter I want to answer a basic question: ‗What sort of thing is the 
nation?‘. Section one of this chapter briefly surveys the key types of answers to this 
question to show that even though there does not seem to be a single definition of the 
nation, one can find some common features amongst key conceptualisations. Section 
two examines these common features which are: 1) that nations are constructs; 2) 
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that nations provide a way of organising our political experience by providing a 
framework of bounded rationality; 3) that, understood in this way nations represent a 
particularly modern tension between the universal and the particular. Framing the 
nation in this way leads me to evaluate the political and moral role of nation-states as 
‗limits‘ of political action in the third section. I claim that nationhood has offered the 
most historically successful basis for a common conceptual language which in turn is 
crucial to modern democracy.  
 
1.1. A Problematic Definition 
The ambiguity surrounding the definition of the terms nation and nationalism 





 centuries we find a vast literature on national character with Montesquieu and 
Hume being just two key examples of the voices in the debate.
19
 This is where we 
can recognise the basic landscape of the contemporary discussions – the questioning 
of the substantive character of national characteristics. Recent debates in nationalism 
studies focus on the process of nation-building, national self-determination and 
secession. While even now politicians and thinkers often tend to use the words 
‗nation‘, ‗ethnicity‘ ‗people‘ and ‗state‘ almost interchangeably, the development of 
nationalism studies in the 1960s highlighted complex dynamics amongst these 
concepts. The study of nationalism rather than the nation-state highlight the fact that 
1) not all nationalisms are successful as a) not all ethnic groups succeed (or aspire) to 
become nations and b) not all nations acquire statehood; as well as that 2) there is not 
a single type of nation.  
 We can find different dimensions of this debate represented within 





                                                 
19
 Charles Montesquieu, The Spirit Of The Laws ,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, 
David Hume, Political Essays, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2003. 
20
 Primodarialism is a theory within nationalism studies that claims that nations are primarily defined 
by ethnicity and as such are ancient. See for example: Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 
London, Fontana, 1973. 
21
 Modernists, in contrast, believe that the emergence of nations was linked to the modern state and 
transformations in industrial economy. See for example: Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 
 
  26 
well as in the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism.
22
 The above debates, 
while being predominantly sociological in character, have bearing on a number of 
philosophical problems, such as to what extent nations are exclusive or inclusive, 
individualist or collectivist. In particular, an overwhelming body of research shows 
that different types of nationalism transcend these binary distinctions. For example, 
Greenfeld argues that English nationalism has always been more liberal and hence 
both more individualist and civic than German nationalism which represented the 
romantic organic model.
23
 Furthermore, the distinction between civic and ethnic 
nationalism has been repeatedly criticised as misleading.
24
  
 Jonathan Hearn, in his comprehensive analysis Rethinking Nationalism, lists 
just a few main definitions of the concept of the nation. It can be understood for 
example as: 1) a combination of social solidarity, historical contingencies and 
collective will (Renan),
25
 2) a community of perceived common destiny and 
frequency of social communication (Anderson)
26
 and 3) a community based on 
kinship and descent (Connor).
27
  
I agree with Hearn that while these different perspectives on the idea of the 
nation might often seem exclusive, they represent different aspects of the complex 
phenomena of nationalism. Nationalism, according to Hearn, can be seen as a 
feeling, an identity, an ideology, a social movement, or a historical process. 




 This complexity of both the nation and nationalism is often unappreciated by 
political philosophers, including those whose work focuses on matters to do with 
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political identity. The understanding of the term ‗nation‘ can be easily limited to a 
cultural community of shared history and heritage. In the liberal tradition, Mill‘s 
account of nationhood which seeks the meaning of nationality primarily in the 
‗identity of political antecedents‘
29
 became archetypical. In other words, Mill‘s view 
of the nation was framed in terms of a common history of a people that recognise 
themselves as a nation. National identity is for Mill not a substantive bond but one 
that allows us to assign value to an individual commitment to particular community. 
Margaret Canovan argues that in this sense, liberal political theory developed a 
defence of nationalism based on viewing nationhood as a value of individuals more 
so than a type of collective identity. We should respect the desire of individuals to 
belong to a nation if their commitment is beneficial for their self-realisation.
30
 This 
understanding of nationhood is indeed useful because it highlights both the political 
(self-determination) and personal (individual identity) aspects of nationhood. 
However, there are other dimensions of the concept of the nation that the above 
definitions omit which I will now explore.  
 
1.2 Recasting the Question: What Is a Nation? 
The following section discusses the ontological problem of what nations are as well 
as the historical role of nations in providing a framework for political community in 
the form of the nation state. I argue that rather than conceptualising the nation simply 
in terms of identity, it is more accurate to think of the nation as a form of modern 
political experience. 
An individual can have many identities. Depending on social context, some 
of these identities will be more important than others and will have a more 
formatting impact on the individual. But nations are only partially sources of 
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identity. They provide a framework of recognition that exists beyond individual 
identification Whilst I can renounce my ‗Polishness‘ and consciously adopt another 
identity or I can reject the notion of identifying myself in national terms, this choice 
makes sense only in the light of my recognition of the claim that I am Polish. In other 
words, while we can consider identity a choice to a certain extent, the experience of 
belonging to a national culture is itself something that we do not choose and can 
merely take a stance towards.  
This commits me to a particular, yet relatively broad modernist view of the 
nation. I will now explicate three dimensions of nationhood as I define it as a modern 
form of political experience: 1) the nation is constructed - its existence is discursive 
(yet not completely, as will be argued later); 2) the nation allows us to participate in a 
common political world through cultivating concrete forms of practical rationality 
and language;
31
 finally, nationhood is 3) a modern form of experience which has 
developed as concept aspiring to be universal.  
 
1.2.1. First Dimension: Nations as Constructs 
The first widely accepted dimension of nationhood is that nations are ‗imagined‘ or 
‗constructed‘. While members of the same national community share certain rituals, 
symbols etc., these practices themselves are a result of a process of invention. 
Nations are constructs also in the sense that their existence is constituted by belief. 
For example, Renan famously defined the nation as an ‗everyday plebiscite‘.
32
  
Even though nations are constituted by belief, we conceive of them as 
substantive entities with historical depth. When I think of Poles, I do not imagine 
simply those fellow nationals who live now, but I am somehow directed in my 
thoughts towards all the Poles that lived before me. In particular, I might be inclined 
to think of the famous Poles who died in battles, wrote books in Polish or contributed 
in one way or the other to what we sometimes call national heritage. However, while 
it is often the case that national communities perceive themselves and their practices 
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as ancient, their antiquity is contested.
33
 Anderson saw the ability of nations to create 
their own antiquity as a nation‘s central feature. He defined the idea of the nation as 
an ‗imagined community moving through time‘.
34
 Nations thrive on stories created 
about their own past. Even today there is a tendency of talking for example about the 
history of Poland in the ninth century B.C., while the names Poland or Poles were 
not even used then.  
One should perhaps note that a nation‘s ability to create their own history is 
not necessarily unique. Rogers Smith argues that all types of political people could 
be understand as ‗imagined communities‘. The nation is, for Smith, simply the 
strongest type of modern peoplehood which can claim sovereignty over others, be it 
class groups, religious groups, or political movements such as Oxfam.
 35
 However, 
Smith‘s approach to explaining national imagination in terms of powerful narratives 
tells us only part of the story.  
 Thus, nations should not be understood simply as constructs. The power and 
longevity of nationalism could not be fully explained if the concept of the nation 
referred simply to an order created by discourse. What is then the non-discursive 
element that nationhood refers to? I find Žižek‘s reflections on national identity quite 
useful here. He defines national identity as a bond that links members of a 




The national Thing exists as long as members of the community believe in it; it is 
literally an effect of this belief in itself. The structure is here the same as that of 
the Holy Spirit in Christianity. The Holy Spirit is the community of believers in 
which Christ lives after his death: to believe in Him equals believing in belief 
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Žižek‘s analogy with the Holy Spirit (which becomes ‗materialised‘ in the institution 
and practices of the Church) seems to suggest that the nation materialises itself in the 
institutions, practices and ritual of its members. According to Žižek, the national 
Thing itself has no substance, but it cannot be reduced to belief. The relationship 
between the members of the nation and the national Thing takes the form of 
‗enjoyment‘, which refers to a specific lifestyle or set of practices that the 
community sees as their ‗thing‘. In short, while nations themselves are constructed, 
they evoke practices that create substantive ways of life. The relationship between us 
and the ways of life developed by our particular national community can, according 




Slovens are being deprived of their enjoyment by ―Southerners‖ (Serbians, 
Bosnians...) because of their proverbial laziness, Balkan corruption, dirty and 
noisy enjoyment, and because they demand bottomless economic support, 
stealing from Slovens their precious accumulation of wealth by means of which 




Žižek‘s point then is, that nationality not only expresses a common thing, but also 
establishes what the common thing is. This seemingly paradoxical form of national 
identity explains the difficulties we encounter whenever we want to come to a 
definition of what nationality is. Furthermore, there is no such national community in 
which all members enjoy the same unique lifestyle. According to Žižek, the nation 
externalises these differences amongst fellow nationals. So instead of recognising 
what differentiates me from other Poles in such a way that could prevent me from 
enjoying my way of life, I identify myself in relation to other national identities that 
do not share my way of life. These foreigners are not simply ‗others‘ as not all 
foreigners can be related to our way of life to the same extent. Žižek‘s framing of 
                                                 
37
 Op. cit., p. 202. 
38
 Op. cit., p. 201. 
39
 Op. cit., p. 204. 
 
  31 
national identity allows us to account not only for xenophobia, but also for the fact 
that many nations seem to have a specific ‗other‘ that becomes either the enemy or a 
scapegoat (depending if it is external or internal).  
 Much of Žižek‘s analysis of the nation, while expressed in a ‗new‘ language, 
tells an old story. In the end, the implications of the way he frames nationhood are 
that nationality is recognised in terms of exclusive identities built on our fantasies 
about our uniqueness. This view of the nation corresponds not only to certain types 
of ethnic nationalisms, but can also be expanded to cultural or civic nationalism. For 
example the national ‗Thing‘ that the English enjoy could be connected to a certain 
way of doing politics – the specific representative institutions, monarchy etc. So we 
can imagine that it would be particularly frustrating that the French also have a 
similar claim to being a political model.  
 Regardless of how convincing Žižek‘s language is, he seems to highlight a 
crucial aspect of nationhood. This is that it is equally wrong to think of nations as 
pure constructs as it is to think of them as substantive entities. While the concept of 
the nation cannot be identified with any objective biological, geographical or cultural 
features, nations do give rise to concrete practices and ways of life that are 
themselves not the constructs of those who follow or use them. In turn, members of a 
national community often receive their identity through their engagement with those 
practices.  
 
1.2.2. Second Dimension: Sensus Communis 
The second dimension of my understanding of nationhood is that, apart from being 
constructed by discourse, nations organise discourse. Social reality originates from 
the network of meanings through which people communicate, give themselves a 
common identity, and determine their attitude towards institutions. Social life creates 
values and norms along with systems of imaginings which articulate and conserve 
these norms. It is from the way people imagine their bonds and mutual duties that 
political language originates. Nationhood became a particularly powerful way of 
imagining our bonds in modern societies. In this sub-section I briefly explain how 
the nation serves as a community that allows us to participate in a common political 
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world. I will also argue that the concept of the nation represents an intrinsically 
political community. First I will establish that politics requires a common world. I 
will move then to exploring how this common world is formed. Finally, I will argue 
that the nation is a successful example of a framework that promotes the formation of 
a political realm.   
Politics can be defined in many ways, but whatever definition we use, they all 
seem to assume the existence of a common world - i.e. a universe in which we can 
communicate with others, make our interests known to them and give meaning to 
rights, duties and obligations. It seems to follow that we should be able to give 
account of an ability to identify that which is not common. Politics can be then seen 
as a bridge mediating between what is personal and not common on one hand and 
that which is public and common on the other. This function of politics was already 
appreciated by the Ancient Greeks, to whom the question of the relationship between 
the personal and the common was particularly problematic because of the distinction 
between doxa and episteme.
40
 
Classical philosophy identified doxa with opinion, which it understood as 
particular and subjective. Doxa is limited to practical judgements about our world 
and cannot lead us to true knowledge. Episteme is opposed to doxa not only because 
episteme is knowledge about what is universally true, but also because it undermines 
the validity of practical judgement. Plato‘s metaphor of the cave, for example, 
illustrates this tension between opinion and true knowledge with the figure of a 
philosopher, who longs for the light of the sun but cannot bear to expose himself to 
that light.
41
 Pure thought cannot relate us to the world – in Plato‘s metaphor episteme 
is blinding. This is why the pursuit of true knowledge was often associated with a 
retreat from the world or even from ourselves to the universe of abstract thought.
42
 
Consequently, neither doxa nor episteme could have become the basis for 
conceptualising politics. When politics was discovered as a unique manner of 
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organising human affairs, Ancient Greeks referred to it in terms of logos – a term 
that stands for language as well as reason.
43
 Logos represents the ability of mankind 
to communicate private interests publicly through language, making them inter-
subjective. Communicating and sharing our interests allows us to engage in a 
common world which is a condition of politics.  
The common world and our ability to engage in it are neither obvious nor 
natural. In fact, our natural dispositions are unable to take us above the level of the 
particular without reason. Consequently, that which is common in thinking can 
become problematic. If indeed episteme represents absolute knowledge of the 
universal and the eternal, and doxa can only relate us to subjective opinion, then 
neither of these can constitute the common world. The latter, because it does not 
relate to the experiences of others; the former, as it does not relate to experience at 
all.  
This raises the question of whether there is a type of thinking or reasoning 
that affirms our being in the world. One possible line of investigation is the idea that 
we can engage in the political world through practical reason. The nature of practical 
life is that our knowledge of our interests does not come from universal 
considerations but from specific choices we make within our community. The ability 
to make these particular judgments within a community that recognizes them as right 
or wrong has to come from somewhere.  
Klaus Held suggests we should seek the origins of that ability in the notion of 
practical reason (Greek phronesis).
44
 This is part of a wider tradition that refers to 
what Kant has called in The Critique of Judgment ‗a broader type of thinking‘
45
 – a 
type of reflection that allows us to move between epistemic horizons of individual 
human actors. In other words, the ability to take the position of someone else can 
allow us to make judgments and make them intelligible to others.
46
  
Since Aristotle, political theory has resisted claims to found politics on 
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universal knowledge. Although truth remains an important issue, especially in 
normative political theory, true knowledge is anti- political as it negates the plurality 
of opinions and horizons.  
 So where does this ability to move between epistemic horizons come from? 
The humanist tradition, represented especially by Vico, Shaftesbury, and Hume will 
look for it in what they refer to as sensus communis or common sense.
47
 Contrary to 
popular opinion, sensus communis is not necessarily a group of shared belief. The 
origins of the concept are twofold. On one hand we can look for it in the notion of 
phronesis which means an ability to apply general notions to particular situations and 
is responsible for practical reasoning. On the other hand we have Aristotelian 
‗common sense‘, which combines data from all five senses: sight, smell, touch, taste 
and hearing, in order to make it possible for us to recognize objects as ‗things‘ rather 
than random sets of sensations.
48
For example, when I see my friend Anna, I don‘t see 
an accumulation of isolated colours, smells, sounds and so on - but I can almost 
instantly recognize her as Anna (perhaps even before I receive all the sensations).  
The modern use of the term ‗common sense‘ takes something from both these 
notions, though it is certainly closer to the first one. These two meanings constitute 
our ability to perceive the world as given. Common sense is common because, unlike 
sensual data it perceives things as coherent examples of general types (a brick a 
stone, a stick) but unlike pure reason common sense does not undermine the sensual 
world. In short, sensus communis is an ability to recognize particular standpoints and 
make judgements in recognition to what is common and universal.  
 
The many as citizens, who form judgments based on the common sense, 
transcend their imprisonment in private worlds thanks to their openness to doxa, 
and not by practicing episteme. The political world is something ―more‖ and 
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This type of rationality that allows us to make and justify particular judgements 
cannot be grounded in universal knowledge. It requires an understanding of what is 
particular and yet can become intelligible to the community.  
Historically nations have been able to provide a type of common language 
and common set of practices and institutions to provide a basis necessary to create 
this type of common world. The nation, as I explained in the previous section, is 
itself a construct which allows us to recognise others as members of the same 
community mediated by national identity regardless of whether we know them or 
not. In the same way, nationhood allows us to relate to fellow nationals thanks to the 
shared practices and ideas of life.  
 
1.2.3. Third Dimension: Universality 
The third and final dimension of the nation as a form of political experience 
is that it represents a particularistic model of community that nevertheless creates a 
framework that opens up to universal values and norms. This is because, as I will 
argue in this section, nationalism promotes a model of an individual liberated from 
the old hierarchies of feudalism and, as a result, created a sphere in which political 
agents can interact under conditions of equality.  
While the primary experience of the individual in classical thought was the 
world and its order (kosmos), the primary experience of the modern individual is that 
of self. It is no longer possible to maintain the naturalistic disposition to the world. 
On the contrary, the world becomes more and more a world of experience - subject 
to the laws of human intellect. As I will show in Chapter Two, modern identity 
originates from the quest for self-knowledge and control. The equality of 
membership that is characteristic of modern societies
50
 means that this quest 
becomes even more difficult, as the only way of meaningful differentiation by 
referring to an external or absolute order has been lost. 
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Nationalism fills out this empty space created after the destruction of the 
concept of natural order by providing a space of equality for individuals in which 
they can seek to realise their notions of a good life within the limits of a community. 
These norms are ultimately embodied in the principles that define citizenship within 
the liberal nation-state. Nations unify, individualise, and universalise their experience 
with the modern state leading to recognition of certain values and norms as universal.  
Equality among members of a national community is a crucial disposition 
allowing for universality of political action.
51
 In pre-modern societies, other types of 
group membership (family, local community, nobility) limited the life options of 
individuals much more strongly than social status does in national communities.
52
 
For example, it is not unusual in most of today‘s liberal democratic states that a son 
of a farmer can become a politician or a civil servant. This has been made possible 
by the unifying power of nationhood.  
The link between nationalism and thus conceived individualism is not an 
obvious one. One theorist who supports this view is Liah Greenfeld, who argues that 
nationalism can be understood as the form of modern culture, inseparable from the 
development of the self. She claims that what we perceive as a plainly socio-
economic process, the formation of nation, inhibits the formation and normal 
functioning of the human mind.
53
 This, however, has both positive and negative 
effects, on one hand promoting the development of individualism and individual 
autonomy, and on the other hand leaving the individual without any ‗map‘ or ‗guide‘ 
according to which she should live her life. The lack of strong moral sources leads, 




The greater the choice one is given in forming one‘s destiny, the heavier is the 
burden of responsibility for making the right choice. The more opportunities one 
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is offered to ―find oneself,‖ the harder is to decide where to look. Life has never 
been so exciting and so frustrating; we have never been so empowered and so 
helpless. Modern societies produced by nationalism, because of their very 





I agree with Greenfeld‘s account of nationhood to the extent in which it shows that 
nationalism is not simply a product of modernisation but represents a more 
comprehensive modern mindset. Chapter Two will explore the type of self that came 
into being with modernity, and which I believe is at the heart of nationhood. 
However, understanding nationhood mostly as a function of identity as Greenfeld 
does, takes us away from understanding the political structure of the nation. In other 
words, Greenfeld‘s definition of the nation does not set sufficient limits allowing us 
to differentiate between nation, modernity, the modern state, or civil society.  
 Greenfeld‘s claim that nationhood has special implications on the mind of the 
individual and on mental health seems to be exaggerated. While it seems reasonable 
that by marginalising the role of close-knit organic communities‘ nationalism could 
have some negative effect on how we experience certain mental disorders, it seems 
far-fetched to say that a secularised and more open world needs to be a source of 
anxiety. In fact, Dusan Kecmanovic claims that there are no studies that would show 
a correlation between modern, nationalist culture and increased likelihood of mental 
disorder. Any such research would in fact be contestable as there is no comparable 
data across different time periods.
56
 Kecmanovic makes a further point in his 
discussion with Greenfeld – namely that ‗many people feel more at ease when they 
can choose (no matter how large the range of options) rather than when they are 
offered just one option.‘
57
 The new range of options that came with nationalism 
should not be treated as necessarily frustrating or confusing. 
One point of agreement between theorists is that nationalism provides an 
unprecedented unifying force. The integration of various types of peoples into one 
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community of citizens would not have been possible without nationalism. Dominique 





The citizen (in the idea of modern nationhood) is defined precisely by his ability 
to break with determinations that would stifle him in a culture and a destiny 
imposed by birth. It releases him from prescribed roles and imperative functions. 
It is this tension between the universalism of the citizen and the particularism of 
the private man as a member of civil society which shapes the principle – as well 




One should note that this egalitarian status of the democratic nation is strongly 
contestable. First, nationalism is often characterised as a top-down process. National 
consciousness was developed and indeed popularised by the educated urban elites.
60
 
Secondly, the process of creating an egalitarian national culture had arguably less to 
do with intellectual individualism and more with enforced homogenisation.
61
  
But if we take Schnapper‘s point not as an explanation of the origins of 
nationalism but the description of a new kind of experience brought about by 
nationhood, then it shows us something important about why nationhood has such 
strong claims defining membership in a political community. Modern citizenship 
originated from a tension between the particularism of the nation-state and the notion 
of universal equality that it brings about as a result. Without it, neither universal 
suffrage nor conscription would be possible. These practices are both central to the 
development of nationalism and to our understanding of citizens as equals.
62
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1.3 Implications for Supra-national Governance and Citizenship 
Framing the concept of the nation as a form of modern political experience highlights 
two aspects of nationhood significant to political theory. These are: 1) that nations 
are contingent social constructs representing a type of imagination typical of 
modernity. In this sense things ‗could have turned out differently‘ as the relationship 
between the state and the nation is not the only possible way of organising political 
community. In that sense, nations cannot be a necessary or a universal answer to the 
problems of the globe. However, 2) nations also create a framework which allows 
solidarity amongst fellow-nationals imagined as equals in liberal western 
democracies.  
 What, then, does the above understanding of nationhood mean for the 
problems of supra-national governance and citizenship? Firstly, if nationhood 
represents a type of experience, then the language of national belonging is under 
attack. This is due to the growing importance of supra-national governance, 
particularly human rights, international bodies and the implications of these 
institutions for national sovereignty. Moreover, increasing multiculturalism in 
contemporary liberal democracies has led to a blurring of individual national 
identity. What nationality shall we assign to an individual who holds a British 




 It seems that if our language was only national and did not open up to other 
levels, we could not fully understand contemporary society. There has to be a space 
for cosmopolitan emotions, allegiances and duties, but also for an inter-cultural 
dialogue. But what my exploration of the concept of the nation shows is that a 
primarily cosmopolitan language misses out on some of the key aspects of modern 
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politics. Nations are contingent but crucial aspects of modernity and any attempt to 
move beyond them should be based on an outlook that respects the place of nations 
in forming our moral and political agency as I argue in Chapter Six. This seems to 
suggest that supra-national governance is only possible if we do not discard national 




In this chapter, I have shown that our understanding of the phenomenon of nations 
should not be limited to framing nationhood as an identity but rather we should think 
of the nation as a modern form of political experience. This is because nations exist 
only in terms of 1) a constructed relationship with (to use Žižek‘s term once more) 
the ‗national Thing‘ and, 2) an established framework of bounded rationality;
64
 in 
doing so 3) this constructed framework allows all its members to participate in the 
political world on equal terms. Nationhood allows us to go beyond the particularity 
of our own experience and reach into the political world in virtue of a shared world 
rather than just a shared identity. Instead of inquiring whether national identities are 
exclusive or not, a more pressing question is whether we can find an alternative form 
that allows us to participate in the political world. While the language of nationalism 
still frames much of our discourse, with the emergence of international law and 
supra-national bodies such as the EU, we often find ourselves confused by the very 
syntax of language.  
 In the following chapters I defend the concept of the nation against its most 
powerful criticisms. In Chapter Two I refute the claim that the concept of the nation 
is inherently collectivist by showing that modern individualism is in fact facilitated 
by the idea of nationhood. This will be explored further in Chapter Five, where I 
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show that nations have historically been valuable to the promotions of individual 
autonomy and universal norms, such as human rights. The key elements of Chapter 
Five will be re-examined in the following chapter, where I argue that nations are key 
to the formation of moral and political agency due to their ability to mediate 
individual experience and create a common world. 
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2 
On the Modern Idea of the Self and Individual 
Autonomy  
‘At no time did identity become a problem; it was a problem from its birth – was born as a 





In the previous chapter I showed that the nation is a constructed community 
which has the ability to transcend particular epistemic horizons and provide a 
framework in which individuals can recognise universal norms and values. I will 
look now at the conceptual mechanism that made this transition from the particular to 
the universal possible by looking at the construction of the concept of the modern 
self. I will argue against abstract individualism that promotes an isolated view of the 
self as a subject by attempting to show that the self is dependent on both internal and 
communal tensions.  
Throughout the course of this chapter, I investigate the transformations of the 
concept of the self and the resulting implications for the modern discourse on 
individual autonomy. This discussion shows that the modern self is characterised by 
a tension between its passive/non-reflective and active/reflective dimensions. I argue 
that this tension is necessary and crucial to our understanding of modern politics 
because this dual nature of the self resonates in a paradox of individual autonomy – 
that is, though autonomy is defined as self-determination,
66
 autonomy relies on a 
notion of a self developed in a social context.  
The first part of this chapter explores the transition from the concept of the 
pre-modern self to (modern) subjectivity. I show that the modern self is defined by a 
type of dualism that was partially alien to the pre-modern understandings of the self. 
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Moreover, in modernity, the conceptualisation of the self was often based only on the 
active dimension of ‗subject‘. The two approaches to the ‗self‘, classical and modern, 
correspond historically to two different sets of political problems. The classical 
understanding of the self as a soul equipped with a body represents the problem of a 
grand ‗order‘; classical thought traditionally perceives the role of political 
philosophy as legitimizing the role of the political body as an extension of the natural 
order.
67
 However, in the modern secularised world where nature and politics are no 
longer perceived as elements of the same order, an individual‘s place in the world is 
not determined by a grand order. Politics is perceived as placed at the intersection 
between freedom of the man-made world and the determinism of nature. 
The second part of this chapter is concerned with the consequences of the 
modern dualistic view of the self for the concept of individual autonomy. I discuss 
the concept of individual autonomy and its relationship with the modern self. 







I argue that autonomy rests on ‗a notion of the self which is to be respected, left 
unmanipulated, and which is, in certain ways, independent and self-determining‘.
71 
However, the paradox of individual autonomy is that the self develops in a complex 
context based on tradition, emotional ties and authority. I illustrate this paradox by 
exploring two ‗illusions‘ of the modern self: absolute beginnings and authorship. I 
conclude that the paradoxical nature of the modern self is unavoidable and places 
necessary limits on the individual. As a part of this context, an individual can aspire 
to exercise autonomy within a political community.  
By showing the concept of individual autonomy as paradoxically rooted in a 
model of the self requiring a framework of bounded community, these reflections lay 
                                                 
67
 This has been noted by many scholars, most notably Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre and 
Benedict Anderson. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1989; Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue – A Study In Moral 
Theory, London, Duckworth, 2004; Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London, Verso, 2006. 
68
 J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
69
 Richard Lindley, Autonomy, London, Macmillan, 1986. 
70






  44 
the basis for a defence of nationhood against the accusation of collectivism. The 
claim that the concept of the nation is collectivist is a common criticism.
72
 It means 
that national identity has often been associated with a model of assimilation, where, 
in order to belong to a nation, one has to adjust one‘s beliefs to fit the national 
model.
73
 The collectivist critique can also be framed by thinking of the nation as a 
structure that imposes itself on the individual in the form of oppressive subjectivity. 
In essence, the ‗collectivist‘ accusation means that the nation infringes on the self‘s 
ability to construct itself and be a master of its own actions. The conclusions present 
in this discussion suggest that when we accuse nationalism of collectivism we offer 
an unrealistically strong interpretation of the concept of individual autonomy and 
rely on an overly narrow and unrealistic concept of the self. I will now discuss both 
types of selfhood (classical and modern) and explain the roles they play in 
transforming demands on the political.  
 
2.1. Two Types of Dualism 
The following section is concerned with our understanding of the concept of the self, 
which in modernity has had many synonyms such as ego or ‗subject‘. In the simplest 
terms, the self refers to ‗what distinguishes me from others‘ and ‗persists through 
changes‘.
74
 It is what we invoke when we say ‗I‘. Modern culture has been 
particularly pre-occupied with pursuing self-knowledge which is seen to be able to 
bring liberation and power over one‘s fate. However, our existence is socially and 
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biologically dependent on others. Family, national belonging and other types of 
strong emotional ties call our self-determination into question.
75
 However, the self 
and subjectivity do not always have to be seen in opposition to other sources of 
identity. Subjectivity itself can sometimes be interpreted as a strategy of identity or a 
way in which we constitute and defend our distinctiveness as selves. 
76
 
While the term ‗self‘ has been widely used throughout Western thought, the term 
‗subject‘ is specific to modern reflection.
77
 Those of us, who were brought up within 
the Western tradition, have a certain understanding of what ‗subject‘ is and some 
meanings are implied in words such as ‗subjective‘ and ‗subject-object‘.
78
 Yet how 
precisely should we understand this term? Is ‗subject‘ the same as the self? Some 
discourses certainly use the two terms in a very similar way. One undisputed point is 
that the idea of ‗subject‘ is modern. The concept of ‗subject‘ rests on an idea alien in 
the classical world: that truth is not an attribute of what really is, but a relationship 
between the knowing mind and external objects.
79
 The circumstances of the birth of 
this distinction will be analysed later on in this section. The word ‗subject‘ derives 
from Latin and means something that lies beneath.
80
 It can then be understood as a 
foundation or basis of something else. In psychological terms for example, 
subjectivity is the continuous basis of the processes that allow individuals to 
negotiate, acquire, and renounce their identities.  
 
Although identity is often seen as intersubjectively produced or, in other words, 
formed through social interaction, what is meant by this is sometimes no more 
than that a pre-existing (but uncultured or pre-linguistic) subject is socialised into 
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particular cultural settings. In this view identity then becomes something the 




As in the case of all historical concepts, ‗subject‘ has to be studied through a 
historical perspective. It is a particularly difficult exercise in recollection, as 
subjectivity is part of how we perceive ourselves. The fact that we understand 
ourselves as subjects is crucial to the analysis of subjectivity. And where would we 
look for the concept of the subject? Is it the Cartesian Cogito
82
 as defined by self-
knowledge, Husserl‘s ‗immanent sphere‘
83
 or perhaps Freud‘s ego?
84
  
These are just a few models of selfhood. What they have in common is that 
they serve as a basis for understanding modern identity. Thus, it is worth asking: 
what is the modern subject? What is the importance and value of the modern subject? 
Is it worth defending today?; perhaps it would be easier to herald the death of 
subjectivity - especially as the language of subjectivity is being challenged by more 
fluid models of selfhood.
85
 The modern self (‗I‘) has to constitute itself in a world to 
which it does not belong; this can mean either remaining in constant conflict with 
what is not ‗my own‘ or by transforming the world around ‗me‘ so that it becomes 
‗my own‘. And this ability is deeply embedded in our political and moral self-
awareness. Hence, to defend subjectivity does not mean so much to promote a 
particular type of personhood or political identity, but to defend the western 
intellectual tradition itself. 
In order to better understand the development of the modern self I compare 
the self with the way it was framed in classical thought. In the following section, I 
attempt to show both the continuity and discontinuity between the concept of 
‗subject‘ and its pre-modern equivalent – the soul. I will first look at the continuity 
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between the two concepts by analysing the Ancient Greek concept of the self. 
Authors such as Siegel and Perkins agree that that we can trace the roots of the idea 
of a rational reflective self back to Plato and Aristotle.
86
 I then move on to show the 
limits of that narrative. I argue that the pre-modern concept of the self is based on a 
different type of dualism than the one we find in modernity.  
 
2.1.1. The Classical World: Soul and Body 
One of the earliest stories about the pre-modern self can be found in Homer‘s tale of 
Odysseus and the Sirens.
87
 In this story, Odysseus and his crew face the threat of 
creatures which have the ability to bewitch passing sailors with their voices and 
cause them to forget who they are. The danger is of losing one‘s identity, losing the 
self.  
 
So far so good,' said she, when I had ended my story, 'and now pay attention to 
what I am about to tell you- heaven itself, indeed, will recall it to your 
recollection. First you will come to the Sirens who enchant all who come near 
them. If anyone unwarily draws in too close and hears the singing of the Sirens, 
his wife and children will never welcome him home again, for they sit in a green 
field and warble him to death with the sweetness of their song. There is a great 
heap of dead men's bones lying all around, with the flesh still rotting off them. 
Therefore pass these Sirens by, and stop your men's ears with wax that none of 
them may hear; but if you like you can listen yourself, for you may get the men 
to bind you as you stand upright on a cross-piece half way up the mast, and they 
must lash the rope's ends to the mast itself, that you may have the pleasure of 





While Homer‘s story does not provide a conceptual definition of the self, the self is 
identified with memory and identity. In this story, the desire to follow the song of the 
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Sirens is clearly threatening the coherency of the sailors‘ lives. The danger is that 
they can forget who they are if they surrender to their immediate desire.  
 The same example was used by Horkheimer and Adorno in the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. For them it represents a politically significant narrative.
89
 In Homer‘s 
story the sailors are forced to cover their ears so that they cannot hear the song; 
nonetheless, Odysseus asks to be tied to the mast so that he can hear the call at the 
same time, remaining safe from the voices that call him to the sea. The sailors avoid 
the danger of oblivion because their ability to hear the song is taken away from 
them,
90
 whereas for Odysseus the song of the Sirens becomes an object of 
contemplation. What saves him is his ability to discipline and restrict himself. The 
apparent strength of his ego is based on denial. According to Horkheimer and 
Adorno, the character of Odysseuss embodies the higher self (pure reason-
contemplation) and the sailors represent the lower self (passions).   
 What this parable illustrates outside of the context of the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment is a model of the hierarchical self based on the opposition between 
reason and passion. Like Horkhemier and Adorno, I believe that this model is 
archetypical to how mainstream Western Culture envisioned the self at the time. The 
Homeric understanding of the self was already quite complex as it referred both to 
the bodily (desires) and spiritual or reflective (reason). However, as Jarrold Siegel 
notes, it is unclear from the parable whether in Homer‘s world individuals can indeed 
exercise any rational control over their desires.
91
  
 Conditions of rationality of the self were expressed differently but 
consistently by both Plato and Aristotle.
92
 However, for both of them, rational self-
determination was a condition of political autonomy. Plato‘s view that philosophers 
should be rulers is usually seen in the literature
93
 as a direct translation of his view of 
                                                 
89
 Adorno, Theodor W. and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, London, Verso, 1997. 
90
 Op. cit., p. 33. 
91
 Jerrold Siegel, The Idea of the Self: Thought and Experience in Western Europe Since the 
Seventeenth Century, Cambridge , Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 45. 
92 
George E. Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in Agreement?, Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus 
to Porphyry, Oxford Scholars hip Online, 2006, p. 2-3. 
93 
For example: Bernard Williams, ‗The Analogy of City and the Soul in Plato‘s Republic,‘ in: 
Richard Kraut (ed), Plato’s Republic. Critical Essays, Oxford, R&L Publishers, 1997. 
 
  49 
the soul where reason is given rule over passions and desires.
94
 Perhaps more 
importantly, in some of his writings Plato identifies the soul solely with intellect.
95
 
And even though his writings on the soul are not consistent about this relationship, 
the crucial texts that elevate the place of intellect in the internal order of the soul are 




 In the parable of the cave it is through the light of reason that we are able to 
move ourselves away from the images created by senses and into the world of true 
ideas.
97
 Moreover in one of his later writings, Letter 7,
98
 Plato clearly separates 
intellect from the other faculties. While the progression from the senses to common 
sense and phronesis is continuous, the passing from reason (dianoia) to intellect 
(nous) is ‗a spark of the gods‘.
99
  
 Even Aristotle, who does not believe in the duality of the two worlds of 
appearance and being as Plato does, could not escape from giving some sort of 
autonomy from the material world to intellect (active reason).
100
 In his treatise De 
Anima, Aristotle says that even though individuals possess passive reason as part of 
their natural ability to grasp the qualities of the world, it is through active reason that 
individuals are able to abstract and construct knowledge.
101
 This form of reason is 
what Aristotle calls the divine element
102
 and he seems to suggest that it is the only 
part of the human soul that is immortal.
103
 However, it is unclear if active reason can 
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indeed be seen as part of the soul because, as Siegel notes, depending on how we 
read Aristotle, active reason is not always portrayed as individual.  
In fact, Siegel argues that in many ways the Aristotelian concept of the soul 
was not much different from the modern idea of the self, meaning the individual 
entity every person is. He goes on to say that because the human soul was seen by 
Aristotle both as the principle of life and the principle of thought, Aristotle‘s theory 
did not separate mind and body as radically as Descartes later did. 
104
  
However, Taylor argues that the classical concept of the self rests on the 
distinction between what is immaterial and material, invisible and visible or 
‗immanent and transcendent‘, ‗worldly and heavenly‘.
105
 This is why the self is often 
identified with the soul, even in the case of the writers who found the whole 
distinction between soul and body problematic.  
Classical philosophy understood our cognition of the world as mostly passive, 
so that falsity was a product of the inaccuracy of our senses and not of any structural 
fault in cognition.
106
 As a result, our place in the world becomes unproblematic. 
Society was supposed to imitate and be an extension of the natural order. Thus, we 
can see the analogy between the constitution of the soul, our bodily organs and 
society in the works of such philosophers as Plato and Aristotle. For them, the 
question about the best type of government was intrinsically linked to the problem of 
what it means to be a good man. Charles Taylor describes this as the key feature of 
pre-modern societies: 
 
Traditional societies were founded on differentiation: royalty, aristocracy, 
common folk; priests and laymen; free and serf, and so on. This differentiation 
was justified as a reflection of a hierarchical order of things. [...] Man could only 
be himself in relation to a cosmic order; the state claimed to body forth this order 
and hence to be one of man‘s principal channels of contact with it. Hence the 
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power of organic and holistic metaphors: men saw themselves as parts of society 




The problem of the relationship between man and the cosmic order, which was 
mirrored by the distinction between visible and invisible, was one of the main issues 
for both ancient and Christian philosophy. If there is a classical problem of the self, 
then it can be summarized in the ancient proverb, allegedly set on the temple in 
Delphi: ‗Know Thyself‘.
108
 By understanding the internal order of the soul, man is 
promised to find harmony with himself and with nature. This is a point Taylor makes 
in The Sources of the Self when he says that it is through understanding the duality of 
the world which consists of things eternal and changing
109
 and through concentrating 
on the former that we can lead a good life.
110
 
In contrast, the next section argues that the modern concept of ‗subject‘ rests 
on the opposition between the inside and the outside which partially springs from a 
separation of the spiritual and the bodily.  
Classical thought represents a holistic and passive
 111
 representation of the 
self. First, it is holistic because, while acknowledging the distinction between the 
spiritual and the material, classical thought sees the soul as encompassing both the 
spiritual and the material. Second, classical thought is passive as it treats our 
cognitive engagement with the world as essentially unproblematic and because it 
places moral sources outside of the individual. In fact, Siegel argues that it is 
precisely because the self is not radically separate from the body (for either Plato or 
Aristotle), the self has to be seen as part of a broader teleological order.
112
 As a 
result, we need to seek the idea of a good life, which may be external to any moral 
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reasons – for example because that is what God wills, or because it expedient.
113
 For 
instance, Gerald Dworking argues that, while the classical view based morality on 
obedience (as it assumed that people are too weak-willed to behave badly), in 
modernity morality becomes about self-governance.
114
 This aspect of the classical 
self will be particularly important to my discussion on autonomy in section 2.2. 
Having briefly portrayed the idea of the self in the classical world, I will now move 
on to the evolution of the idea of the self in modernity.  
 
2.1.2. Modern Self: ‘Subject’ vs. ‘Object’ 
Before we can investigate the modern self, we should first define what we mean by 
modernity. I will understand modernity very broadly as the intellectual framework 
that was mostly shaped in the period between the 15
th
 century and the early 20
th
 
century. It starts with the fall of scholastics (such as Anselm of Canterbury, Peter 
Abelard and Thomas Aquinas)
115
 and the reinstatement of philosophy as a discipline 
independent from theology. Its end is marked by the fall of the great philosophical 
systems and the emergence of the anti-humanist movement (such as Nietzsche, Freud 
and Heidegger).
116
 In that sense modernity should not be confused with 
contemporary thought or modernism, which is a particular strand within 
contemporary debates. However, apart from marking a historical period, modernity 
can also be understood as a specific form of predominantly Western and, at its 
origins, European culture, which does not belong solely to the past. There are still 
values and concepts that we understand as ‗modern‘ in that sense, among which there 
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One of the key concepts of the thus-defined framework of modernity is the 
‗self‘ or ‗subject‘. In a way this is surprising because the term itself was not popular 
in philosophical literature until the late 17
th
 century; even through the 18
th
 century it 
was rarely and narrowly used, principally in opposition to the subjective-objective.
118
 
The term ‗subject‘ only became crucial to modernity retrospectively and as a concept 
attributed to conscious beings.
119
 To be ‗subject‘ meant first and foremost to have a 
privileged and active epistemological position in the world.
120
 In order to further 
unpack this concept of the modern ‗subject‘ the following section addresses the birth 
and development of the idea of the modern self. I will examine briefly the route that 
led to identifying the self with consciousness. I will then show that modernity 
produced alternative understandings of the self and that the tension between them is 
deeply political.  
While both Platonic and Aristotelian thought place politics in a broader framework 
of the order of being and the structure of the human soul, the modern concept of the 
self is uprooted.
121
 With secularism, the world ceases to be internally ordered. There 
is no cosmic principle to discover; the only way for an individual to find their place 
in this world is to look into themselves. As we no longer have a pre-given place in 
the world, we have to reinvent that order instead, and define ourselves in relation to 
what is ‗outside‘ of us. This binary nature of modern identity divides the world into 
‗outside‘ and ‗inside‘, ‗I‘ and ‗other‘. It is exactly in that binary tension that the 
modern self develops.
122
   
One theorist who attempts to give a detailed account of this process of 
forming the modern self is Charles Taylor. In his book, Sources of the Self. The 
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Making of the Modern Identity, he traces the genealogy of the key elements of 
modern identity. These are: 1) modern inwardness, or the sense of ourselves as 
beings with inner depths and the connected notion that we are ‗selves‘, 2) the 
affirmation of ordinary life and 3) an expressive notion of nature as an inner moral 
source.
123
 Here I will only focus on the first element, modern inwardness, as the 
other two are more relevant to Taylor‘s own investigation of the moral sources.
124
  
According to Taylor, the concept of the self is particular to modernity and is 
an invention limited both historically and geographically. As he notes: ‗In every 
language there are resources for self-reference and descriptors of reflexive thought, 
action, attitude [...]. But this is not at all the same as making ‗self‘ into a noun, 
preceded by a definite or indefinite article, speaking of ‗the‘ self, or ‗a‘ self.‘
125
 
It is exactly this transformation of the self into a noun that, according to 
Taylor, differentiates the modern moral world from the ancient. Taylor shows us that 
the notion of respect for human beings - which is at the centre of modern ethics – is 
emblematic of the changes in our understanding of identity. In the classical world, 
we were subject to the law of nature. But with modernity, Taylor claims, we no 




This point becomes clearer when we look at Locke‘s theory of natural rights. 
What distinguishes this theory from the classical concept of natural law is not the 
‗religious bit‘, but the location of ‗right‘ within ‗subject‘.
127
 The passing from the 
law of nature to natural rights is a step towards political recognition, but also 
represents a move toward inwardness. Thus, the modern notion of respect that comes 
from this concept of the self is different to the classical one. Being based solely on 
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the recognition of the moral autonomy of individuals, it cannot be earned or lost.
128
 
Taylor tries to show how these notions of moral autonomy and modern identity 
evolved together in early modernity.  
 
To know who I am is a species of knowing where I stand. My identity is defined 
by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon 
within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, 




Charles Taylor traces the origins of the concept of the modern self in three major 
theoretical steps. The first step is Plato‘s notion of self mastery. Taylor explains how 
Plato‘s moral theory is based on a hierarchical model of the soul. According to this 
model, we are virtuous only when our desires and emotions are subject to reason.
130
 
The rule of reason in the individual soul mirrors the rational harmony of the universe 
(kosmos) and through knowledge of that rational order we can exercise our own 
reason. Virtue, then, comes from knowing about good. According to Taylor‘s reading 
of Plato, acting on emotion or desire takes us away from the truth and from good. For 
Taylor, this is the origin of the modern idea of rationalism: ‗to consider something 
rationally is to take a dispassionate stance towards it. It is both to see clearly what 
ought to be done and to be calm and self-collected and hence able to do it [...].‘
131
 
Thus, to be rational means to be truly a master of oneself.  
In Plato‘s theory, the self can be located in a single place – the mind. In 
earlier Greek writings - and especially in Homer - the soul would be identified with 
bodily locations.
132
 It could be divided just like the body and did not differ from it 
substantively. Plato also uses the term ‗soul‘ in this way. However, he starts using 
the same word to refer solely to the higher human faculty of the mind. Unlike reason, 
                                                 
128
 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity, Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1989, p. 12. 
129
 Op. cit., p. 27. 
130
 Op. cit., p. 115. 
131
 Op. cit., p. 116. 
132
 Jerrold Siegel, The Idea of the Self: Thought and Experience in Western Europe Since the 
Seventeenth Century, Cambridge , Cambridge University Press, 2005.  
 
  56 
Plato perceives the mind as a unitary space.
133
 For Plato, to be ourselves is to be in 
control of our faculties and to be thoughtful and conscious of ourselves. The opposite 
of the self is not the outside world but is instead the body. Sleep, rage, sorrow and 
thoughtlessness are all for Plato moments when we lose ourselves.  
The opposition between the ‗inside‘ and the ‗outside‘ becomes central to the 
concept of the self much later with the development of Christianity. This 
transformation that Taylor calls ‗internalization‘ consists in a replacement of Plato‘s 
understanding of the dominance of reason by another - ‗in which the order involved 
in the paramountcy of reason is made, not found.‘
134
 In order to show this, Taylor 
refers to Augustine‘s concept of the inner light (lumen naturele).
135
 In Taylor‘s 
reading of Augustine, even though good and truth are aspects of God, they cannot be 
found through exploration of the outside world. God‘s creation speaks of God‘s 
might; however, the only true road to God lies inwards.
136
 This is perhaps why 
Augustine‘s inquiry takes the form of confessions, as confessions are a type of 
personal journey. According to Taylor, this cognitive turn is the beginning of a road 
leading to the concept of radical reflexivity.  
 
Radical reflexivity brings to the fore a kind of presence to oneself which is 
inseparable from one‘s being the agent of experience, something to which access 
by its very nature is asymmetrical: there is a crucial difference between the way I 





For Taylor, the final step in the process of internalisation was made by Descartes. 
What for Augustine was a search for transcendent sources of our existence by 
reaching into the human soul, for Descartes is, according to Taylor, an autonomous 
and self sufficient process. This is because Descartes identifies the self with the 
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thinking substance. The aim of Descartes‘ enquiry was to establish what we can 
know for certain. In order to do that, he puts into doubt the validity of his own beliefs 
about the world, searching for a type of knowledge that can withstand this process.
 
138
 He comes to the conclusion that even though we can doubt in the existence of the 
object of our doubting, we cannot doubt in the existence of the thinking subject 
without self-contradiction.
139
 Thus, our own existence as thinking subjects is the first 
and most basic principle of knowledge. The existence of our body, however, 
according to Descartes, does not possess the same level of clarity and certainty.  
 
 I rightly conclude that my essence consist only in my being a thinking thing, 
being a thinking thing [or a substance whose whole essence or nature is merely 
thinking]. And although I may, or rather, as I will shortly say, although I 
certainly do possess a body with which I am very closely conjoined; 
nevertheless, because, on the one hand, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, 
in as far as I am only a thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other hand, 
I possess a distinct idea of body, in as far as it is only an extended and unthinking 
thing, it is certain that I [that is, my mind, by which I am what I am] is entirely 




Taylor‘s account of Descartes could be seen as somewhat one-sided. Siegel, for 
instance, notes that the Cartesian subject, in Descartes‘ own thought, is not as 
independent as is sometimes perceived. Siegel reminds us that it is God who, in the 
end, has to rescue the self from not being able to know the world.
141 
In this sense, 
Descartes‘ theory is not entirely revolutionary and does not, according to Siegel, 
perceive the subject as the sole agent of activity.
142
  
 It could also be argued that Taylor‘s view of the development of the self 
overvalues the reflective element of selfhood. Taylor‘s aim in the end is to portray 
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human beings as ‗self-interpreting animals‘ who find their identity by existing in the 
space of moral questions.
143
  
The moment in the history of philosophy when the self became identical with 
the thinking substance is crucial for the development of modern subjectivity. This is 
because consciousness is not part of the world in the same way as body is. Body is 
subject to laws of nature and, according to Descartes, it can be explained purely 
mechanistically. Consciousness, on the other hand, cannot be understood simply as a 
mechanism. Thinking is independent from body and is subject to its own laws. This 
concept of the independence of the self is a crucial step in a long process of forming 
the concept of the individual autonomy, as we will see further in the next section. 
 Descartes‘ move to place body outside of the self by objectivising it as an 
object of our experience as thinking subjects also meant that the universe no longer 
presented itself as a model for the self. The criterion of truth is no longer the reality 
outside of us but the clarity with which we think. In this sense the self becomes 
independent and cannot find itself in the world. Descartes‘ cogito situates moral 
sources within us.
144
 But this now becomes a political problem, because there is no 
way of knowing other individuals than through their bodies. And Descartes does not 
provide us with a persuasive answer about how to conceptualise the connection 
between the thinking substance and matter. In other words, by making us think of 
ourselves as thinking ‗selves‘, Descartes‘ model of the self does not offer an 
explanation as to how we can construct political subjectivity. How can ‗I‘ transform 
to ‗We‘?  
The three main features of the ‗subject‘ understood as the ‗thinking thing‘ 
are: inwardness, reflexivity, and rationality. Firstly, inwardness refers to the above-
described localisation of the sources of the self within the ‗subject‘. It divides the 
world of our experience into the subjective and the objective. This dichotomy 
represents a type of dualism other than the classical opposition between soul and 
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body. As Taylor notes, in Plato‘s dualism (repeated in Christian thought), the world 
is divided between spiritual and material; self has to be located in relation to both. 
But with modernity, the division is between inside and outside.
145
 This is because 
consciousness is not part of the world in the same way as the body is. The existence 
of our body, according to Descartes, does not possess the same level of clarity and 
certainty.
146
 Thinking is then perceived as being independent from the body – it is 
‗subject‘ to its own laws. This is why inwardness results in a specific idea of 
autonomy of ‗subject‘. 
 Secondly, reflexivity can be understood as an ability of the consciousness to 
turn on itself. It is, as Siegel suggests, an ability of the mind to ‗see cognition as a 
source of understanding not only of the things but also of the self‘.
147
 In this sense 
‗subject‘ has the inherent ability to take on both an active and a passive role. It is this 
ambiguity that will also make ‗subject‘ a key political notion for modernity, because 
it allows us to question the ‗necessity‘ of the existing political and social structures. 
Having said that, different theories will assign various levels of activity to 
‗subject‘. As Siegel notes, the radical empiricist tradition perceives the Humean 
stance on ‗subject to be completely passive.
148
 On the other hand, Kant views all 
experience as possible only because it is actively conditioned by the ‗subject‘.
149
  
 Finally, I differentiate between rationality and reflexivity to indicate another 
quality that springs from identifying ‗subject‘ with consciousness. When Descartes 
differentiates between the thinking substance and what he calls extensive substance 
(matter), he also claims that they belong to different orders. The mind is a sphere of 
freedom limited only by reason. Matter, on the other hand, submits to mechanical 
laws of nature and is a realm of necessity. Therefore, the human condition is to be 
able to will everything, but be limited by nature in doing so. The role of reason is to 
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However, because the modern self is both rational and reflexive, it is a 
‗subject‘ of technical rationality. Our understanding of ourselves is also technical in 
the sense that our self-understanding can and does serve as a tool enabling us to 
transform ourselves.  
This ability to reflectively redefine oneself is crucial to the modern notion of 
individual autonomy. In his book Retreat from the Modern, Nicholas Rengger 
identifies this as the main question of modern humanism: what should we will?
151
 
For Kant, this is the central question of philosophy and one he believes to be 
historically conditioned. Asking the above-mentioned question requires a certain 
level of autonomy that Kant believes only became possible in his time due to the 
progressive policies of enlightened monarchies in Europe.
152
 Kant‘s generally 
pessimistic view of mankind is then balanced with his belief in a mutually 
perpetuated political and moral enlightenment.  
However, one response to this view of the idea of individual autonomy is that 
the way we define ourselves is itself only meaningful in a social context; it is this 
interplay between subjective and inter-subjective elements which constitutes the 
modern ‗subject‘. However, we are then faced with the problem of whether this 
‗subject‘ possesses individual autonomy, whether it can be understood as its own 
author or whether it is a product of the power relations constituting society.  
 
2.2. The Tension within the Modern Self and the Paradox of Individual Autonomy. 
The previous section showed the inherent tension within the concept of the self, 
specifically between its active and passive dimensions. The idea of the emancipation 
of the individual based on self-creation is put into question by the existence of 
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nations, communities, social classes and cultures. Or, as Siegel argues, by 
consequently showing the dependence of the allegedly independent and universal 
selves from biology, history, power or culture.
153
 
The tension between the passive and active elements of the self is a key 
feature of modernity. The Cartesian ego which sprung as a radical consequence of 
dualism has grounded the way in which we think about our freedom but has not 
provided a way to understand both our belonging in the world and to society. If the 
self is identical with consciousness it becomes separated from the outside but also 
from itself. The self cannot know itself without division, and this is where the actual 
opposition of the subject and object is born. The combination of two worlds into one 
comes then with the price of dividing the subject. This translates into a political 
problem as modern society is based on both: the radical notion of freedom plus the 
modern self on one side and a deep sense of national belonging on the other.
154
  
In this section, I explore the link between the idea of the modern self and 
individual autonomy. Here, I will show that the way we conceptualise the modern 
self views autonomy as the primary problem of modern selfhood.
155
 I will start by 
discussing the definition of the concept of individual autonomy and then move on to 
how focusing on autonomy created dilemmas for the modern political self.  
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principle was to be achieved by abandoning reason, through some intuition inarticulable in rational 
terms, then we have in fact sacrificed the essential.‘ (Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979, p. 12) The Romantic vision of a man as an expressive 
unity is powerful, but one sided. In the same way as rationalism has problems with understanding 
belonging, expressivism does not offer a language in which to talk about our choices, rights and 
duties.  
155
 Even if complete autonomy is an illusion (it is impossible to think of individuals outside of any 
network of reference – human beings are biologically dependant on others), autonomy became one of 
the most pursued ideals in modernity. 
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2.2.1. The Concept of Autonomy  
The word ‗autonomy‘ comes from ancient Greek and generally is a combination of 
two Greek words: ‗self‘ and ‗rule‘ or ‗law‘.
156
 It is, like most philosophical concepts, 
notoriously ambiguous and often used interchangeably with self-determination, 
freedom, self-creation, authorship and independence. Definitions of autonomy range 
from relatively narrow and strict to broad and weak. An example of the former can 
be Robert Wolf‘s view, in which he defines autonomous action as such that can only 
originate from one‘s own desires. In that sense, any external authority contradicts our 
autonomy.
157
 Politics then is a sphere of subjugation. The latter is represented by Joel 




 There are generally two elements common to most modern definitions of 
autonomy: firstly, that autonomy has something to do with being free and, secondly, 
that we can prescribe autonomy only to rational beings. I will explore both of these 
ideas in turn.  
 First, freedom is often confused with autonomy. This is partially because 
some historical conceptions of freedom do indeed relate to both terms. For example, 
in Berlin‘s famous discussion of positive liberty he states: ‗I wish to be a subject, not 
an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by 
causes which affect me, as it were, from outside.‘
159
 Berlin develops an idea of 
freedom which seems to be co-extensive with autonomy or self-rule. In contrast, his 
concept of negative freedom does not include any requirements concerning 
autonomy, but is limited to the lack of coercion.
160
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 However, Richard Lindley argues that freedom and autonomy are two quite 
different concepts. He uses the example of deceiving a patient in order to convince 
her to agree to a specific treatment. In this example, the patient is not restrained and, 
consequently, can exercise freedom of action. If we were to criticise deception in this 




 Second, rationality is often cited as a condition of autonomy. Lindley sees 
this view of autonomy as rooted in Kant‘s theory, according to which one needs to be 
a fully rational agent to be considered fully autonomous. However, Lindley argues 
that Kant‘s requirement of rationality is too strict because it assumes that the true 




 Lindley suggests that the rationality condition should be treated more 
broadly. In his view, rationality is ascribed not when an individual‘s actions are 
motivated by desires, but by an individual‘s ability to choose which desires are 
motivational.
163
 Rationality is thus a quality associated not with higher intellectual 
functions, but is simply the possession of will. Human beings are rational, according 
to Lindley, and prawns are not: ‗Prawns cannot be judged in terms of autonomy/ 
heteronomy not because they are irrational but non-rational.‘
164 
Autonomy is then a quality assigned to free and rational creatures. But these 
are only necessary conditions of autonomy. In order to call a person autonomous, we 
require one other quality – authorship. Dearden points to this quality when he 
mentions that ‗a person is ‗autonomous‘ to the degree that what he thinks and does 
cannot be explained without reference to his own activity of mind.‘
165
 When we 
demand autonomy, we want more than to be left alone, we demand (or claim 
possession of) the means to our own independent thought and action. It is this 
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particular element of the concept of autonomy that is most interesting in relation to 
political theory. To become autonomous, we must first develop agency.
166
 Thus, not 
everyone has the capacity to claim autonomy, because we can only claim authorship 
if we can claim agency. Infants, for instance, do not have this type of autonomy. This 
is where the concept of autonomy intersects with the idea of the modern self. As 
explained earlier in this chapter, the modern self is defined by its struggle to 
constitute itself as an active subject.  
 
2.2.2. Authorship and the Dilemma of the Modern Self 
Authorship is a concept central to both the concept of autonomy and the idea of the 
modern self. Within modern individualist society being an author is a unique quality. 
This section investigates what it means that the self is an author and explores the 
political implications of demanding authorship. Drawing on Eyal Chowers‘ concept 
of ‗entrapment‘
167
 I will continue to show how the tension within the modern concept 
of ‗subject‘ affects our understanding of the political and the demands we place on 
political community. I agree with Siegel, that the type of autonomy associated with 
authorship rests on a one-sided and largely inaccurate view of the self. We can only 
reach autonomy in the sense offered by authorship if we choose a fully reflective 




The concept of authorship is ambiguous; it refers to two distinct phenomena 
which are often confused when we use the word casually. Firstly we refer to 
authorship when we want to say that a ‗thing‘ – an article, a book, a piece of music – 
was written by a person or a group of people. The term authorship describes here a 
special relationship between the author and the world. An article, a book or a piece of 
music are supposed to represent something unique about the author.
169
 They are 
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expressions of his or her inner self, perhaps even the soul. When we think about 
authorship in this way, we assume that authors are somehow unique. And it is this 
uniqueness that grants special value to the author‘s words and deeds. As authors we 
are responsible for the final outcome of our work and, hence, we are entitled to ask 
Homer ‗What did you want to say in your story about Odysseus and the Sirens?‘. 
Moreover, on meetings with an author, we seek to learn something secret about their 
work, something otherwise hidden to non-authors.  
The second meaning of the word author refers to the relationship the author 
has with herself. I understand this as a claim that the self is partly or completely in 
control of its interpretations. In other words, we are the creators of the image of 
ourselves and have the ability to transform ourselves according to who we want to 
be. This ability to reinterpret oneself is based on the belief that an individual can 
constantly ‗start from the beginning‘. The claim that this is, in fact, a key element of 
the modern ‗subject‘ seems today a truism, particularly when we consider the link 
between individualism and authorship in popular culture and everyday life. The 
motto to ‗be yourself‘ can be found not only in pop music or advertising but is used 
in all parts of culture as well as in education and politics. From a young age, we learn 
that we are unique ‗subjects‘ and that the purpose of our development as selves is not 
to reproduce knowledge but to be original 
We see then that the modern self is characterized by a permanent desire to 
reconstitute itself. The imperative to always start from the beginning has become a 
basic principle of science and – with the idea of the revolution
170
 – of politics. 
Nothingness is its natural starting point. However, as nature knows no such thing as 
nothingness, it becomes the task of a theorist to create it. In a fight against 
prejudgment and prejudice,
171
 everything that is has to be deconstructed. 
Fetishisation of the absolute beginning and its power is a product of the same 
metaphysical thinking that modernity and especially enlightenment were trying to 
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avoid.
172
 It would be impossible to understand the tensions that torment the concept 
of a rational individual without this idea of absolute beginning. 
I differentiated between the two meanings of the word authorship: 1) as the 
relation between the author and the world and 2) as the relationship between the 
author and herself. What the two different meanings of ‗authorship‘ have in common 
is that they both relate to a conception of ‗subject‘ that is autonomous and in control 
of its representations and products. This conception is, of course, contestable. For 
instance, Foucault‘s essay What is an Author?, criticises the importance our culture 
attaches to authorship.
173
 He suggest that we should think rather of authors as 
products of their times.
174
 Moreover, he investigates why we see culture and society 
as expressions of individuality. One example Foucault gives is the customary order 
to display and search for books in a bookstore where books are ordered according to 
author. Foucault asks if it would not be equally possible to have books grouped 
according to writing styles, themes or length.
175
 Foucault convinces us that this 




Moreover, one can argue that the language we use to reinterpret and develop 
ourselves exists only within a community. The words and images used to interpret 
ourselves carry meanings that we cannot necessarily intend or anticipate. In that 
sense we do not have full autonomy in the way we constitute ourselves because we 
are limited by the inter-subjectivity of language.
177
 All in all, the danger of looking at 
the self mainly as an author is obvious – we simply do not possess the necessary kind 
of autonomy in our social and cultural environment.  
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But it is the second meaning of the word authorship – the relationship 
between the author and self - that is most misleading. For the relationship between 
the self and the world is unlike the one between the self and one‘s own interpretation 
of the self. There is an inherent duality between ‗I‘ and the world. But when we think 
about the self in terms of authorship, we inevitably understand it as split in two. As a 
result we objectify not only the world but also ourselves. The ‗subject‘ exists in that 
divided space between the self-made ‗I‘ and the self-made world. But this creates a 
paradox. How can ‗I‘ be a passive ‗subject‘ of society with a duty to conform to its 
norms, and also an autonomous individual?  
This is the political dilemma of the modern self. According to Eyal Chowers, 
this is because ‗only the I that I think and intuit is a person; the I that belongs to the 
object that is intuited by me is, similarly to other objects outside me, a thing‘.
178
 He 
argues that claims to authorship result in a conflict between the individual and the 
social world.  
Chowers shows while individuals gained freedom and authorship in early 
modernity, they also became susceptible to the threat of subjection.
179
 He argues that 
we should look for the causes of this phenomenon in the collapse of the idea of 




 centuries which resulted in two different views. The 
first view, represented by Kant and Condorcet, claimed that the self was finally 
awaking from its slumber and with the progress of society, mankind will finally 
reach full maturity.
180
 The second view, which Chowers assigns to Herder, states that 
mankind lacks the necessary knowledge and ability to control the social world it 
created.
181
 As a result of these conceptual transformations, the later popular 




 century exemplified the fear that the products of our 
reason will chain us to a uniform and degrading existence.
182
 Chowers believes that 
the tension between reason and nature is something inherent to the modern ‗subject‘ 
itself. This duality of the modern self was according to Chowers best described by 
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Kant‘s distinction between ‗subject‘ and ‗object‘. For Kant, because we are 
‗subjects‘ we are free – we belong to the noumenal world (the world of things in 
themselves). However, as objects of knowledge we become part of the phenomenal 
world and are consequently bound by the laws of nature.
183
  
Chowers‘ discussion sheds light on the idea of individual autonomy because 
it shows how this autonomy is dependent on a particular view of the self, which he 
sees as problematic. Thus, autonomy understood not simply as freedom but 
authorship, is not only impossible but counter-productive – it alienates us both from 
ourselves and the world. However, I do not think this is entirely the case. In the 
following section I seek a solution to the dilemma of entrapment.  
 
 
2.3. A Way Out? 
While it is true that there is a tension between the passive and active dimensions of 
the modern ‗subject‘, it does not necessarily follow that we need to overcome it. 
What Chowers describes as entrapment is not a condition of the modern self but its 
primary experience – a way in which it defines itself within social and moral space 
and thus makes autonomy possible. In her article ‗From Freedom without choice to 
choice without freedom: The Trajectory of the Modern Subject‘ Cornelia Klinger 
remarks:  
 
Modern subjectivity is torn between the impulse to rejoice at the loss of the 
fetters of origin, tradition, and conventional wisdom of all kinds on the one 





Klinger argues that modernity is characterised by two divergent directions: 
rationalisation and subjectivisation. Even though both currents within the modern 
culture spring from the same founding experience of liberation from the constraints 
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of the holistic order,
185
 they understand achieved autonomy differently. 
Rationalisation, which refers to a belief in reason and rationality and the objectivity 
that these can provide, defines autonomy in terms of efficiency and utility. 
Subjectivisation on the other hand, referring to both the individual and the collective 
self, defines autonomy in terms of ‗subject‘ no longer being assigned rank in a grand 
order.
186
 In other words, rationalization represents the technical aspect of modernity. 
This drive for making the world rational and ‗subject‘ to our will is reflected in 
modern science, economy and law. It is perhaps best understood in the image of an 
18
th
 century ethnologist who travels the world in search of new species of insects to 
catch, pin and catalogue. Klinger argues that rationalisation differentiates and 
divides. Subjectivisation is, according to her, the opposite process that centres on 
‗subject‘.
187
 Klinger‘s central claim is that in modernity the identity of the self is 
born from a search for re-embeddedness. So, according to her, Simmel‘s law that 
‗Individuality of being and doing unfolds [...] in the same measure as the social 
context of the individual expands‘
188
 is, for most of that period, correct. 
 More specifically, Klinger attempts to show that the modern ‗subject‘ gained 
its ‗inner depth‘ through maintaining an alterity
189
 towards society and political 
institutions.
190
 The modern ‗subject‘ is on the crossroads between celebrating its 
uniqueness and the desire to be like everyone else. In my opinion, no one describes 
this burden of identity of having to be a self better than Nietzsche (see also Chapter 
Seven).
191
 Heidegger also saw this tension, which he expressed in the concept of 




 However, according to Klinger, Simmel‘s law loses its validity in the 
postmodern era. Klinger attributes this to the decline of family, class, nation and 
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other sources of substantive collective identities leading to a dominance of rationality 
over subjectivity. As a result, we find ourselves in what Klinger calls a no-win 
situation, that being a world offering neither freedom nor identity.
193
 According to 
Klinger the modern ‗subject‘ progresses from ‗a freedom that proved to be without 
choice to innumerable choices without freedom‘
194
 because ‗the subject that would 
be able to enjoy this new freedom vanishes‘.
195
 This is, of course, a variation of a 
well known argument that in the marketplace of contemporary culture the individual 
loses itself in its choices.
196
 Klinger argues that in late modernity when the traditional 
sources of meaning were lost and replaced by a commercialised production of 
meaning, the distinction between subjectivity and rationalization was abolished.
197
 
At the same time, Klinger‘s argument is set against both the mainstream 
postmodern theory of subjectivity and what she calls ‗fundamentalism‘. The former 
group sees globalisation as an opportunity to free the self from the constraints which 
were characteristic to the concept of the modern ‗subject‘.
198
 The latter group 
represents an attempt to re-assert traditional foundations of identity – nation, class 
and family. While we often see the clash between these two outlooks as a debate 
between pre-modern, perhaps even classical, culture and postmodernity, Klinger 
does not believe this is the case. For her, there is no clear distinction between 
modernity and what is sometimes called the ‗postmodern‘ era. 
  
While modernity is defined in sharp contrast to a pre-modern phase of history, by 
a clear-cut break in the flow of time, as expressed in the metaphor of revolution, 




In fact, Klinger argues that the decline of modern sources of subjectivity is part of 
the process of modernisation which is accelerating at a rate never before 
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experienced.
200
 What is dangerous about this process is that, as I have shown above, 
Klinger believes that both subjectivity and rationalisation are necessary components 
of individualism.  
A somewhat similar way of dealing with the tension between subjective and 
rational components of the self is offered by Siegel. In his opaque work The Idea of 
the Self, Siegel argues that we can find three separate dimensions of selfhood within 
modernity: bodily, relational and reflective.
201
 The bodily dimension of selfhood 
places the sources of selfhood in individual passions and needs. The first dimension 
of selfhood is evoked when we identify ourselves with our deepest, often 
subconscious, desires and believe they are key to explaining our actions.
202
 
According to Siegel, the relational aspect is usually culture-specific and relates to our 
social identity and place in society, the most radical example being Marxism.
203
 
Finally, the reflective dimension of selfhood is defined by a specific notion of 
rational autonomy or self-determination. The self is here defined as being 
independent from passions and needs as well as external conditions. We are 
perceived as masters of our own fate. 
For Siegel these three dimensions of the self are not exclusive but necessarily 
remain in a state of continuous interplay. He claims that even though the most radical 
and perhaps theoretically stimulating are one-dimensional versions of self, a more 
multi-dimensional model of the self avoids reductionism.
204
 One-dimensional 
concepts of the self are faulty because they create disharmony between the self and 
the world. They create a false opposition between authorship and determination, 




What intrigues me is that Siegel believes that whenever we think of the 
concept of the self as primarily reflective, we place demands on it that that are 
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simply too high. The radical freedom of thought that the Cartesian ego postulates 
cannot be fulfilled in the world.
206
 But that is an irrational expectation. In fact Siegel 
notes that the Cartesian ego itself ‗suddenly enters into the truth of its own self-
reflectional subjectivity just at the point when its subjection to worldly confusion and 
uncertainty seems complete‘.
207
 In order to bring harmony back between the self and 
the world we need to resign from this notion of radical freedom. Siegel calls this 
concept ‗moderate autonomy‘.  
 Both Klinger and Siegel evaluate the contemporary attempt to see the 
‗subject‘ mostly through its reflective, rational aspects and find this attempt 
misconceived. They show that if we understand the self mainly in its self-creative 
ability – its ability to choose identities and self-interpretations - we in fact amplify 
the strength of disciplinary power. It is not the state that is the main source of that 
power but the market. Consumerism ultimately leads to a loss of alterity towards 





To conclude, by exploring the changes in the concept of the self and the origins of 
the modern political self, I have shown that the story of the self is more complex than 
it could seem at first sight. The modern account of the concepts of the self and 
autonomy is one-sided and reflects tensions between the idea of individual autonomy 
and community. I have shown that the tension within the self between its active and 
passive elements and the tension between the self and the world are not problems but 
are instead key fundamental accomplishments of modernity.  
The self cannot exist in nothingness; it needs a bounded space of a political 
community (as explored further in Chapter Six). The dualism of the self that exists 
whenever it maintains an alterity towards society and itself is a condition of 
individual and political autonomy. Consequently, we should not think that individual 
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autonomy and national identity are mutually exclusive. I will develop this point 
further in Chapter Six, in which I argue that this dualistic view of the self requires the 
framework of nationhood in order to facilitate the development of moral and political 
agency.
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3 
Defending the ‘Political’ Dimension of Nationhood 
Little has shaped modern European history more than the formation of 
nation-states and the accompanying belief that citizens should be nationals. The 
relationship between nationalism and state have proven useful not only because of 
the (questionable) value of nations as structures capable of generating loyalty and 
support, but also because of the way they allowed for the generation of social 
solidarity. Moreover, national identity offered an alternative to feudalism in terms of 
conceptualizing political authority both territorially and legally. 
In the previous chapter I explored the development of the modern self and its 
link to nationhood and individual autonomy. My findings indirectly addressed the 
first line of criticism of national identity – that of collectivism – by showing that the 
modern self is in fact defined by a tension between its passive and active dimensions 
and, as such, requires a bounded community to resolve this tension. Therefore, 
autonomy is not something individuals gain once they free themselves from 
communal life, but in fact can only be gained in a bounded community.  
In this chapter I move on to addressing the second line of criticism of 
nationhood – namely that it is ‗a-‘ or anti-political. The Romantic tradition 
represented by Herder, Humboldt and Fichte was the first attempt to provide a 
philosophical understanding of the nation. However, Fichte‘s theory situated national 
identity almost entirely in a pre-political, natural force, effectively leaving the nation 
out from the normative debate on the structure and limits of political community. 
National identity has since often been framed in radical ethnic terms as an identity 
based on ‗blood and soil‘ rather than common values or aims. In this chapter I will be 
in conversation with theorists who identify the concept of the nation with an 
apolitical community and resultantly perceive nationhood as a threat to politics. 
The set of institutionalized practices that the state employs to define its 
citizens as nationals, or its nationals as citizens, is complex and multi-layered. 
However, these practices rest on the idea that rights of individuals can be articulated 
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and defended only through the principle of the sovereignty of the nation. This has 
been expressed both in the principle of modern democratic sovereignty of demos as 
well as in international law. But the identification of the state with its (ethnically 
defined) population is philosophically problematic. As Hannah Arendt points out, 
‗[in the French Revolution] the same nation was at once declared to be subject to 
laws, which supposedly would flow from the Rights of Man, and sovereign, that is 
bound by no universal law and acknowledging nothing superior to itself‘.
209
 As a 
result, nationalism became a synonym for using the state as a tool of ideology. The 
employment of the state‘s administrative apparatus to manage immigration policy, 
education, propaganda, resettlement and segregation policies are just a few infamous 
aspects of nationalist ideology.
210
 This deformation of the national principle, 
acclaimed to be the force behind many tragedies of the 20
th
 century, was followed by 
a failure of political philosophy to adequately incorporate the idea of national 
identity into the theory of political community.  
This chapter addresses this failure in two ways. It examines key arguments 
against understanding nationhood as a political concept by drawing on classical 
understandings of politics. It also shows why incorporating elements of the concept 
of nationhood into political philosophy is problematic. In the first part of this chapter 
I examine the reasons why nationhood is often seen as distinct from a relationship 
between citizens, i.e. is a non-political relationship. In the second part of the chapter 
I move on to a critique of nationhood as an anti-political phenomenon. I will draw 
particularly on Michael Oakeshott‘s theory of civil association, Hobbes‘s social 
contract theory and Hannah Arendt‘s and Berlin‘s respective concepts of ‗politics‘. 
These are not only an interesting selection from the historical point of view, but also 
all four authors are particularly convincing in their arguments against nationhood. 
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The reason why their accounts are ultimately flawed lies partially in the way they 
oppose the concepts of the nation and the political. The nation is perceived in these 
accounts mostly as a natural (pre-political) force or sentiment, which demands a 
certain type of homogeneity and unity. In contrast, politics is portrayed as a public, 
legal activity that only makes sense under the conditions of diversity. In this and the 
following chapter I will try to show why I think that both these concepts are 
misrepresented.  
Based on the arguments projected thus far in this thesis, we can see why it is 
necessary to consider whether or not nationhood is a political concept and why this 
project goes beyond an exercise in the history of political thought.  Within the most 
recent circles of Anglophone political thought, questions about national identity are 
of a predominantly moral character. Most of the literature focuses on the ways in 
which national identity affects our considerations about rights and duties towards 
other human beings.  
However, in Chapters Two and Six I try to answer more fundamental 
questions about the nature of the relationship between nationhood and political 
subjectivity. The purpose of this is twofold: firstly to show that locating nationhood 
outside of political subjectivity cannot be a neutral basis for a normative evaluation 
of national identity because it already rests on a normative claim about the limits of 
‗the political‘; and secondly, in thinking about nationhood, to do justice to the 
ambiguity of the notion which denominates both a kind of relationship between 
individuals and the consciousness of the political meaning of this relationship.  
 
3.1. Why Nationhood is Not a Relationship Between Citizens 
The idea that a degree of ethnic, cultural and historical homogeneity is beneficial for 
a political community is not novel. Common descent was an important element of 
many classical and modern models of political community. Even Plato, when trying 
to set up his ideal form of community, finds it necessary to tell a story about ‗soldiers 
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from earth‘ to provide the commonwealth with a sense of brotherhood and unity.
211
 
As Smith points out, narratives about peoplehood are commonplace both in 
philosophical and religious literature.
212
 Plato‘s story, however, is especially 
illuminating. He does not place the mythical origins of his community in any pre-
historical state. Instead, he writes of the ancestors as being soldiers made of earth, 
placing them clearly in the natural order. It is this interplay between natural and 
political – earth, blood and right – that became crucial first to the concept of the 
political and then to the concept of national identity. 
However, one may argue that only certain types of homogeneity are 
beneficial in politics. It has already been stated in previous chapters that national 
identity is a notoriously ambiguous notion. My focus in this chapter is on the notion 
of nationhood, which denotes a relationship between individuals defined in terms of 
national identity. In other words it is a relationship that exists when individuals 
recognize each other as members of the same nation.  
There are two main philosophical critiques of nationhood as a relationship 
between citizens. Firstly, it has often been suggested that national sentiment is a pre-
political, natural force and as such is alien to politics. This argument was put forward 
by Minogue and Berlin, who were writing in response to the dramatic events of the 
nationalistic ideologies of the early 20
th
 century. They both see the unifying and 
homogenizing character of nationalism as a threat to democratic legitimacy. This is 
because they portray the nation as a natural community.
213
 However, this notion of a 
natural community is so heavily contested today that it cannot be a viable critique of 
nationalism as a political principle.  
Secondly, and more promisingly, a shared nationhood can be viewed as a 
different type of relationship than a shared civicness. The state, claim the proponents 
of this way of thinking, is primarily a legal community. Furthermore, political 
authority comes from something more than the recognition of common descent. 
Drawing on Michael Oakeshott‘s concept of civil association and Hobbes‘s concept 
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of right I will examine these lines of thought to determine whether the distinction 
between national and civic/political can be maintained.  
 
3.1.1. Cives vs. The Nation: Michael Oakeshott’s Concept of Civil Association  
The fact that the relation between citizens is identical to the bonds of nationhood is 
historically problematic as state boundaries are not the same as national boundaries. 
Furthermore, not all nations make claims to statehood (as opposed to other types of 
political autonomy), and there are many more nations than states. Nevertheless, 
national identity remains one of the strongest bases of political claims to citizenship. 
Is there not a link between the two?  
One line of argument comes from Michael Oakeshott who argues in On 
Human Conduct that Modern European states have not originated out of any unity or 
ethnic homogeneity.
 214
 On the contrary, European politics was an arena of constant 
instability and internal differentiation. In fact, the most durable states in European 
history had the most internal differences.
215
 The emergence of the state was, 
according to Oakeshott, not a product of the unifying force of the nation, but a result 
of the destruction of local law by centralised administrative structures. The 
population that inhabited the territory of a state did not form a community. Oakeshott 
remarks: ‗the most that might have been expected was that some day, with luck, it 
might discover some sort of precarious identity and manage to be itself‘.
216
  
Oakeshott has a modernist view of nationalism (see Chapter Two). For 
instance, Gellner makes the same point but to a different end.
217
 Unlike Oakeshott, 
he sees nation-building and state-building processes as interlinked. But just like 
Oakeshott, Gellner sees homogeneity as a product of the modern industrial society 
rather than shared national identity. Homogeneity is then not imposed by 
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nationalism, but ‗rather that homogeneity imposed by objective, inescapable 




It is not the case that nationalism imposes homogeneity out of a wilful 
cultural Machtbedűrfniss; it is the objective need for homogeneity which 
is reflected in nationalism. If it is the case that a modern industrial state 
can only function with a mobile, literate, culturally standardized, inter-
changeable population, as we have argued, then the illiterate, half-starved 
populations sucked from their erstwhile rural cultural ghettoes in the 
melting pots of shanty-towns yearn for incorporation into some one of 
those cultural pools which already has, or looks as if it might acquire, a 
state of its own, with the subsequent promise of full cultural citizenship, 




In this sense, the nation-state is clearly an illusion. National identity is a response to 
the changing form of political authority. The kind of changes in a constitution 
produced when passing from a feudal state to absolute monarchy required a new 
device for acquiring legitimacy. And this, according to Oakeshott, could be only 
acknowledged in a language of civil intercourse.
220
 It is only through this type of 
legitimacy that the state can exercise its continuously growing power which rests 
mainly on administrative control.
221
  
In order to understand Oakeshott‘s stance on nationhood, we need see where 
national groups fit in his theory of associations. In On Human Conduct, Oakeshott 
differentiates between two main types of association: enterprise association and civil 
association. They are identified not as historical models but different modes of 
association (ideal types). Enterprise Association is a voluntary association 
constituted by a common purpose or good other than its own existence. Civil 
association is a self-sufficient mode of association. It is not constituted to achieve 
any extrinsic purpose or good. I will now discuss these two types of association in 
more detail. 
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 First, civil association rests, according to Oakeshott, on the idea of autarky 
and thus shapes its own limits. Furthermore, this mode of association is not 
voluntary. We are born as members of a particular state. In fact, it is the state that 
recognises and records our birth, the process of which initiates a series of other 
administrative procedures that guide as through growing up and being educated and 
records and recognises our death.  
The idea of autarky is principally an Aristotelian intuition. Aristotle uses the 
opposition of oikos (household) and polis in book one of The Politics to explain to 
the reader the subject matter of his enquiry.
222
 The household is a domain of force, 
violence and subjection.
223
 It is dominated by private interest and necessity. In 
contrast, polis is a space where those who are free and equal meet to discuss the 
affairs that matter to all of them.
224
 The political is thus understood as public and 
free. But it is more than that. A household is a group of people related by blood or 
servitude. Members of the household have different roles determined by the will of 
the head of the household. This way of living together is instrumental – it provides 
for the basic human needs. Politics are exactly contrary to that. Political societies 
relate together those who are not otherwise related.
225
 Citizenship is regulated by 
law, not by blood (oikos is defined by kinship).  
 Conversely, enterprise association is defined by Oakeshott in the terms of a 
common purpose and of the management of this purpose. Examples of such 
associations are easy to find. Oakeshott mentions a fire station or a tennis club,
226
 
both of which provide good ideas of the kinds of activities members of these 
associations engage in. To become a fireman or a member of a tennis club means to 
accept the rules of these organisations, but it also requires a will to play tennis or 
save people from fire. On this idea Oakeshott comments: ‗Pursuing a purpose or 
promoting an interest is, however, nothing other than responding to continuously 
emergent situations by deciding to do this rather than that in the hope or the 
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Civil association is for Oakeshott not a relationship based on a common 
pursuit of a shared goal. In other words it is a formal and not a functional or a 
teleological relationship. Members of such a commonwealth are not required to share 
beliefs or opinions about anything. In fact such a community of beliefs could never 
be called political. The purpose of politics is to create a many-in-one community 
while maintaining the diversity of interests and views. Civil relationship is thus 
defined by Oakeshott as a relationship in terms of recognition of a common 
authority. Such recognition cannot come from loyalty or affection. It does not depend 
on our opinion of the person or people in authority. A political association is entirely 
based on the recognition of rules (laws) that bind it together.
228
 This does not mean 
that tennis clubs or fire stations do not have rules or laws, but that they are not 




Of course it might be said that the same can be applied to the state. It is in 
fact very difficult to imagine any kind of legislation that would not be to an extent a 
codification of some pre-existing practices. But Oakeshott would argue that even 
when these rules are deliberated, their desirability is not assessed solely in terms of a 
substantive result. Or as Oakeshott puts it: ‗What relates cives to one another and 
constitutes civil association is the acknowledgement of the authority of respublica 
and the recognition of subscription to its conditions as an obligation.‘
230
 In other 
words, a civil relationship is a relationship among individuals solely in terms of their 
obligations to each other and to the community they are members of. These 
obligations do not determine the choices that individuals have to make, but prescribe 
the conditions of any actions they could take, both in their private and public 
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capacity. In contrast to with enterprise association, the recognition of these 
conditions occurs prior to consent.
231
 
Oakeshott emphasises that both civic and enterprise association are valuable 
in political life, but notes that enterprise association can be seen to threaten politics 
as an autonomous mode of action. Even though it is the civil association that 
Oakeshott seems to identify with the political community per se, the plurality of 
voluntary groups (tennis clubs, political groups, social movements, religious groups) 
is valuable as it expresses the distinctiveness of individuals. In other words, 
enterprise associations allow us to explore the rich diversity of human life, without 
which these modes of action would not have any meaning.
232
 Oakeshott‘s liberal 
individualism does not stand in opposition with membership in groups.  
However, as Richard Boyd notes, there are many groups which, while not 
exercising coercion, have a semi-compulsory character. Examples of these are 
obligatory trade unions, established religions to which we are born to, and so on. It is 
these types of groups which individuals may be born into, and are, Boyd argues, 
based on substantive bonds of fraternity, which Oakeshott seems to perceive as 
homogenising and anti-political because they limit our choice.
 233
  
Consequently, in Oakeshott‘s theoretical framework, nationhood is treated 
neither as a type of civil relationship nor as an enterprise association. Nations are 
associations in virtue of a perceived shared identity and history rather than 
recognition of common authority. As such, they represent a substantive rather than a 
formal relationship. However, they are not generally regarded as voluntary 
associations. Nation, for Oakeshott, is not a community in a political sense of the 
word. What it aspires to be could be maybe called a community of wills. That 
however, would be misleading as the nation itself does not present a way to mediate 
individual will without the state.   
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Oakeshott chooses then to avoid referring to a language of national identity or 
belonging as anti-individualistic and destructive to the formal nature of civil 
association. Instead, he claims that politics is sustained by a notion of civility, in 
which individuals can participate if they set aside ‗all that differentiates them from 
one another‘ to ‗recognize themselves as moral equals‘.
234
 Richard Boyd argues that:  
 
Because civil association is defined by this relationship of morality, it 
requires more than just equal treatment in the eyes of a rule of law that 
makes its appearance only in situations of conflict or transgression. As a 
kind of moral relationship, implicated in shared ‗moral‘ or ‗adverbial‘ 





In contrast, nationhood is, to Oakeshott, based on difference – we recognise fellow 
nationals not based on their moral equality as fellow human beings or moral agents 
but as members of a specific community.  
  
3.1.2. State as a Legal Community: Hobbes’s Concept of Right 
Oakeshott‘s argument could be understood as a contemporary version of a similar 
pattern of thought in Hobbes‘s Leviathan. Oakeshott was a well-known authority on 
Hobbes as well as a highly regarded editor of his works.
236
 Leviathan does not 
include the concept of nationality in the considerations of the state.
237
 In fact, there 
seems to be no place for nationhood in the entire social contract. The state of war of 
all against all as described in the Leviathan can legitimize political authority only if it 
is understood as a state between individuals. The continuous readiness to war that 
remains inherent even in the state of civil society can only be mediated by a forceful 
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ruler. The stability of civil institutions that guard the peace depends on this 
recognition of authority and nothing more.
238
  
 This is why we will not find much on national identity in Hobbes‘s work. If 
Hobbes talks about nations, he uses the term in the same way he uses the term 
state.
239
  When John Stuart Mill wrote his essay On Representative Government, he 
too did not devote much attention to common descent; but for Mill, like many in the 
liberal tradition, organizing nations into states was a condition of social stability and 
of free institutions. He defined nationality as a type of sentiment or a set of 
sentiments that arise among members of a given historical community. These can 
originate as a product of cultural integrity but do not have to do so. Management of 
sympathy and antipathy among ethnically defined and historically formed groups is 
key to state-building.
240
 These sentiments allow citizens to engage in cooperation 
within common institutions.  
For Hobbes common sentiment has nothing to do with institutional order. On 
the contrary, the unifying power of institutions might make it possible for a 
community to identify with itself. The bonds of loyalty are not established prior to 
political community. The only kind of loyalty that can protect us from the state of 




In Foucault‘s interpretation of Hobbes this becomes even more evident. 
Foucault argues that, for the author of Leviathan, the quality of the will that 
recognizes the sovereign is irrelevant.  
 
It does not matter whether you fought or did not fight, whether you were 
beaten or not; in any case, the mechanism that applies to you who have 
been defeated is the same mechanism that we find in the state of nature, in 
the constitution of the State, and that we also find, quite naturally, in the 
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But this passage must sound strange to us. Europe has been immersed in conflicts 
that originated from the refusal of the conquered to recognize the authority of the 
conquerors‘ claim to power, often based on claims of national identity. This refusal 
to consider authority on national grounds comes, according to Foucault, from 
Hobbes‘s reluctance to recognize the discourse of historical politics, where authority 
is considered in relation to the understanding of political past, identity and 
domination. According to Foucault, Hobbes‘s theory becomes problematic whenever 
we encounter the problem of conquest: ‗We may well have been conquered, but we 
will not remain conquered. This is our land, and you will leave it.‘
243
  
Oakeshott‘s remark that the history of Europe is the history of Poland can 
thus mean something more than the author intended.
244
 He used it in the context of 
the constantly changing borders of Poland and its ambiguous history when it 
constituted a multi-national monarchy from the 15
th
 to the 18
th
 centuries and its 
territory stretched from today‘s Estonia to the ports of the Black Sea. But what is 
theoretically more interesting is what happens in the 19
th
 century when the country 
disappears from the map of Europe.
245
  
The reason why nationhood cannot be a relation between citizens for Hobbes 
is not so much that it is a different type of relationship, but that Hobbes wanted his 
theory to address situations when these two do not overlap. Both Hobbes and 
Oakeshott pursue a similar line of thinking by restricting the notion of political 
community to that of a rule-based association.  
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I have briefly drawn the key points of the arguments against understanding 
nationhood as a relation between citizens as can be found in Oakeshott‘s and 
Hobbes‘ theories. I argued that the former claimed that citizens can be related to each 
other as citizens only in terms of the recognition of rules. Furthermore, for 
Oakeshott, a political community exists only in virtue of this relation of civility. It is 
not constituted by common sentiment, blood or purpose. Hobbes, on the other hand, 
claimed that citizens can be related to each other only as subjects in virtue of the 
sovereign who binds them together. In fact, both these arguments are statements 
about political subjectivity. But before we explore that, I will present one more 
argument against nationhood, that of Hannah Arendt.  
 
3.2. Nationhood as the Anti-Political: Arendt’s Account of the French 
Revolution  
The experience of 20
th
 century totalitarianism, ethnic conflict and extremist 
nationalism has made political philosophy particularly sensitive to the threat 
nationalism poses to democratic politics. Berlin expresses it most clearly when he 
writes that nationalism is a principle of organic homogeneity in which the members 
of the national community have to submit their wills to the pursuit of common values 
and goals.
246
 Those who are not member of a particular group or do not share 
particular values and goals are then forced to do so.
247
  
Even today, one of the most popular British public intellectuals, Anthony 
Grayling, begins his essay on nationalism by stating: ‗Nationalism is an evil. It 
causes wars, its roots lie in xenophobia and racism, it is a recent phenomenon – an 
invention of the last few centuries – which has been of immense service to 
demagogues and tyrants but to no-one else.‘
248
 This hostility towards nationalism is 
further justified by the opposition some scholars find between the concept of the 
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nation and politics. The failure of nationalism in the third quarter of the 20
th
 century 
was sudden and unexpected. As Berlin notes, most liberal thinkers tolerated 
nationalism because they believed it would disappear with the progress of the 
rationalist tradition with its source in the European enlightenment.
249
 But this did not 
happen. On the contrary, national interest became one of the strongest factors 
shaping contemporary politics. Bernard Crick, in his famous work In Defence of 
Politics, identifies nationalism as one of the key threats to politics. When does 
nationalism become anti-political? According to Crick even though the existence of 
nations is morally ambivalent,
250
 nationalism promotes two potentially anti-political 
ideas. These are: 1) that ‗there are objective characteristics‘; that 2) ‗there can be a 
single criterion for organizing states‘.
251
  
 However, this seems to be a very limited and one-sided view of nationalism. 
While it can relate to ethno-centric nationalism of the 20
th
 century, or even certain 
contemporary forms of nationalism (for example in Eastern Europe), the reality is 
that many modern forms of national identity are much more fluid (see Chapter 
Seven). Crick‘s understanding of the concept of the nation relies on a very classical, 
Arendtian reading of the French Revolution as the origin of modern democratic 






 is, according to Arendt, a key event in the history 
of the West.
254
 It is also an ambiguous moment. Its meaning is mostly symbolic as it 
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has become a point of reference for all other revolutions but also in all major political 
ideologies. She sees our political language, especially on the Continent, as 
revolutionary at its roots.
255
 In this sense, Arendt‘s examination of the Revolution is 
intended to uncover the basic assumptions of this language: what it brought to 
political discourse and what has been lost. Arendt sees both the French and American 
Revolutions as unique moments of public spirit that presented an alternative form of 
government (direct democracy) to that of the centralised, representative democracy 
emerging from old monarchical institutions.  
For Arendt, both the French and the American Revolutions were primarily 
expressions of public spirit. She claims that man could no longer be happy only in 
the private sphere,
256
 so citizens demanded access to public life.
257
 Arendt describes 
examples of revolutionary political forms that made that type of engagement 
possible: the Parisian clubs, town hall gatherings, German rate and Russian rady. 
These small communities were all formed spontaneously and worked without a 
constitution, according to a few general rules. Arendt gives an example of one of the 
Parisian clubs:  
 
The society will deal with everything that concerns freedom, equality, unity, 
indivisibility of the republic; [its members] will mutually enlighten themselves 
and they will especially inform themselves on the respect due to the laws and 
decrees which are promulgated; how to intend to keep order in their discussion: if 




But the public spirit of radical (democratic) self-determination of the Parisian Clubs 
and Societies, Communal Councils, and then Soviets and Räte has been lost. In 
Arendt‘s view, liberal nation-states are not a success of the revolutionary 
movements, but a mark of their failure. The civil liberties, contemporary 
individualism, the welfare state and the rule of public opinion are concessions that 
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the revolutionary movement made. They replaced direct public engagement, 
autonomy and representation.  
 The idea of Revolution is characterised by the perpetual need to start from the 
beginning. But there is an inherent tension between that type of radical self-
determination and security. Hence the idea of the republic, on Arendt‘s reading, 
needs to be proposed in order to overcome this contradiction through the principles 
of sovereignty of the nation and democratic representation. However, she believes 
that this works as pretence for establishing a centralised apparatus of control.
259
 As 
Elizabeth Fraser notes, Arendt‘s On Revolution is a ‗sustained analyses of what 
happens when instrumentality replaces politics.‘
260
 
 For Arendt this represents the tragedy of the Revolution, where newly gained 
political freedom could not be translated into a political will that could constitute a 
durable entity. The ability of the people to govern themselves was overcome by the 
need to create a stable entity, capable of protecting the rights of individuals. During 
the French Revolution, societies offered ways of accessing the public realm. Thus, 
the gap between the government and the governed was closed. But when the 
Revolutionaries were faced with the task of writing a constitution, they decided to do 
away with societies as enemies of the republic. Robespierre turned against them in 
the name of what he called the great popular Society of the whole French people.
261
 
This need for unity is not merely a concern about the strength of institutions. For 
Arendt it is a problem inherent in the act of Revolution. The idea of starting from the 
beginning is a powerful concept in modernity because it is linked to the concept of 
autonomy (see previous chapter). But in the act of revolting against the government 
it is precisely the principles under which the community is based that are recognised 
as both alien and oppressive;
262
 it is this freedom understood as re-invention that can 
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be the source of public spirit. However, the act of creating a constitution involves a 
tension between revolutionary freedom and questions of stability.  
 
The act of founding the new body politic, of devising the new form of 
government involves the grave concern with the stability and durability of 
the new structure; the experience, on the other hand, which those who are 
engaged in this grave business are bound to have is the exhilarating 
awareness of the human capacity of beginning, the high spirits which have 




It is not clear whether Arendt actually believed that the public spirit of the 
Revolution could be preserved without the need to constantly renew it. As Jefferson 
put it, ‗the tree of liberty must be refreshed, from time to time, with blood of patriots 
and tyrants. It is its natural manure.‘
264
 Arendt‘s sympathy towards Jefferson‘s 
concept of a wards system and towards French clubs and societies was justified 
mostly by her hostility to the concept of representation. Apart from the many 
theoretical difficulties that it produces, representation for Arendt is a device which 
destroys the autonomy of politics in the modern nation-state. Representative 
democracy, which was supposed to be the answer for preserving the newly gained 
freedom of the people, transfers all power to the nation but simultaneously limits the 
ability of individual citizens to act in the public sphere.
265
 As a result, the public 
sphere becomes dominated by private interest, and the only way of protecting the 
people from the corruption of their own government is to limit it. 
All of this has to be done in the name of the nation through the unifying force 
of the state. Because even though the nation, in its modern sense, comes into being in 
a different way than the state, they become closely linked in the act of a Revolution. 
The state was formed by the changes within political institutions of the medieval 
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realm (regnum). It inherited the function of a supreme legal institution that protects 
all inhabitants in its territory. As Arendt puts it: 
 
The tragedy of the nation-state was that the people‘s rising national 
consciousness interfered with these functions. In the name of the will of 
the people the state was forced to recognize only ‗nationals‘ as citizens, to 
grant full civil and political rights only to those who belonged to the 
national community by right of origin and fact of birth. This meant that the 





As we can see, in Arendt‘s interpretation of the French Revolution, nationhood 
presents itself as an alternative to public spirit – to citizenship. And in this sense 
national identity becomes deeply anti-political. While Arendt does not disregard the 
value of identity in politics, she criticised the nation-state for identifying politics with 
instrumental control under the label of sovereignty of the people.
267
 But the nation-
state does not represent the people, but rather the interests of small group of 
individuals who become identified with the national interest.
268
   
 Arendt‘s account of the idea of the modern revolution is in many ways 
ingenious and persuasive. This is partly because she accurately identifies the main 
problem of the revolution as the struggle between radical autonomy and social order, 
democracy and representation, freedom and stability. However, her account is one-
sided and her historical analysis tends to disguise philosophical interpretations as 
facts. First of all, Arendt‘s ideal of the democratic spirit and its value for the 
revolutionaries might be over-stated. Christopher Hobson for instance notes that the 
democratic ideal was in fact ‗dead‘ until the invention of representation.
269
 The 
classical Greek (Athenian) democracy was deemed impossible in a large state and, 
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thus, is de facto obsolete; in his article ‗Revolution, Representation, and the 
Foundations of Modern Democracy
‘270
 Hobson argues that when the French 
Revolution started, democracy was still perceived as the system that had brought 
Athens to its doom.
271





Plato‘s and Aristotle‘s criticisms of democracy were still largely regarded as 
accurate. Democracy was perceived as a social rule
272
 under which the people 
(demos) are interpreted as the mob rather than the whole political society.
273
 Hence, 
until the French Revolution, the only positive equivalent of democracy was a mixed 
form of rule. This has changed, according to Hobson, thanks only to the introduction 
of the idea of representation, which would not be possible without the concept of the 
sovereignty of the people.
274
 If we follow this account, then even though the French 
Revolution was the origin of modern democracy, democracy was not its main 
objective. Revolution brings the two previously antithetical concepts of rule by the 
people and representative government together in the idea of a nation.  
But Arendt‘s account is also one-sided in the sense that it offers a far too 
narrow understanding of the idea of the modern revolution. Israel, one of the key 
scholars of the Enlightenment period, blames Arendt for convincing a large part of 
the academic world that the term ‗revolution‘ is specifically modern and in fact was 
not even used in its ‗proper‘ sense before the French Revolution. But the author of 
Enlightenment Contested provides many examples of the word ‗revolution‘ being 






 The difference, he claims, between pre-
modern and modern revolutions is that the latter ‗quintessentially legitimize 
themselves in terms of, and depend on, non-traditional and newly introduced, 
fundamental concepts‘.
276
 The social and political revolutions of early modernity 
only gained their meaning by being part of a broader strand of revolutionary thought. 
The most stereotypical example of that thought is Descartes‘ model of 
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methodological scepticism. However, it was part of a general philosophical shift, 
observed not only by Descartes but also Hobbes, Spinoza and Leibniz.
277
Moreover, 
while ancient revolutions referred to a cyclical notion of time, in which forms of 
government keep changing, modern revolutions seem to represent a rupture in time. 
The key difference between Israel and Arendt is that while Arendt sees the 
American and French Revolutions as contingent historical acts (acts of free will) 
which led or contributed to the processes of modernisation, for Israel it is modernity 
that produced the Revolution in that modernity is itself ‗revolutionary‘.
278
 However, 
as Israel notes, the Revolution was not necessarily welcomed by all intellectual 
circles. In fact ‗traditionalists‘ were stronger in numbers at that time. The 
revolutionary agenda of what Israel calls the ‗radical enlightenment‘ was promoted 
by a handful of philosophers. Israel identifies two Enlightenments, radical and 
conservative.
279
 The former is based on an idea that reason should be the guide of 
human action, while the latter represents a belief in a mixture of reason and tradition. 
By understanding revolution as part of a broader process of modernity, as 
Israel and Hobson do, we can see that its main effect was not the re-creation of direct 
rule but the harmonisation of the radical autonomy of the subject produced by the 
radical enlightenment and a new type of political community.  
 
3.3. Nationhood and the Limits of ‘The Political’ 
The purpose of this short excursion to the two lines of thought was to show how this 
study of nationhood and modern subjectivity is conditioned by an understanding of 
the limits of ‗the political‘. Both Arendt and Oakeshott, and to a certain extent also 
Hobbes, attempt to present politics as a separate domain of conduct and, more 
importantly, a domain only discovered under specific circumstances in Europe. It is 
not my aim here to evaluate Arendt‘s or Oakeshott‘s concepts of politics, but a brief 
description is helpful. Both have known faults. Arendt‘s idea of the public realm has 
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been criticised for being exclusive, and idealistic in its artificial distinction between 
public and public.
280
 Not only does it represent an attempt to project a traditional, 
classical definition of politics onto modern societies, but it remains unclear whether 
her interpretation could be accurate even when applied strictly to classical political 
theory. If politics was indeed a separate and independent domain of the free and 
equal, then what exactly would it do? In other words what is the content of politics if 
it is not entangled with society or economy?  
 Furthermore, Arendt‘s separation of politics as an autonomous and fragile 
sphere of human action is problematic, because, as Elizabeth Fraser notes, there are 
nevertheless some non-political actions that can bring about desired political effects. 
It unclear why political actors should avoid non-political means and how 
autonomous politics can actually be.
 281
  
Oakeshott‘s notion of politics is more plausible. He defines it as ‗an 
engagement to consider the desirability or otherwise of the conditions prescribed in a 
practice where the practice itself is the terms of association and where these 
conditions are susceptible of deliberate change‘.
282
 As such, he differentiates this 
understanding of politics from what he calls a vulgar satisfaction and management of 
wants. We can imagine Oakeshott‘s cives as simply individuals negotiating with 
persons of authority.
283
 The content of politics as an engagement seems clearer than 
in the case of Arendt as well. It consists of issues concerning the community. 
However, it is not the content that distinguishes political activity, but its form. 
Politics is concerned solely with rules, not with wants or needs. There has to be a 
procedure of translating wants and individual aims to interests that can engage in the 
public deliberation of the rules, but that is another problem. Politics is here 
differentiated from decision-making or ruling.
284
 But it has also to be separated from 
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other types of association among people. ‗It is the idea of association as intelligent 
relationship enjoyed only in being learned and understood, distinguished (for 
example) from relationship in terms of propinquity, kinship, genes, or from organic 
or so-called ‗social‘ integration‘.
285
  
The problem with the way Oakeshott sets limits to politics is that it is not 
clear whether what he describes is an ideal type or something he would want to 
recognise in the political reality of the modern state. Furthermore, his commitment to 
plurality as a political value is undermined by his critical stance on the role of certain 
types of enterprise association.  
  
Conclusion 
To sum up, in this chapter I argue that each of the above three explanations 
seem insufficient to explain the role of the nation in modernity, partly because they 
have overlooked something about the notion of nationhood and partly because their 
concepts of ‗the political‘ seem too restrictive. As a result theorists such as 
Oakeshott, Hobbes, Berlin or Arendt have problems with explaining the phenomenon 
of national consciousness both as a political phenomenon and as something 
embedded in the experience of the modern individual. 
 The concept of the nation cannot be adequately represented solely in ethnic 
terms as a natural community as opposed to a political community. This does not 
mean, however, that the national community and community of citizens are or should 
be identical. The relationship between them is much more complex than that. Even if 
nationhood is not or should not be a relationship between citizens, it can still be 
understood as having a key political role, for example as a source of obligation.  
In the next chapter I defend the political role of nations by showing they 
provide a crucial framework for bounded rationality. I will draw on the limited 
understanding of the political, which I hinted to in this chapter. Nations are bounded 
communities in a different sense than states are. While states have territorial borders, 
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I will argue that nations allow members of national communities to participate in 
common practices and beliefs,  and provide them with a bounded framework which 
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4 
Why Politics Requires a Bounded Community. 
It might seem strange that at a time when politics seems omnipresent, it is 
also perceived by many to be in peril. In fact, in itself the idea that politics is 
something that can be in crisis or in need of defence is a sign of our time. If we were 
to point out the causes of this phenomenon, among them we would have to name the 
crisis of participation, political trust and the privatisation of public life.
286
  
These three factors pose questions about both the nature and value of 
contemporary liberal democracy as well as about the state of contemporary political 
culture in relation to the processes of globalisation, multiculturalism and social 
atomisation. A particularly theoretically interesting line of argument comes from a 
strand of thought characteristic to the second half of the 20
th
 century. It is represented 







 and Chantal Mouffe,
290
 who perceive modernity as a 
progressive retreat of the political before the private or social.  
In fact the word ‗crisis‘ can be seen as one of the distinct features of 
philosophical thought until recently. Some authors, such as Fukuyama, explicitly 
herald the end of politics, history and art.
291
 In a sense, this is a position of theoretical 
reflection European thought fell into following Nietzsche and after Husserl brought 
the notions of ‗end‘ and ‗crisis‘ to moral and scientific discourse.
292
 However, it is 
also indicative of a problem for political philosophy because the threat to politics 
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allegedly derives from the way we conceptualise political life. On one hand, authors 
such as Schmitt and Mouffe point out the problems that liberal politics has with 
conceptualising and responding to conflict.
293
 An example of this being that many 
western liberal states have changed the name of their Ministries of War to Ministries 
of Defence though they do not intend to entirely halt their role in initiating conflicts. 
On the other hand, authors like Arendt and Oakeshott, as we have seen in Chapter 
Three, are concerned about the progressive deconstruction of politics as a unique 
way of organising public life.  
To say that politics is omnipresent can mean two different things. Firstly, the 
omnipresence of politics can be understood as a statement about the growing scope 
of the state. It is an article of faith today that the state performs many new functions 
and the list has been growing more rapidly than ever since the mid 19
th
 century. This 
is partly because of the advancement in technology as well as the techné
294
 of 
governing. But this expanded scope of state control could not be justified without a 
compatible concept of the self and its role in politics. A technical approach to 
governing presupposes a self that is rational and ‗amendable‘, otherwise we could 
not hope to predict the effects of political decisions. Secondly, ‗omnipresence of 
politics‘ can simply mean that politics has become a word used much more broadly 
in modern society than in any other century. Thus, this is no longer only a statement 
about the scope of the state or political institutions, but about the self-understanding 
of the  political world. Based on this understanding, our everyday experience is 
deeply politicised. Previously non-political choices or differences are now seen as 
political. Here ‗political‘ no longer means ‗concerned with the affairs of the state‘, 
but is described through other categories such as ‗oppressive‘, ‗unjust‘ or ‗risky‘ 
which relate to the economic and intimate.   
This second way in which the omnipresence of politics affects us is not 
necessarily a product of the growing scope of the state. It is something that became 
noticeable with the universality of political action that came with the birth of the 
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nation-state. By universality of political action I mean that in modern democracies, 
the political class is recruited from across the society. The fact that anyone can 
become a politician or be otherwise engaged in politics is a great achievement of 
modern liberal democracy. However, the work of authors such as Schmitt, Arendt or 
Oakeshott can be seen as a warning that the concept of universality of political action 
comes with a danger of perceiving politics itself as being universal. As a result, 
antinomies between economy and politics, morality and politics, private and public, 
and so on, cease to exist.  
So far I have established that the concept of the nation cannot be simply 
discarded as being anti- or apolitical. This was, I argued in Chapter Three, due to too 
narrow an idea of what politics is as a sphere of activity. In this chapter I want to 
move on to defending the idea that regardless of the apolitical nature of the nation, 
politics has to be bounded and that nationhood provides an appropriate framework 
for doing so. In particular, the nation enables us to participate in the ‗political‘ world 
through shared social practices and institutions which in turn allow us to develop a 
language of bounded rationality. Universalism, I will argue, is as equally dangerous 
to politics as particularism.  
The aim of this chapter is to show why politics is not a universal activity. The 
argument is divided into three sections. Section one investigates the notion of politics 
as a limited activity defined through the concept of ‗the political‘. Drawing mainly 
on Arendt and Schmitt, I will show the perils of extending the notion of politics to 
the non-political. However, I will also criticise their models as insufficient in 
explaining the universality of political action brought about by the idea of 
nationalism. In section two, I examine the limits of politics from the perspective of 
the concept of bounded rationality. I show that the idea of political community 
indicates a specific form of common experience. I use the concepts of phronesis, and 
sensus communis to provide my definition of bounded rationality. This leads me, in 
the final section, to investigate how bounded political rationality finds its place in the 
modern form of political community as ‗the nation‘.  
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4.1. Politics and Its ‘Enemies’ 
The title of this section alludes to Robert Dahl‘s Democracy and its Critics.
295
 Both 
‗democracy‘ and ‗politics‘ originate from the same historical term of the Ancient 
Greek polis. Even though both of these terms have changed dramatically since the 
original conception of polis, it would be problematic to attempt to define either of 
them without the context of their origins. This is not just because of the role history 
plays in forming political concepts, although its influence is indeed often overlooked 
in contemporary political philosophy. This is due to an understanding that political 
notions are purely theoretical concepts and can be treated as such, as noted by 
Voegelin.
296
 But the reason why it would be impossible to define politics or 
democracy without any reference to the idea of polis is that polis has remained a 
model for the understanding of both these concepts throughout most of modern 
history.  
In this section, I investigate the notion of politics as limited activity. I begin 
with a brief analysis of the origin of the term as used by Aristotle. This will show 
that politics at its root was not only referred to as a limited realm of word and deed, 
but as a concrete form of life distinguishing free government from despotism. I then 
move on to discuss the link between this classical notion of politics and its modern 
meaning. Drawing on Arendt‘s work,  I discuss the concept of ‗political‘ as ‗public‘ 
and show how in Arendt‘s view the notion of politics has become privatised through 
the development of society and the modern state. I will then discuss Schmitt‘s 
concept of ‗the political‘ and compare it with Arendt‘s. 
 
4.1.1. The Classical Concept of Politics 
The term ‗politics‘ in its original sense - just like all other political notions – 
is polemical. Aristotle uses it to distinguish the Greek way of life from that of 
barbarians. The latter are defined by Aristotle as those who do not know politics and 
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because of that can exist only as slaves.
297
 By this, Aristotle means two things: 
Firstly, they are not free because their lives do not belong to them but to the despot. 
Secondly, they cannot become free because, in Aristotle‘s view, they are incapable of 
rational speech (logoi). Hence violence is, in Arendt‘s reading of Aristotle, the only 
way of guaranteeing their obedience. By opposition, according to her, politics is 
defined as the realm of free word and deed.
298
  
 The exclusiveness of politics in Aristotle‘s theory is a product of a strong 
distinction between the private and the public. In other words, it is a result of a 
restriction on what and who can appear ‗publicly‘. In fact, the ability of citizens to 
distinguish between their private interests and the common good is constitutive to 
Aristotle‘s categorisation of forms of government.
299
 In this analysis, he envisions 
democracy as the least preferable political system because it is almost bound to 
corrupt its citizens by allowing them to pursue individual interests instead of the 
common good.  
Aristotle‘s theory of politics does not have to be seen as so distant from 
Plato‘s vision drawn in ‗The Republic‘.
300
 This is because for Aristotle, as for Plato, 
the political project rests entirely on a theory of the human soul. And this is why 
Aristotle‘s investigation into politics is preceded by Nicomachean Ethics. For 
Aristotle, the ultimate purpose of the state is, just like for Plato, the creation of a 
good citizen,
301
 just as it is for Plato.
302
  
The invention of politics in the ancient world was a reaction to a crisis of 
moral language. This is clearly visible in Plato‘s dialogues which represent a struggle 
to define notions no longer recognised as clear and common. In fact, his entire 
project can be seen as an attempt to objectify the increasingly divisive language of 
the Greek polis.
 303
 For Aristotle, this separation or objectification is, of course, a 
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futile effort because he does not believe that general concepts could exist or have any 
meaning outside of their concrete representations.
304
 Polis becomes a place where 
many opinions can co-exist. Politics is thus a unique device allowing us to accept a 
diversity of interests and opinions without destroying them. It is in this sense that we 
can talk about defending politics as defending a specific, historically developed way 
of living in community with other individuals. I will use the term politics in this 
limited sense and not in the popular sense when it is synonymous with decision 
making or managing.  
In a more contemporary context however politics is no longer so clearly 
defined. Politics is not an exclusive activity; thus, the traditional ways of defining it 
through the distinction between private and public, or in the Aristotelian terms, 
‗household‘ and ‗polis‘, are no longer relevant as many elements of the private 
sphere are now seen as potentially political. In fact, the problem of what can and 
cannot be considered political, has become one of the key political questions 
distinguishing various ideological and theoretical positions. In other words, even 
though theorists broadly agree what politics is in its broadest sense, we find it 
problematic to determine which areas of human action should be present in the 
political domain. This confusion is a reflection of the historical development of the 
state. 
 The Aristotelian view is neither the only nor the dominant understanding of 
politics.  For example, Elizabeth Fraser and Kimberly Hutchings point at two main 
traditions of framing politics: one in which political power is identified with 
domination and another, which attempts to exclude domination from politics.
305
 The 
former, they claim, has in fact been the dominant trend within how we think about 
politics in the West and can be associated with Machiavelli.
306
 The latter has gained 
ground in modernity since the birth of contractual political theory wherein politics 
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constitutes the domain where individuals entrust the power of the use of force to the 
judiciary function of the state.
307
  
Thus, I do not wish to lead the reader into thinking, that the classical view of 
politics is the only view of politics. However, it is the one most relevant to my thesis 
because it represents a way of thinking about the political as unique, precious and 
fragile. It is unique, because the political way of life is specifically human and thus 
distinguishes us from the natural order. It is precious, because it allows us to live 
together in conditions of freedom, and finally it is also fragile, because it is 
threatened by non-political modes of conduct. 
 
4.1.2. Hannah Arendt and the ‘Invasion of the Social’  
One of the thinkers who offered the most convincing defense of a limited, classical 
vision of politics is Hannah Arendt. Arendt sees politics as unique sphere which 
allows us to present ourselves to others in conditions of freedom. Drawing on the 
previously discussed Aristotelian understanding of politics, Arendt argues that it is 
speech and the ability to persuade that defines the political relationship between 
citizens. According to Arendt, the equality of public speaking (isegoria) was what 
distinguished the political system of Athens.
308
  
As shown in Chapter Three, Arendt follows Aristotle in her description of the 
household as a natural relationship in the domain of subordination and violence. But 
as Arendt says – ‗sheer violence is mute‘.
309
 It cannot be communicated and in that 
sense cannot participate in creating a common public realm (see discussion in 
Chapter Three). Frazer and Hutchings further argue that Arendt excludes violence 
from the public realm because violence is instrumental, but politics is not. Violence 
is a tool used to a particular end.
 310 
However, for Arendt, politics is not an end-
driven activity.   
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In The Human Condition, Arendt argues that with the birth of the concept of 
society, this classical distinction between ‗natural‘ and ‗political‘ is destroyed. In 
fact, for her, the sole term ‗society‘ assumes a type of mutual dependence between 
individuals forced to live or co-operate together to satisfy their needs and wants.
311
 
We can see this most explicitly in the classical social contract theory. Both for 
Hobbes and Locke, the contract is a product of striving for survival and the need of 
protection or co-operation.
312
 Arendt argues that with the coming of ‗society‘ as a 
key political concept, private interests gained public significance.
313
 The final 
expression and culmination of this process is, according to her, the invention of 
political economy and the language of national identity.  
The reason why Arendt‘s analysis is relevant to my argument is that it shows 
how the growing scope of the private sphere in early modernity has changed the way 
we perceive politics. The purpose of government became securing and providing for 
the needs of the individual. Modern politics is, according to Arendt, about managing 
society. She argues that the consequences of this phenomenon are dangerous both for 
the individual and for ‗politics‘ itself. The reasons for this are twofold.  
First, the growing scope of the state and society means that it is no longer 
possible for the individual to maintain a holistic perspective in decisions and actions. 
By this I mean that the knowledge required to solve most political or social problems 
is so advanced, one individual is unable to comprehend it. Thus, it is this world that 
becomes characterised by anomie.
314
  
Secondly, according to Arendt, the modern concept of politics as 
management of the affairs of society leaves the political sphere empty and neutral. 
The decisions become impersonal and bureaucratic.
315
 And in this sense they become 
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similar to the laws of nature. For Arendt, the invasion of the social onto the political 
ultimately threatens to destroy the latter through privatisation of the public and the 
reduction of politics to economy and social management.  
It could be said that what Arendt describes as the corruption of politics was 
actually one of the greatest achievements of the modern age. It is necessary to 
question the border between the private and the public sphere in order to see that the 
classical distinction between them was exclusive and oppressive. By excluding the 
affairs of the household from the public space, the polis reinforced politics as the 
domain of men. This model did not allow for public discussion of gender-specific 
questions because of the fact that the intimate could not appear publicly. The 
feminist slogan ‗private is public‘ stood in clear opposition to the classical notion of 
politics.  
However, what Arendt claims is not that this process of politicisation of the 
private sphere was wrong in itself. She seems to try to show us that the notions of 
private and public are mutually dependant. In this sense, the destruction or corruption 
of either notion brings down the distinction. The danger that the destruction of the 
distinction between public and private presents, is that Arendt believes that politics 
can be only understood as a public activity and can be valued only in a world that 
values public life.  
 
4.1.3. Carl Schmitt’s Concept of ‘The Political’ 
We can find a somewhat similar argument about the danger of losing the distinction 
between public and private in Carl Schmitt‘s writings on political thought. Schmitt 
criticises liberalism (or in fact the liberal consensus) for constructing a language that 
confuses politics and society. He claims that as a result, the political enemy becomes 
confused with an economic competitor, private adversary or a partner in a 
discussion.
316
 In this process, Schmitt argues, everything becomes political and 
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consequently nothing is no longer specifically political.
317
 In other words political 
issues become expressed through non-political language. Modern society is 
described in The Concept of the Political as a product of a bourgeois consciousness. 
Schmitt shows how the appreciation of the apolitical private sphere becomes part of 
the middle class ethos. The bourgeois ‗rests in the possession of his private property, 




 Schmitt‘s negative evaluation of the liberal model of politics rests on his 
definition of ‗the political‘ as an autonomous category. The political distinction 
between friend and enemy cannot be derived from any other entity.
319
 He writes: 
‗The political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not 
appear as an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with 
him in business transactions.‘
320
 For Schmitt, the concept of political community 
rests on the ability to distinguish ourselves from others. The only distinction strong 
enough to legitimise political power is one between friend and enemy. As much as 
this may seem an obscure empirical observation, it is not. The distinction between 
friend and enemy is for Schmitt much more than a general statement about human 
nature. Schmitt uses it to show the distinct nature of ‗the political‘. Friend and enemy 
is a similar dichotomy to good and bad or beautiful and ugly, which are distinctions 
characteristic to moral and aesthetic discourses. The political distinction between 
friend and enemy is, according to Schmitt, existential and cannot be solved or erased 
by means of persuasion. The difference in terms of which this distinction is drawn is 
not necessarily a substantive difference of interests or values. Schmitt argues that 
political enemies need not be hated personally or be defined in terms of conflict of 
interests.
321
 In the crudest sense, political enemies are just those who do not belong 
to ‗us‘. This is why, political community is the highest form of association; political 
community is sovereign, because it has the ability to produce the ‗highest unity‘. As 
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Schmitt states, ‗not because it is an omnipotent dictator, or because it levels out all 
other unities, but because it decides, and has the potential to prevent all other 




 The concept of the political in the form which Schmitt proposes, is closely 
linked with the concept of the modern state. First, this is because while Schmitt is not 
a theorist of the state
323
, he sees states as historical expressions of the political to the 
extent that states function within a plurality where the existence of the state 
presupposes the existence of other states.
324
  
The term ‗state‘ itself refers to a neutral status that can be applied to talk 
about different types of government. In this sense ‗state‘ replaces words such as 
‗regnum’, ‗imperium’ or ‗res publica’. It was John Pocock
325
 who first argued that in 
fact the word which in western languages is spelled ‗state‘, ‗der Staat‘, ‗l’etat‘, 
originally comes from Italian ‗lo stato‘.
326
 Quentin Skinner offers the first use of the 
word ‗state‘ to Machiavelli, who used ‗lo stato‘ to mean a neutral political state that 
could refer to any government.
327
 Skinner claims, the word ‗state‘ originated from 
the diversity of Italian political entities, constitutions, boundaries and loyalties. The 
word itself means ‗a base‘, ‗ground‘ or ‗foundation‘, and because of this ‗state‘ can 
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Secondly, Schmitt defines the state as an entity of a people
329
; the state is the 
political status of a people. Hence, in Schmitt‘s view, the existence of the state 
presupposes the distinction between friend and enemy. Thus, ‗state‘ is a political 
distinction which ultimately manifests itself in the right of a government to wage 
war. This is what distinguishes the state from all other types of organisations in 
society such as tennis clubs, political parties or churches.  
 Schmitt sees liberalism as the force behind a progressive destruction of the 
political dimension of the modern state. He seems to be especially critical of the type 
of pluralist theory which understands the state as just one of the many social 
organisations; if the state is to be understood as a political community, it must be 
sovereign. In the pluralist perspective, Schmitt argues, the state not only ceases to be 
the most important type of human organisation, as individuals might see their 
membership in the church or in the tennis club as in fact more central to their lives, 
but it also strips the state of its political dimension. 
 Perhaps more importantly for Schmitt, liberalism presents a threat to politics 
because of its inability to incorporate radical conflict in its political language. As a 
consequence in liberal democracy, as Schmitt writes, the ‗adversary is not an enemy 
but a disturber of peace‘.
330
 In other words, for Schmitt liberalism fails to see that 
political language is in fact antagonistic and polemical.
331
 All political notions have 
the ability to turn the world into the dichotomy of friend and enemy.
332
 ‗Every 
religious, moral, economic, ethical, or other antithesis transforms into a political one 




Schmitt‘s theory is problematic perhaps most visibly because of the one-
dimensional explanation he offers regarding the way the political people are 
constructed. However, his criticism of the liberal concept of politics is persuasive. 
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Like Arendt, Schmitt believes that the eradication of the distinction between the 
private and the public, and consequently between a personal and political enemy, is 
destructive to the concept of politics itself. 
Having said that, we must remember that the issue of the distinction between 
the private and public is in fact at the centre of modern liberalism (as seen in the 
above section). It is an important part of the principle of limited government that is 
vital to the liberal understanding of individual freedom. Without this distinction, 
individuals become vulnerable to the abuse of power. But it is precisely the value of 
private life in the liberal model that is criticised by Arendt and Schmitt. They argue 
that once we all cease to have the need for public engagement politics becomes 
nothing more than a managerial activity.  
Furthermore, Agnes Heller claims that Schmitt‘s conception of the autonomy 
of the political is a misleading approach to theorising politics. In particular, she 
argues that Schmitt‘s theory attempts to transform everything into a political thing, 
thus reducing the abundance of forms of life to one single political form.
334
 As a 
result, in Heller‘s analysis of Schmitt, his concept of the political is not autonomous, 
but in fact parasitic.  
Both Arendt‘s and Schmitt‘s accounts of the concept of ‗the political‘ are 
perhaps least convincing when it comes to nationhood. They fail to acknowledge the 
role of the nation in creating a framework for a political community (Chapter One). 
In contrast, for Arendt it is precisely the notion of the nation-state that finally 
threatens the idea of politics as a limited public activity. In the following two 
sections I will discuss how well-founded her suspicion is.  
 
4.2. Why Politics Cannot Be Universal 
Let us now move to the problem of the universality of politics itself. I will show that 
politics cannot be universal because it ultimately rests on an idea of bounded 
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rationality. This issue seems to be at the heart of both Arendt‘s and Schmitt‘s 
arguments. For Schmitt, politics is a limited activity ex definitione as the political 
entity presupposes the real existence of an enemy and therefore coexistence with 
another political entity.
335
 Politics cannot be universal. It is a ‗pluriverse‘
336
, meaning 
that political community has to be limited. For Arendt, politics can only be 
understood as a limited sphere of human action which is, in essence, a bounded 
activity. Politics is conceived as a place where individuals choose to appear publicly 
among others. But the creation of this public space is conditioned by the forms in 
which we are able to appear to each other. In polis this was made easier because of 
its size. With the birth of the nation-state this can only be achieved through the 
representation of the nation, as I discussed in Chapter Three. 
 The question of the universality of politics has become particularly 
significant in the context of the contemporary globalised world. Globalisation does 
not only mean a change in the way we perceive the nation‘s place among other 
nations. It also transforms our understanding of political action. This is due to two 
phenomena; firstly, our lives are increasingly affected by global factors such as 
global warming or an international credit crunch. These phenomena are universal 
because they affect us all. As a consequence the national perspective becomes 
insufficient from which to tackle many of the most significant issues on the political 
agenda of Western countries. Secondly, with globalisation comes an awareness of 
certain issues evoking a sense of compassion or solidarity. Issues such as poverty, 
human rights abuses, genocide and other types of mass suffering are increasingly 
perceived on the grounds of common humanity transcending national or racial 
boundaries. The universalist view can be summed up by saying that with this notion 
of humanity, politics should enter a new era which makes traditional state boundaries 
obsolete.  
 According to the universalist view, the limitation of political community to a 
specific ethnic or cultural entity is based on prejudice. It rests on an irrational 
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attachment to what is ours and what David Miller calls the ignorance of the outside 
world.
337
 However, language is much more than an instrument of communication. It 
represents the network of meanings through which people communicate, give 
themselves a common identity and determine their attitude towards social and 
political institutions. Social life creates values and norms which articulate and 
conserve these meanings. Thus, language originates from the way people imagine 
their bonds and mutual duties; political concepts resemble these images. As Barbara 
Markiewicz points out, - ‗if they do not - we become unable to articulate new 
situations‘.
338
 Faced with nationalism, terrorism and the risk society,
339
 the task of 
political theory is to incorporate these phenomena into our political language in a 
way that will enable us to talk about them, make judgments and eventually express 
our interests.  
 The position I am advocating comes, just as in David Miller‘s case, from an 
assumption that there is no universal language and that rationality is based on 
sentiments and practices which originate from living together as individual actors 
within the political realm.
340
 In fact, this does not necessarily lead to a strictly 
conservative or nationalist political philosophy as discussed in the upcoming section. 
Instead, what I wish to highlight here is that the claim about limited rationality can 
be compatible with a concept of citizenship based on a formal rather than a 
substantive relationship.  
A good example of this is the discussion in Chapter Three regarding Michael 
Oakeshott‘s concept of civil association. There, I explained how he defines the 
concept of civil association in contrast to enterprise association,
341
 or a substantive 
relationship based on needs or wants. Members of such an organization have to share 
specific beliefs, values or views.
342
 Once the wants are satisfied, there is no further 
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need for this relationship. Consequently, an enterprise association is not a political 
association. The membership in this type of organization is highly exclusive because 
it requires a prior agreement on a substantive goal or goals – an agreement that is 
usually expressed before joining such an association.  
Conversely, I explained that civil association is a relationship in terms of 
practice and not in terms of substantive wants.
343
 In other words, civil association is 
an agreement on rules as the conditions of the association but not on specific choices 
and is understood solely in terms of its own authority.
344
 However, even though such 
a relationship is not based on a common substantive good or bonds of blood, it is still 
a bounded view of the political community. This is because the rules that constitute 
civic association are intelligible to its members only through the common practices 
and the language of civil intercourse.
345
 
 A somewhat different argument against the universality of politics comes 
from Chantal Mouffe. Mouffe argues that the concept of universality belongs to the 
moral and not the political order.
346
 Drawing on Schmitt in her reconstruction of the 
concept of the political, Mouffe shows that the political requires an underlying 
antagonism without which pluralism becomes an empty slogan. She argues that if we 
are to take democracy seriously, we need to encourage a higher level of meaningful 
difference. ‗A healthy democratic process calls for vibrant clash of political positions 
and an open conflict of interests. If such is missing, it can too easily be replaced by a 
confrontation between non-negotiable moral values and essentialist identities.‘
347
 To 
say that pluralism depends on antagonism is to say that politics is not only a way of 
transforming conflict, but that conflict is a condition of politics in general in the 
sense that it provides the options necessary for political choice. This is why Mouffe 
is critical about liberal democracy as well as liberal cosmopolitanism. The notion of 
humanity as a community is not political because it does not allow for the 
recognition of meaningful difference.  
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 Mouffe sees politics as a domain of practical reason rather than universal 
moral values and thus her argument rests on the idea of bounded rationality.
348
 
Drawing on Arendt and Aristotle, she refers to the distinction between episteme and 
doxa. Politics is not the domain of truth or being, but is instead constituted by the 
world of appearances. Hence, to have an opinion means to choose to appear in a 
certain way in the public sphere.  
The concept of bounded rationality reaches far deeper than the conservative 
liberal, Oakeshottian concept of a practice or tradition. It is rooted in the conditions 
of possibility of the political community itself. Based on my exposition of Mouffe‘s 
argument, we can now see why the universalist position cannot be accepted. In the 
next section, I discuss the problem of bounded rationality in the context of the 
modern nation.  
 
4.3. Nationhood and Bounded Rationality 
Even if we agree that politics is a bounded activity, this still does not eliminate the 
normative question regarding the appropriate way of setting limits to political 
community. Setting the limits of political association according to ethnic or historical 
boundaries is problematic. In particular, it might seem strange that the benefits of the 
universality of political action that has recently been achieved in most liberal 
democracies are not to be extended to all. In this final section, I examine reasons why 
national boundaries should be defended as both adequate and historically necessary 
conditions of modern political community. I argue that nationality is foundationally 
political and, in this sense, cannot be understood in solely ethnic or cultural terms.
349
 
Firstly I will present Miller‘s argument regarding bounded rationality. Then, I will 
move on to discuss Anderson‘s definition of the nation as imagined community and 
explain why it can only be imagined in political terms. I want to defend two claims: 
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1) That nationhood provides a framework of bounded rationality because it creates a 
world that is familiar to us by shared practices, and because 2) it creates a world in 
which we can imagine others as fellow member of the community without having to 
directly interact with them.  
David Miller‘s argument can be briefly summarised as follows: Nationality 
relates us to a particularist perspective, where ‗my place‘ becomes more valuable 
than the outside world. This view is based on an idea of bounded rationality which 
gives preference to subjective knowledge based on sentiment and practice rather than 
reason. As a result, the nationalist view produces the distinction between us and them 
understood in the framework of what is known and tamed, and the wilderness of the 
outside world.
350
 However, this distinction is key to producing the kind of 
community of responsibility that the modern state requires.
351
 In this sense, the 
statement ‗mine is better‘ should not be considered as a claim proceeding from a 
prior truth. It is in fact a solely normative statement about the nature of our 
obligations.  
Andrew Vincent criticises Miller‘s defence of national identity as a necessary 
unifying force for statehood. While he agrees that nation can indeed create a 
community of responsibility, so can other forms of particuralistic bonds and 
commitments such as religion, ideology, class and moral ideals, all of which can 
‗generate belonging‘. 
352
 I agree in principle with Vincent‘s statement that the nation 
is not the only source of belonging and political partiality and do not think this 
assertion undermines Miller‘s argument. This would be the case if Miller perceived 
nationhood simply as a type of personal identity; however, his defence of national 
identity goes beyond conceptualising it in terms of a group of individuals unified by 
shared beliefs.   
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Miller distinguishes what he calls the three dimensions of nationality. The 
first dimension is that nationality is part of personal identity.
353
 This is the most 
evident level of nationality, as it relates to the way we understand ourselves as 
members of a concrete historical community. The second dimension is ethnic, which 
means that as far as the nation embodies historical continuity,
354
 it is based on a set 
of shared values or beliefs that broadly constitute an ethnic group. But the third 
dimension is specifically political and is key to understanding the previous two 
dimensions.
355
 This is an assertion that the nation is constituted and maintained by 
belief and not a substantively understood set of shared features or values.
356
 The 
historical continuity of a political people is mythical and its perception changes 
constantly throughout history. What constitutes a nation as a political community is 
then not common identity but a shared attachment to a mythically defined homeland 
which is linked to a geographical place.
357
 This notion of a homeland is the source of 
the nation‘s claim to self-determination.  
 Miller‘s argument is, however, still an incomplete expression of the political 
dimension of nationhood. By claiming that a shared national identity is necessary for 
mobilizing people to provide collective goods, he seems to be allowing the nation to 
remain within a contractual theory of society. Miller argues that a contractual 
understanding of citizenship as an exchange of public goods would be impossible if 
we were to base it on the idea of a shared humanity.
358
  
Miller‘s account of national identity focuses on the individual who needs a 
familiar world in order to make practical judgements. However, the nation provides 
much more than just familiar practices and habits. It also allows us to recognise 
others as equal members of our community. This point is best shown by Benedict 
Anderson. He argues that to understand nationalism in terms of what he calls an 
‗imagined community‘ is to imagine it as both inherently limited and sovereign.
359
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Nation is an imagined community because none of the citizens will ever be able to 
know all of its members;
360
 thus, the relationship with others is ‗imagined‘. In this 
sense, nation is not the only type of an imagined community. All types of political 
peoples could be understood in that way. In fact, it was only in the case of the ancient 
Greek polis where the political space was limited to a hill where all citizens could 
meet and see each other. Since then, as Robert Dahl skilfully described, political 




For Anderson, the element distinguishing nations from other types of 
imagined communities is the idea of time characteristic to national consciousness. As 
I mentioned in Chapter One, nations are understood as historical entities moving 
through time.
362
 Anderson‘s analysis is set to spell out the conditions under which 
such an act of imagining becomes possible. He argues that with the collapse of the 
religious paradigm, history lost its eschatological character and is no longer 
understood as part of the divine plan. Nationalism has put history in the place of 
God.
363
 Within the nation, individual members find the meaning of their worldly 
existence in homogenous and empty time: 
 
‗The century of Enlightenment, of rationalist secularism, brought with it its own 
modern darkness. With the ebbing of religious belief, the suffering which belief 
in part composed did not disappear. Disintegration of paradise: nothing makes 
fatality more arbitrary. Absurdity of salvation: nothing makes another style of 
continuity necessary. What then was required was a secular transformation of 




Anderson argues that nationalism responds to our need for the divine and 
transcendent because even though we are individually mortal, nations are not.  
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This brings us back to the point that David Miller also made: the origins of 
national identity are always mythical. Nations are not supposed to have historical 
births or deaths, although they may have mythical ones.
365
 Anderson attempts to 
show that only through this ‗immortality in history‘
366
 could rulers demand their 
citizens to sacrifice their lives in the name of the nation. Nationhood postulates an 
imagined community between the past, present and future. This relationship is 
symbolic and can be found in institutions and monuments such as the tomb of the 
unknown soldier.
367
 However, it is also narrative in the sense that in the empty 
homogenous historical time in which nations exist and develop the meaning of our 
actions is determined by their order in time.  





 The kind of continuity that this notion of history presupposes 
allows us to think of ourselves as part of a collective historical entity moving through 
time. ‗These societies are sociological entities of such firm and stable reality that 
their members (A and D) can even be described as passing each other on the street, 
without ever becoming acquainted, and still be connected.‘ 
369
  
Nationhood is, for Anderson, a community of imagination in which 
‗everyone‘ participates. I will not go into details of how Anderson thinks this 
community of imagination became historically possible as this is not part of my 
argument. Suffice it to say that it is this type of imagination that makes the entire 
state machinery possible. Not only because it provides historical limits of the 
political community, but also because it serves as a source of obedience and 
sacrifice.  
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Conclusion 
To summarise my argument, I have discussed the main reasons against a universalist 
view of politics. In the first part I have reconstructed the narrow concept of politics 
as a public activity. Drawing on Schmitt and Arendt I showed that this narrow view 
of politics is fragile and remains in contradiction to the liberal model of politics, in 
which the political is not autonomous from the social. In the second section I 
examined the reasons why politics in this narrow sense cannot be a universal activity. 
Finally, in the third section I argued that the nation can be seen as an embodiment of 
the political principle of bounded rationality.  
It must now be examined whether the nation is an adequate horizon for 
political community. In Chapter Five I argue that it is precisely because nation has 
the ability to create an identity that incorporates universal values and ways for 
political activity to transcend state borders. I will show this by analysing the 
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5 
Cosmopolitanism vs. Nationalist Particularism:
370
 
Beyond the Alternative 
The historical role of the nation in providing a framework of bounded rationality and 
thus promoting individual autonomy, which I discussed in Chapters Two and Four, 
faces challenges today. On the one hand, nations continue to stimulate our political 
imagination, contrary to what the propagators of the ‗decline of the nation‘ in the 




 attempt to make us believe. In particular, 
globalisation (or the set of processes we generally call globalisation) arguably has 
not led to an erosion of national politics. Far from it - while it is true that issues such 
as migration have effectively transformed the rules of access to citizenship and 
nationality, these same issues have encouraged the growth of regional identities in 
places such as Scotland, Wales, Quebec and Catalonia.
372
 Moreover, the post-Soviet 
resurrection of nationalism in 1989 represents a separate issue, as Eastern European 
nationalism is often described as being more ethno-centric than the Western version 
of nationalism.
373
 On the other hand, the emergence of international norms, 
transnational identities, migration and the growing awareness of global risks 
(economic, environmental, etc.), challenges the limitations of citizenship to national 
boundaries by putting into question the special value we assign to shared national 
identity. In view of such challenges, there is a growing need to reconceptualise the 
limits of political community. 
In previous chapters I showed why the concept of the nation was and remains 
central to modern politics. I argued that nations are political constructs creating a 
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framework of bounded rationality promoting the development of individual 
autonomy and reflecting the tension within the modern self. I now move on to 
responding to the third and last line of the criticism of nationhood
374
, which is that 
nations are an obstacle to the moral progression of humankind. This objection is 
raised particularly by cosmopolitans, who challenge the idea of national boundaries 
as being morally arbitrary.
375
 In fact, some cosmopolitans often perceive the 
emergence of the new transnational order as a step towards cosmopolitan norms. The 
nation is either seen as an obstacle on the way to that order or as an artefact of the 
past.  
To be clear, globalisation is neither a component in nor a condition of 
cosmopolitanism, but instead provides a crucial context for cosmopolitanism. 
Globalisation challenges our views about what a political community should be and 
facilitates the emergence and protection of cosmopolitan norms. These include not 
only high profile norms such as human rights, but also, as Jeremy Waldron notices, 
various forms of economic and trade conventions, rules and practices.
376
 In this 
chapter, I argue that the debate and the alleged disagreement between nationalist 
particularism and cosmopolitanism is largely rooted in a distorted view of what 
nations are. Contrary to some of the assumptions made in this literature, for example 
in Nussbaum,
377
 the dichotomy of nationalist particularism and cosmopolitanism 
does not mirror the relationship between particularity and universalism in modernity. 
That dichotomy fails to acknowledge that while the nation remains the key 
framework for our political experience, this experience opens up to new transnational 
and global dimensions.  
I will begin by defining both concepts: ‗nationalist particularism‘ and 
‗cosmopolitanism‘, in order to outline the tensions between them. Drawing on 
Samuel Scheffler‘s distinction between ‗cosmopolitanism about culture‘ and 
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‗cosmopolitanism about justice‘,
378
 I will discuss both categories in turn. Defining 
nationalist particularism is even more problematic than cosmopolitanism both 
because of the abundance and diversity of the literature on the nation, as well as the 
enigmatic position the concept of the nation has in political philosophy. I, however, 
will concentrate my efforts on liberal nationalism as it is the most relevant to the 
debate. In the second section, I will examine each one of these views in more detail.  
Cosmopolitanism about culture (which I will call cultural cosmopolitanism) 
can be very broadly defined by the melange principle – recognition that a 
cosmopolitan culture can incorporate multiple particularisms. Cosmopolitans about 
culture perceive the development of a cosmopolitan self as a necessary condition of 
the individual‘s capacity to flourish.
379
 Specifically, I will look at Jeremy Waldron‘s 
interpretation of Kant‘s Cosmopolitan Right and supplement this discussion with 
Beck‘s concept of cosmopolitanisation.
380
 Cosmopolitanism about justice, which is 
sometimes seen as ‗proper‘ philosophical cosmopolitanism, is defined by its 
opposition to restricting the scope of the conception of justice to bounded 
communities.
381
 In its political form, cosmopolitanism about justice rests on the 
claim that there are cosmopolitan norms providing foundations for a global 
institutional order.  
I will focus on Held‘s model of cosmopolitan democracy and Benhabib‘s idea 
of democratic iterations.
382
 Both make a claim that nation-states provide an arbitrary 
and insufficient container for democratic citizenship and suggest the need of 
extending the demos globally. This will lead me to reconstructing the defence of the 
national case. There are two main lines of this defence: that nations are necessary 
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elements of social cohesion and solidarity (David Miller)
383
 and that nation-states 
provide the best framework for liberal democratic citizenship (Will Kymlicka).
384
  
However, as I will argue in section three, the battlefield indicated by this 
debate is misplaced. The debate between cosmopolitanism and nationalist 
particularism should be phrased neither in a language of universality (of norms) 
versus particularity (of political identity) nor by national and post-national politics. 
Neither is a defence of the nation contradictory to certain types of moral and political 
universalism. In the fourth section I show how my comprehensive view of 
nationhood as a form of political experience allows us to overcome the tension 
between cosmopolitan norms and national sentiment.  
 In short, nations do matter more than some advocates of ‗celebratory 
cosmopolitanism‘ want to admit.
385
 They remain the most persuasive political 
container and a source of the modern political self. Cosmopolitan norms are 
nevertheless becoming increasingly central to the way we understand politics. 
Nation-state and cosmopolis are not logically exclusive. At best, the opposition 
between the two is dialectic. And, as with any dialectic opposition, the answer to the 




As a result of globalisation, the way we lead our lives increasingly transcends 
national boundaries and other local political or cultural identities. This has been 
recognised in the sociological literature, where ‗cosmopolitanism‘ does not refer to a 
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normative theory but a lived experience of a ‗denationalised‘ self.
386
 This empirical 
‗cosmopolitanism‘ is increasingly seen as a fact of ordinary life.
387
 However, the 
allegedly ‗cosmopolitan‘ lifestyle, which can be experienced in the centres of 
international trade (such as London or New York), is nevertheless only distantly 
related to normative cosmopolitanism. The term ‗cosmopolitan‘, certainly does not 
mean the same as ‗global‘. However, contemporary globalised culture does have a 
cosmopolitan dimension in the philosophical sense as well. The term cosmos comes 
from the ancient Greek word for ‗order‘ and referred to the idea of an ordered 
universe. In that sense, to be cosmopolitan, means to seek order within the global 
processes surrounding us. Cosmopolitanism cannot be identified with the hybrid 
forms of identity which I discuss in Chapter Six, but does refer to the world in which 
people who have these identities interact with each other in a certain way. A 
definition of cosmopolitanism must then be put on two separate scales. On one hand, 
cosmopolitanism is always a type of universalism. This is what sets it apart from 
different forms of patriotism and from post-modern concepts of hospitality that are 
particularistic, like those found in Derrida.
388
 On the other hand, cosmopolitanism 
also represents the belief in a rational order unlike, for example, the theory of global 




The term cosmopolitanism, in a relatively broad, modern sense, refers to a 
claim that a recognizable universalistic moral order exists and places demands on 
both individuals and polities. The precise nature and status of these demands depends 
on the variety of cosmopolitan thought. One should note that the universalistic 
character of cosmopolitanism is somewhat paradoxical. As Nicholas Rengger notes, 
it relies on an understanding that we are able to recognise certain norms as 
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universal.
390
 However, we who supposedly recognise these universal norms can only 
do so from a specific time and place.  
There are several classifications of cosmopolitanism, most of which 
distinguish between moral and political variants.
391
 The former demands recognition 
of universal moral norms that apply both to states and individuals but are non-
mandatory.
392
 The latter represents a group of theories arguing for institutional 
change
393
 in such as they recognise the existence of global norms that should take 
priority over domestic law. This basic distinction is relatively useful as it highlights 
the difference between global ethics and global justice. While ethics can be personal 
and do not require an institutional framework (though institutions can be based on 
ethics), if we understand cosmopolitan norms as principles of justice, this 
necessitates the emergence of adequate global institutions. 
For the purpose of my discussion, I adopt the afore-mentioned Scheffler‘s 
distinction between cosmopolitanism about justice and cosmopolitanism about 
culture.
394
 I will use the term ‗cultural cosmopolitanism‘ interchangeably with 
‗cosmopolitanism about culture‘. This cultural type of cosmopolitanism is 
particularly interesting, as it does not seem to be easily included either in moral or 
political models of cosmopolitan thought but is instead based on the concept of 
identity relating to both. The claim here is not that globalisation results in a 
cosmopolitan state. It is rather that globalisation brings out the natural hybridity of 
our individual selves. We, according to this view, have a natural capacity to create 
our own identities, to which national borders neither give justice nor provide 
sufficient space. 
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To sum up, although the term ‗cosmopolitan‘ is hard to define, the 
cosmopolitan theories I have discussed share a belief in the existence of universal 
norms (ethical and judicial). Some theories require a more institutional approach than 
others. A discussion about cosmopolitanism is critical to this discussion on national 
loyalties because national loyalties can clash with cosmopolitan norms, particularly 
when duties to our fellow nationals take priority over those of strangers or prevent 
the establishment of cosmopolitan institutions. Having said that, there are also those 
variants of cosmopolitanism which reconcile national loyalty with cosmopolitan 
norms (such as Beitz or Appiah).
395
 Cosmopolitanism does not need to be a theory 
according to which our only allegiance is to humanity, but we can also conceive of 






5.1.2. Nationalist Particularism 
The concept of nationalist particularism is even more ambiguous than that of 
cosmopolitanism. This is partially because the concept of the nation did not receive 
much theoretical attention until the development of nationalism studies in the late 
1960s. I alluded to the many contesting definitions of the concept of the nation in 
Chapter One. However, the relatively minor role of the nation in political philosophy 
until the late 20
th
 century is another factor contributing to the confusion. Arguably, 
the term ‗nation‘ has only come to the forefront of philosophical debate three times: 
first, in German Idealism, which represented its romanticised version. Its second 
appearance is found in Mill‘s work on Representative Government,
397
 and its most 
recent appearance is in the debates around identity politics, multiculturalism and 
cosmopolitanism. These three ‗entries‘ of the language of the nation to philosophy 
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were quite independent from each other and in that sense do not constitute a coherent 
line of thought.  
According to Chowers, the romanticist vision of identity operated with 
distinctions between nature and culture, which placed the nation firmly within the 
former.
398
 Mill‘s understanding of the nation is perhaps expressed in a more 
accessible language, but it also firmly places nations in the apolitical realm as an 
individual preferred choice.
399
 The contemporary philosophical debate focuses on a 
relatively modern interpretation of the nation. In fact, most philosophical discussions 
of normative status of national bounadries are quite limited, in the sense in which 
they see it simply as a type of patriotism. The main components of nationhood are 
then a) a common identity that provides a basis for b) collective political claims to 
autonomy and c) a sense of a shared duty to fellow nationals. This is close to David 
Miller‘s understanding of national identity explicated in Chapter One. I will refer to 
nationalist particularism as a position that recognises a) and b) as the primary 
conditions of modern politics and makes a normative claim about c). I will be only 
interested then in the normative aspect of the debate on nationhood. 
 It should be noted that the deficit of theoretical reflection on the nation in 
modern political thought does not mean that the nation did not pose a problem to 
political thought before. On the contrary, as Margaret Canovan recently showed, the 
existence of nations is a ‗tacit presupposition of most current discourse in political 
theory‘.
400 
While many mainstream liberal theorists dismiss nationhood as a topic,
401
 
their focus on the institutions of the state fails to account for the fact that, as Rogers 
Brubaker argues, we live in a ‗world in which nationhood is perversely 
institutionalised in the practices of states and the workings of the state system.‘
402
 
                                                 
398
 Eyal Chowers, The Modern Self in the Labyrinth, Politics and the Entrapment Imagination, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2004, p. 29-34. 
399
 John S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, London, Routledge, 1904, p. 54. 
400
 Margaret Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, Glos 1996, p. 
13. 
401
 R. Goodin, P. Pettit (eds), A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, Oxford, Blackwell, 
1993, p. 3. 
402
 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in New Europe, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 21. 
 
  127 
The paradox of western political thought and the dominant liberal democratic 
discourse is that its universalist liberal democratic values originate from a particular 
set of political institutions and forms of identity. Canovan evokes the example of 
Rawls here, whose A Theory of Justice was supposed to abstract from particular 
social circumstances, but according to Canovan, it took for granted that the principles 
of justice apply only within a bounded national community, ‗recruited primarily by 
birth‘.
403
   
 
5.2. The Debate 
In this section I discuss what I see as the two central variants of cosmopolitanism and 
the nationalist particularist response to those variants. I will focus on the problem of 
whether national boundaries should play a central role when setting the limits of 
individual political obligation. The first part of this section is concerned with cultural 
cosmopolitanism where I show that cosmopolitanism is not only about norms and 
duties, but can relate to ways of managing identity. The second part of this section 
discusses cosmopolitanism about justice and in the third part I present the nationalist 
particularist response to these ideas.  
 
5.2.1. Cultural Cosmopolitanism 
Philosophers can easily be tempted to disregard the ambiguities of notions 
originating from the social science world. However, as I have shown earlier in this 
thesis, cosmopolitanism is not simply a philosophical concept. Like all political 
ideals, it springs from concrete and existing forms of moral, aesthetic and political 
life.  
The idea of a world citizen is classically seen as a normative ideal. While 
membership in political communities developed historically through building loyalty 
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around ethnic and territorial identities, cosmopolitanism often remained an abstract 
concept. Hence, some authors oppose the ‗cold‘ rationality of cosmopolitanism with 
‗warm‘ feelings of national belonging and patriotism.
404
 That distinction can only 
partly hold true. While it is right to say that cosmopolitanism represents a rational 
order that classically could be thought rather than felt, cosmopolitanism should not 
be treated as an abstract ideal. In fact, both Kantian and Stoic models of 
cosmopolitan thought represent a reaction to pre-existing social and political 
processes. For stoics, this was the experience of legal unification brought about 
through the Holy Roman Empire and, for Kant, the new realities of colonialism. As 
Waldron notes:  
 
[Kant‘s] convictions in the realm of cosmopolitan right were not just some bright 
normative idea that he thought up (in the way that a modern political philosopher 
in New England might think up a new theory of justice). His work on 
cosmopolitan right has a positive, expository dimension that addresses norms that 




Cultural cosmopolitanism specifically recognises pre-existing transnational 
identities. There are at least two types of cultural cosmopolitanism which I will call 
a) methodological and b) anthropological. Both types recognise that the lifestyle of 
the contemporary individual is only moderately influenced by national boundaries 
and geopolitical allegiances; both claim that the current state-centric system is a 
product of an obsolete outlook. In this sense, the normative question of whether we 
should have any special duties to our fellow nationals is preceded by what seems to 
be a more basic question: what is the ontological status of nations? The argument 
here is that these duties make no sense in much the same way as we cannot have 
special duties towards elves or gnomes. However, there is a crucial difference 
between methodological and anthropological cosmopolitanism. The former is a 
passive response to current global transformations. It does not make a normative 
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claim against nationalist particularism, but rather shows national boundaries as 
having increasingly less explanatory significance when trying to understand social 
structures and agents. The latter corresponds to an inherent quality of human 
interaction. In this view, all social boundaries are, in a sense, artificial. Cosmopolitan 
norms are simply rules of engagement originating from our interaction with others 
when they are not our compatriots. I will argue that only anthropological 
cosmopolitanism is cosmopolitan in the normative philosophical sense highlighted in 
Section One. 
 Methodological cosmopolitanism is a term most adequately associated with 
the work of Ulrich Beck. This sociological account of globalisation takes the 
nomadism and instability of contemporary identity as its starting point.  
 
One constructs one‘s identity by dipping freely into the Lego set of 
globally available identities and building a progressively inclusive self-
image. The result is a proud affirmation of a patchwork, quasi-
cosmopolitan, but simultaneously provincial, identity whose central 




There are two reasons why Beck‘s view can be called cosmopolitan rather than 
simply a theory of globalisation. Firstly, the new ‗liquid‘ reality means that identities 
are not only more complex but also less exclusive. This means that cosmopolitan 
norms can become ‗felt more‘. Or, in other words, our duties to aliens become less 
problematic as the opposition between citizen and alien loses its substance. Secondly, 
the liquidity of modernity means that we recognise global phenomena on a political 
level as well. This requires political action on a supra-national level.  
 
The globalization of politics, economic relations, law, culture, and 
communication, and interaction, networks, spurs controversy; indeed, the shock 
generated by global risks continually gives rise to worldwide political publics... 
In world risk society – this is my thesis, at least – the question concerning the 
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causes and agencies of global threats sparks new political conflicts, which in turn 





However, the idea that contemporary life is more cosmopolitan is ambiguous. 
On one hand, this idea is often used in reference to a consciously chosen lifestyle. It 
signifies a way of life to which contemporary man is seen to aspire. Part of this 
lifestyle is the ability to ‗make the world our home‘. However, realistically, that type 
of lifestyle is available only to the wealthy few.
408
 For a majority of the 
contemporary international workforce, mobility is not a result of freedom but is 
instead a necessity. They are not ‗at home‘, nor are they strictly ‗away‘. This other 
face of cosmopolitanism represents the mechanistic response of international 
institutions and movements to global threats and risks as well as the involuntary 
movement and mixing of the people.  
 Finally, even if we do accept that contemporary life is imbued with some sort 
of cosmopolitan quality, it is difficult to understand what sort of implications this 
could have for normative cosmopolitanism. One suggestion that seems to flow from 
this is that an individual who lives a life limited to one culture could not be 
cosmopolitan. Having said that, Beck‘s intuition that new transnational forms of 
identity and cosmopolitanism are related is justified. But the explanation does not lie 
in unprecedented globalisation or in the emergence of global risks, or even in global 
publics. I would rather argue with Jeremy Waldron that the link between 
cosmopolitanism and the cultural aspect of globalisation is that identity can be 
defined as ‗the way we present ourselves to others in a non-negotiable way‘.
409
 
Cosmopolitan norms both originate from, and are intended to regulate, this 
encounter. The alleged liquidity and openness of post-modern identities is not 
cosmopolitan in itself. As Jeremy Waldron notes, many cultures already have a 
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cosmopolitan aspect and there is something about human nature itself that is 
explorative in the cosmopolitan sense.
410
 This is what I call ‗anthropological 
cosmopolitanism‘.   
 According to Waldron‘s model, the cultural dimension of cosmopolitanism 
becomes apparent once we cease to understand cultural particularity as based on non-
negotiable identities. Conversely, the nationalist framework often encourages 
individuals to identify inherent differences between cultures by emphasising national 
uniqueness.
411
 These differences, according to Waldron, are not correctly perceived. 
In fact, most neighbouring cultures should be rather more similar than distinct
412
 as 
they take a lot from each other. (For example, every Polish child is taught about the 
uniqueness of its country‘s cuisine. What a disappointment to discover that pierogi 
are equally Russian, sekacz German, and most of the Christmas herring dishes are 
widely served in Sweden!
413
) Consequently, Waldron states that: ‗there is nothing 
excusive in culture – dancing, worshiping does not say anything about other cultures, 
or rather the relationship between the two is problematic‘.414 
Thus, the choice between nationalist particularism and cosmopolitanism is 
not only a question of norms. It is a decision about how individuals understand and 
approach culture and, as a result, what principles will apply when dealing with aliens 
who do not share it. For example, in a radically nationalist framework, my values are 
non-negotiable. I am monogamous because I am Polish. However, Waldron argues 
that this non-negotiability is rarely the case. Human beings need reasons to justify 
claims about who they are. But these explanations, unlike identities, are negotiable. 
So perhaps it happens that being Polish makes me more likely to be monogamous. 
However my commitment to monogamy is not justified by my ‗Polishness‘ but by 
my belief that monogamy is morally or practically superior to polygamy.
415
 The 
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actual justification might take various forms. It might be that I prefer monogamy 
because of the value I attach to a particular model of family based on a loving 
relationship between two individuals that makes their love unique etc. Or, it might be 
because I do not think that polygamy is particularly time-efficient. Waldron argues 
that as long as we can provide reasons for our commitment to certain values and 
norms, moral universalism ‗is not an affront to cultural particularity‘.
416
 
Waldron‘s approach to culture as a crucial issue when imagining our duties to 
aliens is rooted in his reading of Kant‘s theory of cosmopolitan right.
417
 Waldron 
defines cosmopolitan right as the area of law regulating relations between individuals 
and states, finding that cultural diversity and proximity are the circumstances of 
cosmopolitan right.
418
 While the Hobbesian idea of social contract accounts for a 
diversity of interests, Kant‘s political philosophy is concerned with a more basic 
conflict about the ideas of right and justice.
419
 According to Waldron, Kant suggests 
that because the world is a sphere and we are forced to live in proximity to other 
cultures [which do not share our concept of right] cosmopolitan right regulates the 
way we share this world with other people.
420
 Benhabib criticises this interpretation 
of Kant by claiming that the link between cultural diversity and cosmopolitan right is 
contingent.
421
 However, it seems intuitive that cosmopolitan right is not simply a 
normative idea but, as Waldron argues, responds to an area of human interaction. 
More specifically, it is an answer to the political and moral question about how to 
accommodate diversity. Cosmopolitan right, according to Waldron, represents then 
the rules that originate from law-generating practices across cultures and polities 
rather than some sort of abstract universalist moral order.  
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5.2.2. Cosmopolitanism about Justice  
Let us now move on to cosmopolitanism about justice. While cultural 
cosmopolitanism opposed the idea that closed communities are necessary for the 
development of individuals and advocated new forms of hybrid identities, 
cosmopolitanism about justice opposes national particularism on altogether different 
grounds.
422
 It is based on the conviction that national boundaries can, as Nussbaum 
claims, ‗oppose justice and equality‘ and that ‗nation is about morally irrelevant 
differences that only cosmopolitanism can overcome‘.
423
 The idea that individual‘s 
primary allegiance should be to humanity has been criticised for being based on an 
abstract and unrealistic view of the self. Nussbaum‘s view of cosmopolitanism 
presupposes the existence of universal norms and values which can be identified 
through the virtue of simply being human.  
It is important to note that even a commitment to a universalist view of 
morality does not imply the negation of importance of national boundaries. As Miller 
notes, national boundaries might still be relevant in implementing universal duties 
because they create communities of ‗widest feasible membership, and therefore with 
the greatest scope for redistribution in favour of the needy‘.
 424
 In this section I will 
discuss cosmopolitanism about justice mainly by referring to Held‘s theory of 
cosmopolitan citizenship and Benhabib‘s theory of democratic iterations. 
Held argues that if we understand democracy as simply the ability of the 
people to make decisions for themselves, then this cannot be achieved solely within 
the limits of national boundaries.
425
 In his work, Held tries to clarify the difference 
between international forms of life in the past and present. While it is clear to him 
that certain forms of cosmopolitan life are not novel, we are currently experiencing 
the erosion of national boundaries. More specifically, Held argues, our political 
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actions can no longer be limited to one state. Issues such as security (terrorism, 
international crime), environment, energy or scientific advances cannot be 
successfully tackled at state level. This, according to Held, poses questions of 
legitimacy as our lives are increasingly dependent on decisions made outside the 
state (whether that is the European Union, United Nations or a result of an action 
taken by a different country).
 426
 For instance, country A‘s commitment to cutting 
greenhouse gas emissions can be effective only if countries B, C, or D follow the 
same move. In short, Held claims that nation-states do not make decisions only for 
themselves
427
 and that this creates a deficit of democracy. The only just way to 
address this problem is to propose an institutional framework that would lead to a 
broadening of citizenship so that national rights of people are in line with 
cosmopolitan law. 
Benhabib has a different starting point than Held but in a sense she arrives at 
the same destination. Unlike Held, her primary goal is not to address the political or 
democratic deficiencies of the international system. This is partly because she is 
concerned with individuals rather than with states and partly because she believes 
that ‗the democratic‘ is in a sense secondary to our idea of citizenship.  
In Another Cosmopolitanism, Benhabib sets out her understanding of the 
status of cosmopolitan norms: 1) Cosmopolitan norms are about the relations 
between individuals within a global civil society; 2) they exist as neither moral nor 
legal rights but somewhere in-between; lastly, 3) because of their in-between state, 
they are conditioned on the existence of national communities.
428
 This in turn defines 
the main problems we encounter with cosmopolitan rights. If they are indeed neither 
moral nor legal, then are they binding? Naturally, this leads readers to question 
further whether cosmopolitan rights are morally or politically binding and whether 
they apply to individuals or to states or both. If they are about individuals in a global 
civil society and they do not originate from our duties to each other as members of a 
state, then what are their philosophical foundations? Finally, if cosmopolitan rights 
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are conditioned by the existence of the state, then how is that compatible with a 
global civil society?
429
 This dilemma is at the heart of Benhabib‘s theory:
430
 How can 
we have a global civil society together with self-confined communities? The paradox 
is that they cannot exist any other way. Benhabib argues that universal claims are 
integrated into the will of any sovereign citizenry in that the legitimacy of a 
constitution is conditioned by its adherence to basic human rights.
431
 But also, 
historically, the democratic rights of a particular nation were  understood as rights of 
man. The paradox here is that democracies require borders. In short, democratic 
rights exist in a tension between the universal will of the people and the particularity 
brought about by the self-defining quality of that will.   
Benhabib‘s solution to this dilemma is innovative. She suggests that we mend 
or at least narrow the gap between cosmopolitan norms and particular politics 
‗through renegotiation and reiteration of the dual commitments to human rights and 
sovereign and self-determined nation ‗.
432
 This can take various forms, from 
linguistic, to legal and political reinterpretations.
433
 Thus, the concept of democratic 
iteration claims to describe an actual process in which the increasingly disaggregated 
citizenship
434
 provides a bridge between cosmopolitanism and particularity.
435
 The 
normative claim is that we should encourage these processes wherever they emerge 
from opening up citizenship, to transforming the rights of immigrants.  
The concept of democratic iterations, while theoretically interesting, does 
encounter problems. Benhabib wants us to believe that the authority of cosmopolitan 
norms ultimately rests on ‗the power of democratic forces within the global civil 
society‘.
436
 Identifying what these democratic forces are and where they are located 
is problematic. If indeed we accept that democratic iterations are legal, cultural and 
political
437
 then why are they not also commercial, or anti-political? When Benhabib 
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claims that these norms are neither moral nor political but morally constructive,
438
 
she does so in an attempt to escape moral universalism. But arguably her attempt 
fails. It seems, at the very least, problematic to claim that this process is democratic 
where democracy implies the equal ability to participate, and the seaming of such 
abilities is so variable across the globe.  
Perhaps more importantly, the idea that cosmopolitan norms are in-between 
moral and political norms is difficult to comprehend. If cosmopolitan norms indeed 
escape such categorisations, how can they be binding? Furthermore, it is unclear how 
a norm can be morally constructive but not moral in itself. Are then cosmopolitan 
norms the only example of the former? It seems that Benhabib‘s solution raises more 
questions than it solves.  
 
5.2.3. The Case for the Nation 
As I noted in the introductory chapter, there is a deficit of philosophical reflection on 
the political role of national identity. As explained in Chapter Three, this is partially 
due to the alleged ‗a-‘ or ‗anti-political‘ status of nationhood in much of political 




 In the following section I will discuss three 
notable contemporary defences of the case for national particularism: Miller‘s 
concept of national identity as a basis for solidarity, Kymlicka‘s idea of the nation as 
the ‗proper‘ container for democratic citizenship and Tamir‘s notion of the cultural 
nation. I have chosen these particular models partly because they are representative 
of the most successful lines of defence of nationhood within this debate. In addition, 
all three of the above accept the core assumptions of cosmopolitan discourse. In that 
sense, focusing on them will make the case for incorporating the nation into 
philosophical debate clearer.  
I am intentionally leaving out the non-liberal defence of nationhood that 
Margaret Canovan calls ‗romantic‘ or ‗collectivist nationalism‘.
440
 According to that 
                                                 
438
 Op. cit., p. 72.  
439
 See Chapter 2 
440
 Margaret Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, Glos 1996, p. 5. 
 
  137 




 and the Polish Messianism
443
 (to 
mention a few), nationalism is a sacred calling.
444
 On this view, individuals are 
bound by a sacred duty to a nation, rather than to each other.  ‗Nation‘ is understood 
as a moral entity, which has an equivalent substance as individuals. Consequently, in 
romantic nationalism, it is claimed that states should mirror the way in which God 
divided mankind into peoples.
445
 Canovan lists three objections to this model of 




There are, however, stronger reasons why we should reject the view that 
nations somehow represent natural collective entities with special rights. Even if 
humanity did ‗naturally‘ divide into nations, nations still remain contingent (though 
crucial) elements of modern identity. But the contemporary self can no longer relate 
as easily to that identity. As I show in Chapters One and Two, the transformations 
within modern subjectivity paralleling the development of nationalism, are not 
‗natural‘ elements of the human condition, but products of a particular framework of 
the modern mind. I will thus focus on three authors who represent different versions 
of liberal nationalism – Miller, Kymlicka and Tamir. In broad terms, liberal 
nationalism is defined by two beliefs: that national identity is valuable because 
individuals require a sense of national belonging to lead autonomous lives; and that 




 For David Miller
448
 national bonds provide a crucial foundation for social 
solidarity, which in turn allows people within modern states to participate in 
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providing collective goods.
449
 In that sense, the nation plays the role of the missing 
link in a certain version of social contract theory. In the classical liberal version, as 
found in Locke, we entrust ourselves to others based on the recognition of a common 
rationality. In contrast, Miller sees the idea of reason as the basis for social trust as 
implausible. In Citizenship and National Identity, he follows Hume in arguing that 
sentiment is more important than reason in forming social bonds. The nation, he 
argues, represents ‗my place‘. But it also represents the known world,
450
 hence 
everything that is outside the nation seems alien and irrational. For example, it is 
puzzling for many non-British that most British sinks have a hot and cold tap rather 
than one tap for both hot and cold water. This type of trivial encounter with otherness 
illustrates how nationality limits our perception of the world. However, Miller would 




 National identity for Miller is the sentiment that acts as glue for the 
construction of larger, more diverse modern societies requiring more unity across 
greater distances. It is an unprecedented phenomenon. Ancient empires were larger 
in terms of territory but were also based on huge inequalities between social classes 
and dependencies between the centre and periphery. The nation provides the first 
framework for social mobilization based on an imagined equality of the entire 
populace. The only way to achieve this equality is by constructing an imagined bond 
based on mythical history. According to Miller, nations represent such bonds, 
because his understanding of the nation based on ethnicity 
Kymlicka, on the other hand, focuses on the capacity of nationalism to 
accommodate ethnic, cultural and political diversity, because Kymlicka has a civic-
based definition of nationalism. The key problem of nationhood as a basis of setting 
political boundaries is that while successful in providing a framework for democratic 
citizenship and security, it is simultaneously often exclusive towards aliens – 
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foreigners, immigrants and sub-state minorities.
452
 But Kymlicka‘s defence of 
national identity rests on the fact that, according to him, we are limited to two 
possible ways out: either we tackle the exclusiveness of national boundaries by 
building ‗post-national or cosmopolitan citizenship‘ or we reduce the risk of liberal 
nationhood by diffusing it.
453
 Kymlicka notes that both features of modern 
citizenship, namely rights and responsibilities together with membership in a national 
community, are very recent.
454
  
 Kymlicka‘s argument is a response to Benhabib‘s analysis of the European 
Union‘s model of citizenship. In Another Cosmopolitanism, Benhabib discusses the 
disassociation of social and political right within the EU as an example of democratic 
iterations leading to cosmopolitan right.
455
 In contrast, Kymlicka argues that ‗Far 
from transcending liberal nationhood, the EU is universalizing it, reordering Europe 
in its image‘.
456
 What Benhabib sees as disassociation, Kymlicka interprets as one of 
the strategies of ‗taming‘ liberal nationhood. Through widening access to citizenship 
and the reasonable accommodation of immigrant ethnicity,
457
 the model of national 
identity can be transformed to a point where it can accommodate transnational 
loyalties.  
 In contrast to both Miller‘s and Kymlicka‘s theories, Tamir argues for a 
separation of nationhood from the principle of the political self-determination or self-
rule. Instead, she offers a cultural interpretation of the principle, where individuals 
should have the right to ‗express their national identity, to protect, preserve and 
cultivate the existence of their nation as a distinct entity‘.
458
 While, for Tamir, 
nations represent genuine and valuable historical and cultural identities, these are 
neither the only identities nor the only ones with political significance. They should 
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not be confused with membership in a state. Tamir sees a transformation in the role 
of nationalism. Nations, according to her, can no longer be seen as homogenous. 
Furthermore, they have lost their ability to facilitate modernisation and, thus, no 
longer represent the key motor of progress in contemporary democracies.
459
 
However, I agree with Margaret Canovan, who criticises Tamir‘s view for striding 
away from a discussion on how nations actually behave. Canovan states that:  
 
The weakest feature of the notion that the problems inherent in the politics of 
communal identity can be solved by displacing them from the level of the nation-
state is the assumption that an overarching political structure without the support 
of communal identity will be able to contain these conflicts and preside over 




According to her, while the state can command authority without being founded on 
the national principle, historically nations are the main sources of political power in 
modern western liberal democracies. Furthermore, Tamir‘s view of the relationship 
between nationalism and the state is also contestable. Firstly, she does not clarify in 
what sense nations were ever homogenous. The process of nation-building requires a 
parallel process of state unification. Most of the successful nationalist movements in 
which the nation secures power in its own state are not homogenous. Secondly, it is 
not clear how national identity would be distinguished from other types of cultural, 
ethnic or religious identities without the drive towards political determination.  
Canovan also criticises other liberal national theorists for similar reasons. 
Both Miller and Kymlicka recognise the dynamic nature of nationhood. Miller‘s 
view offers an alternative to a conservative justification of patriotism. Nationality, he 
claims, can incorporate diverse political ideals and is subject to rapid change.
461
 
Kymlicka‘s argument serves a similar purpose, but goes farther in establishing duties 
to widen access to citizenship to non-nationals. However, according to Canovan, the 
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definition of the nation within liberal nationalism is too vague. While the Scots are a 
relatively unproblematic example of the liberalisation of nationalism, Yugoslavia is 
not.
462
 Canovan shows how liberal theorists have taken for granted the existence of 
nation-states, particularly when ‗they say that distributive justice is restricted in 
scope to communities in which citizenship is a matter of birth and not choice‘.
463
  
While Canovan agrees with Miller that national identity is not fixed but is 
open to interpretation, she argues that this is not a beneficial feature of nationalism. 
Nations have always been subject to some kind of ideological manipulation. 
Canovan mentions Hitler, but that is just one example in which the openness of 
nationalism to interpretation can be dangerous.
464
 On a smaller scale we always face 
the danger of the consequences of redefining our own identity through a revision of 
history or patriotic education, both of which can have beneficial or harmful 
dimensions.  
 I agree with Canovan that reconciliation between nationalist particularism 
and liberal universalism is difficult and perhaps not completely feasible.
465
 It is a 
paradox unique to liberal theory because, as Canovan states, it is the nation that is 
ultimately supposed to provide the power necessary for the state to administer social 
justice and guarantee rights. Liberal attempts to substitute national allegiances with 
patriotism are, according to Canovan, unsuccessful as they either present us with a 
model of a community that is too weak or ‗as congenial as nationalism‘.
466
 But the 
liberal response to the problems posed by the nation has to be complex because any 
attempt at a universal answer overlooks the fact that nations do not exist 
universally.
467
 In the final section, I try to address these concerns by an approach to 
nationhood that I see as a partial solution to the problems noted by Canovan.  
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5.3. Moving Beyond the Alternative 
The problem that emerges from the debate I discussed in the previous section can be 
described as follows: cosmopolitanism rightly brings our attention to the artificial 
nature of national boundaries both in terms of justice and in terms of identity. We are 
increasingly urged to consider our duties to strangers, re-examine the special 
relationship we might have with fellow nationals and to open ourselves to other 
identities and ways of life. But, this vision of cosmopolis is contested, because it 
seems that our ability to recognise cosmopolitan norms from a position in which both 
our power to act politically (institutionally) and individually (as moral agents) is 
conditioned by the existence of nation-states. This dilemma is described by Canovan:  
 
By generating collective power and thereby establishing islands of firm 
ground among the treacherous swamps of political affairs, nationhood has 
allowed Western liberal theorists and publics to develop ideals and 
principles that are global in scope and to perceive them as projects rather 
than utopias. But the problem is not only how to build Jerusalem among 
the swamps. More seriously, we cannot easily reconcile the commitment 
to build Jerusalem for all mankind with the defence of our own patch of 




 In this last section, I want to point towards an alternative to the above 
dichotomy by arguing that the conceptual position of the idea of the nation has 
changed. I claim that the reason why cosmopolitanism and nationalist particularism 
may seem mutually exclusive is contingent on the definition of nationalism. In fact, 
even this is misleading. I already established in Chapters Two and Three that the 
nation is intrinsically political. Nationalism, then, becomes the movement to assume 
control of political boundaries as established by the state. Thus nationalism is the 
historical process of modern state-formation and is, politically exclusive and thus 
anti-universalistic. However, the concept of organising political communities into 
nations has proven both practically and theoretically open. This is partially because, 
as Kymlicka says, national citizenship can be ‗tamed‘ and made accessible. More 
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importantly, however, this is because nationhood expresses an ability for individuals 
to approach others as equals. As I show in Chapter Two, the tension within the 
modern political subject is crucial to our understanding of individual autonomy.   
One could object that it is impossible to separate the historical process of 
nation-building and the concept of the nation itself. This is partially true. The concept 
of the nation has undergone various transformations and is not solely derived from 
nation-building. But perhaps the most important transformation has taken place 
recently.  
Ulrich Beck, whose position I analyse in more detail in Chapter Seven, offers 
a sociological analysis of this phenomenon. As I mentioned earlier, his book, 
Cosmopolitan Vision, shows how the national outlook is gradually de-ontologised by 
the growth of global identities. This new reality is not simply an amendment to the 
membership criteria but, according to Beck, requires a completely new language to 
describe it.  
 
During the national phase of modernity cosmopolitanism could only be grasped 
intellectually, in the head, but could not be felt as a living experience. 
Nationalism, by contrast, took possession of people‘s hearts. This head-heart 
dualism is turned upside down in the second modernity. Everyday life had 
become cosmopolitan in benign ways; yet the insidious concepts of national-ism 
continue to hount people‘s minds almost unabated, not to speak of the theories 




While I do not agree with Beck that what he describes is really a 
cosmopolitan world,
470
 I do think that he is ‗on to something‘ when he claims that 
the syntax of social science does not allow us to grasp the new complex reality. If we 
perceive nations methodologically as a way of framing our political experience, then 
we can also imagine experiencing nationality in a way that transcends national 
boundaries.  
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Kate Nash makes a similar claim when she says that traditionally 
cosmopolitanism is associated with human rights as opposed to political 
community.
471
 However, more recently, we can witness the development of ‗popular 
cosmopolitanism‘ in which we see fellow nationals also as fellow human beings.
472
 
This represents an inherent trait of nationhood often constructed within a moral order 
where ‗real‘ emotions are figured as ‗human‘.
473
 The fact that nationhood has that 
capacity to universalise our experience is recognised by Kymlicka and Benhabib,
474
 
amongst other scholars. 
To sum up, nation-centred outlooks do not have to be opposed to 
cosmopolitan norms. At the same time, the role of the nation has been changed 
substantially by globalisation and as a result the language that we use to express our 
national allegiances is not always adequate.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have shown that both cosmopolitan and nationalist particurist 
perspectives leave philosophical gaps, particularly when considering cosmopolitan 
norms. While, as Held and Benhabib suggest, it is true that democratic citizenship 
has the capacity to create norms transcending the limits of a particular polity, 
Kymlicka‘s position seems more convincing. However, his view of nationhood 
should be amended. The distinction between liberal citizenship and the concept of 
national belonging is blurred by the fact that, as Nash claims, nations are becoming 
‗cool‘.
475
 If we understand the nation as a form of political experience, this becomes 
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even more evident. While nations still organise people‘s lives, our perception of the 
political extends beyond national borders. This does not represent a new paradigm, 
but rather represents a radicalisation of the modern ideal of politics in which the 
universal has to be mediated by a limited political community. 
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6 
In Defence of a Comprehensive View of the Nation   
Throughout the thesis, my argument has been focused on situating the idea of the 
nation into modern political thought and defending the concept of the nation from its 
critics. What has been achieved as a result is a series of claims about the nation that 
clearly seem to link together into a whole, and now need to be re-ordered. What I 
have shown is that major critiques of the nation (both liberal and cosmopolitan) 
manifest a certain deficiency in their understanding of the idea of ‗nation‘. This is 
either because they overlook something about the concept of the nation itself (for 
example when they presuppose a radically ethnic view of nationhood) or because 




I want to move now beyond the critical part of my task and show where it has 
led me. In this chapter I defend what I call a comprehensive view of the nation. It is 
an attempt to go beyond the limited capacity in which the concept of the nation 
seems to be present within mainstream contemporary (predominantly liberal) 
political theory. I have already identified the crucial components of this view 
throughout the earlier chapters of the thesis.  
 First, I argue in Chapters One and Two that the concept of the nation refers to 
a phenomenon that should be understood as neither simply exclusive nor inclusive; 
instead, it embraces both particularism and universalism concurrently. While 
nationhood cannot be conceptualised in terms of a purely civic or legal relationship, 
neither can it be seen as a natural, a- or anti-political identity. In fact, nations provide 
a crucial element of political power, because they have the ability to motivate 
citizens to take on burdens they otherwise would not.
477
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Secondly, I argue in Chapter Two that the dichotomy within the concept of 
the nation reflects a similar dichotomy within the modern self. The project of radical 
autonomy based on the ideals of authorship and absolute beginnings is futile. Modern 
individualism rests on dialectics between passive and active components of the self. 
The individual subject is formed through a position of alterity towards common 
shared institutions.  
And thirdly, I show that the nation represents a form of bounded rationality 
which is a necessary condition of politics.
478
 This is not only because our political 
language (which enables us to express our interests) is itself a product of a limited 
community, but also because politics is a sphere of practical rationality dependent on 
a set of shared practices and institutions.  
 Now I want to develop this position further and explicate to what kind of 
claims we are now committed. In particular, I will show that if we take this 
comprehensive view seriously, it then becomes evident that nations have the capacity 
to provide sources of recognition and solidarity reaching beyond national borders. 
Furthermore, I will argue that the very paradoxical nature of national identity 
mediates between universal and particular, allowing us to relate to each other both as 
individuals and as members of a perceived historical community. 
I should note that the defence of national identity is a difficult task. Firstly, 
because the burden of proof is on the side of those who defend what seems to be the 
status quo. Contrary to what seemed to be the general feeling in 1970s and 1980s, 
nations do not seem to be in decline. In fact, there are many new nationalisms and 
some of the old nationalist movements have been recently re-invigorated.
479
 
Furthermore, it is easy to criticise political cosmopolitanism for being utopian, 
unrealistic or lacking in detail - most innovative thinking about politics is. Secondly, 
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any plausible defence of nationhood should give an account of the dynamic nature of 
nationalism, including the changing role of nations in the global era. While it is not 
my goal here to assess the impact of globalisation on the role of national identity, I 
want to show how nations can constructively participate in, and in fact are crucial to, 
a more cosmopolitan international community.  
The argument in this chapter builds on my definition of the nation as a form 
of modern political experience from Chapter One to show that nations have the 
ability to create and sustain public worlds. These public worlds are crucial for the 
development of the moral and political agency of individuals because they provide a 
framework in which the self can be rooted. I draw here on Margaret Canovan‘s work, 
and in particular her view of nations as ‗mediators‘
480
 which allow citizens to 
participate in a ‗public world‘.
481
 This also links back to my own examinations of 
nationhood as a form of political experience as suggested in Chapter One. I believe 
that it supplements Canovan‘s own view and explains in more detail how nations can 
constitute the public world.  
In the second section of this Chapter, I explore why political agency requires 
bounded rationality (which the nation represents) of the common world brought 
about by nations. This leads to the final section where I reinforce my claim from 
Chapter Six, that in creating the framework for contemporary moral agency, nations 
have the ability to transcend their borders. It is then possible to think about a 




6.1. Nations Mediate Between the Self and the Public World   
In Chapter Two, I explore the tension within the modern self between the desire to 
constitute itself as an autonomous individual and the need to belong to a community. 
I show that this tension, while often leading to a conflict of values, is indeed 
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necessary and constitutive to the modern individual, who defines herself precisely 
through a position of alterity to the society. In the context of nationality, this relates 
to the fact that a Pole or an Englishman does not possess, or even identify with, any 
of the features that they associate with being Polish or English. However, the process 
of identification takes place in a dialectic with those features. While it is common to 
emphasise that personal identities are often defined negatively in relation to other 
nationalities (I am Polish in virtue of being different from ‗Scottish‘ and ‗Jewish‘), it 
is less commonly noticed that on an individual level national identity can also be 
framed in opposition to one‘s own national group. For instance, my identity as a 
Polish immigrant living in Britain is framed neither as acceptance of purely Polish, 
nor purely English or Scottish features. My ‗Polishness‘ is unique, in the sense that, 
contrary to a stereotypical Pole, I am not a Catholic, do not like vodka, and prefer 
eating Pad Thai to Bigos.  
 I also make a related point, that this tension within modern identity is a result 
of how the modern subject (the active epistemic self)
483
 is framed. The duality 
between the passive (non-reflective) and active (reflective) elements of the subject 
constitutes the modern self which is always a self-in-the-making. Even though 
modernity defines the tasks of ‗the individual‘ in terms of authorship, absolute 
autonomy in self-creation is beyond our reach. The modern self requires a framework 
of bounded rationality to be able to productively engage in a process of self-creation. 
I argued in Chapters One and Three that the nation offers that kind of bounded 
rationality.  
However, while there are alternative languages and groups that can offer a 
foundation for the modern individual in terms of practices or traditions, it is 
specifically the nation that successfully combines cultural norms with the ability to 
create and maintain a public world. I have already discussed this function of 
nationhood in Chapter One, where I discuss the nation as a ‗form of political 
experience‘. I discuss the concept of the nation in terms of its three dimensions: that 
it is a ‗non-thing‘, refers to an ability to create a common world by transcending 
individual horizons and finally that it is characterised by a principle of universality. I 
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will go a step further here and claim that because of the three above features of the 
concept of the nation, nationhood creates a public world. By this I mean a realm in 
which individual actors can participate freely in debating issues beyond their private 
interest.  
Without the capacity of the nation to provide a public world, the tension with 
the self could not be successfully mediated. In other words, we do not have the 
ability to define ourselves in universal terms. For example, Butler argues that 
because standards of universality are historically and culturally articulated, the very 
idea of detached self is unintelligible.
484
 
Nor is a detached self desirable. The ability of nations to provide a bridge 
between cultural, political, ethnic, religious and practical elements of our identity 
allows for democratic deliberation and for liberal politics in the sense that 
nationhood outweighs all other types of group membership and, as a result, creates a 
framework in which individual interests compete with each other. Within the nation, 
at least in theory, we are all directly connected primarily as individuals and not as 
members of families, churches, trade organisations and other partial associations.  
My analysis of nationhood is similar to Canovan‘s idea of nations as 
mediators.
485
 In Nationhood and Political Theory, Canovan suggests that instead of 
thinking of the nation as either civic or ethnic, natural or artificial, particularist or 
universalist, it is more accurate to think of it as a phenomenon that holds these 
alternatives together.
486
 Or, in her own words: ‗A nation is a polity that feels like a 
community, or conversely a cultural or ethnic community politically mobilised.‘
487
 
Debates about whether the nation is a cultural or political concept are then futile. 
What we need instead is a better understanding of how national identity can express 
different dimensions of the experience of the individual.  
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The mediating function of the nation, for Canovan, enables them to serve as 
‗worlds‘.
488
 By acting as a bridge between various aspects of individual experience, 
national bonds constitute political communities by bringing all aspects of the life of 
an individual together.
489
 The national world is rich not only because it is a collective 
of individuals, but precisely because it represents their collective experience 
embodied in shared institutions, practices and the enjoyment of a common cultural 
heritage.  
 
 We are British not in virtue of conforming to some particularly British 
way of thinking but because (either by inheritance or by adoption) we 
jointly own the complex legacy of the nation, from institutions like 
Parliament, and the BBC to less tangible legacies ranging from 
Shakespeare‘s plays and a history of overseas empire to traditions of 
gardening and agitating against cruelty to animals – all of which are ‗our‘ 




Both my and Canovan‘s account of nationhood stand in contrast to otherwise 
similar accounts that also highlight the mediating function of nationhood but limit it 
to a cultural function (such as Tamir‘s for instance).
491
 Nonetheless, we see that the 
nation has a political dimension because it creates a common world in which all 
kinds of interests and demands can be stated regardless of class, ethnic background, 
church affiliation, etc.. The nation as such is not a political entity but always strives 
to have some kind of political presence. This can be either through independence as a 
nation-state or some other kind or recognition via different levels of regional 
autonomy or minority representation.  
While my account is similar to Canovan‘s, I believe I go further in explaining 
the way in which nations mediate different types of experience to constitute a 
common political world. This is because my analysis shows that a comprehensive 
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theory of the nation should include an analysis of the modern self. Nationhood has 
two main sources of reference: political community (the modern state – Chapter 
One) and the individual (the modern subject – Chapter Two); we need both objects to 
provide an adequate account of this phenomenon.  
The mediating function of nationhood is indeed crucial to the establishment 
of the modern liberal democratic state. Without it, modern societies would be 
collectives of different groups: professional, class, racial, ethnic, religious, to name 
but a few. However, the nation can help negotiate individual interests over and above 
these affiliations by providing a shared identity, and creating a realm in which all 
these identities are recognisable through shared practices and institutions. Hence, the 
liberal project of making politics a sphere which brings together individuals is only 
made possible by the particular historical circumstances brought about by the nation-
state (specifically in the ‗West‘).  
Nevertheless, Canovan‘s notion of nations as mediators might suggest that 
nationhood is somehow a neutral bridge between politics and culture, ethnicity and 
citizenship. Further analysis suggests that this is not seem the case. Nations do not 
simply mediate or translate our experience, they can also corrupt or mistranslate it, 
which has the potential to result in harmful forms of exclusion.
492
  
By constituting a common world, the nation provides a framework in which 
we can recognise other individuals as members of the same political community 
regardless of their membership in other groups. In the next section I will argue that 
nations are then constitutive to modern moral and political agency. 
 
6.2. Nationhood as a Source of Moral and Political Agency 
My definition of the concept of the nation aims to show how nations create a world 
in which individual political and moral agency can flourish. Nations offer much more 
than a source of solidarity based on a feeling of a shared fate or bonds of kinship. As 
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I have shown, national identity is constitutive to the way we define ourselves. This 
can be understood in two ways: Firstly, nationhood provides a framework for the 
process of self-creation; secondly, it sets the conditions of recognition of our 
relationship to others.  
In this section I explain why moral and political agency requires a self rooted 
in a community and why the mediating function of nations is so important for the 
idea of individual autonomy. I will first define the term agency and explain its 
relationship to the concept of autonomy. Then, I will show that moral agency 
requires a bounded community, and, consequently, so does political agency.  
In the simplest terms, the word ‗agent‘ refers to the self when it is viewed as a 
‗doer‘ or, in other words, when we examine the self‘s capacity to act. Moral agents 
are ‗individual human actors who have the capacity for deliberating over possible 
causes of action and their consequences and then proceeding on the basis of this 
deliberation‘.
493
 The concept of moral agency allows us to view individuals as 
capable of action which can be viewed in terms of ‗right‘ and ‗wrong‘ and who are 
morally responsible for those actions. Political agency can sometimes be seen as a 
sub-type of moral agency as it relates to the same domain of practical rationality. In 
short, the concept of political agency refers to the ability of individual actors to 
deliberate over their interests and communicate them to other individuals. Agency 
cannot be assumed. The capacity for deliberating over possible causes of action and 
acting on that basis is not something we are automatically born with, but that we 
need to develop.  
 As I have shown in Chapter Two, there is a strong strand within western 
philosophy that sees the self mostly as a thinking substance and as such withdrawn 
from the world. However, the concept of agency refers to a notion of an acting self 
that is already in-the-world (because it has the ability to change it).
494
 How are these 
two ideas about the self related? On one hand thinking and doing are often seen as 
opposing activities. To be able to think about an action we need to distance ourselves 
from that action (this is how the ‗subject‘ is recognised). On the other hand, as 
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MacMurray notes, ‗to act and to know I am acting are two aspects of the same 
experience‘.
495
 The self is then neither solely a thinking thing nor solely an agent, but 
is instead both. How are moral and political agents constituted?  
I will adopt a communitarian view of moral agency, meaning that I claim that 
becoming an agent is only possible within a community. Millard and Forsey explain 
that agency could not be possible without the ‗acquisition of language, and through 
this acquisition we are already laden with certain understandings and prejudgements 
about the world.‘
496
 Furthermore, Alasdair MacIntyre argues that our moral actions 
are unintelligible unless we place them within a coherent and inter-subjectively 
available story (it is not enough if that story makes sense only to an individual).
497
  
MacIntyre uses the example of someone digging in the garden. The question 
‗What is he doing?‘ can have multiple answers which do not depend on the actual 
observable activity. He might, for example, be ‗gardening‘, ‗pleasing his wife‘, 
‗doing exercise‘. All of these activities can be represented by digging but to say that 
‗digging‘ is the only thing that is going on would not be an adequate account of the 
meaning of his actions.
498
 
What MacIntyre is trying to show is that the meaning of an action can only be 
worked out if we know the intentions of an agent as well as the activity the agent is 
performing. But to have intentions or plans involves having a coherent story about 
why we do what we do. This story has to be expressed in a common language in 
order to be recognisable. There are cases when agents act in a coherent way but in a 
language that is not intelligible to us. This is especially characteristic of different 
types of psychological disorders and anti-social behaviour. In the end, social trust is 
based on our expectation that others will act in a rational and predictable way.  
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Political agency can be treated analogically to moral agency in the sense that 
it is difficult to imagine a way individuals could make sense of their own interests or 
communicate without a coherent narrative that would not require some sort of 
coherent story or narrative. National bonds represent the kind of bounded rationality 
that enables us to engage with ‗the political‘ through social practices and institutions 
which make common language accessible.  
Nations provide the means through which the self-agent can constitute itself 
in a coherent way in relation to set and tested ways of life. This does not mean that 
the self becomes identical with some sort of nationalist cliché, but it does mean that 
our identity can be recognised by others meaningfully only if it is presented in a way 
that relates somehow to these shared ideas of life. Nations promote the development 
of moral agency because they offer a framework of bounded rationality through 
traditions, practices and institutions.  
 
6.3. Universalist Nationalism or Rooted Cosmopolitanism 
Even if we accept the most inclusive (or perhaps simply the weakest) theories of 
nationhood, the normative problem concerning the limits of our moral and political 
duties to others who are not members of our community, remains pressing. While 
questions of national interest and sentiment often require us to make partial choices, 
the values nationalism promotes are often perceived as universal. Nationalism has 
historically promoted individual autonomy by helping to equalise the rights of 
persons who belong only to the same national group.
499
  
This is both a moral and a political problem.
500
 On the ethical level, the 
problem is how we can reconcile a commitment to the nation with recognising the 
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equal moral standing of strangers (individuals out-with the nation).
501
 On the 
political level, this is about the choice between national interest versus an impartial 
(global) perspective. The tension between duties to fellow nationals and to fellow 
human beings, as well as between the national community and the global 
community, is not new but has been highlighted by emergent global problems such 
as poverty, terrorism and environmental threats. Our awareness of these issues has 
made questions of the limits of our duties more acute.  
 One theorist who attempts to reconcile these two extremes on the ethical level 





 as two opposite poles in the debate about 
the limits of duty. Her argument against ethical cosmopolitanism follows similar 
lines as Miller‘s. Erskine argues that ethical cosmopolitans have an unrealistic view 
of the human condition (specifically of how moral agents are constructed), because 
people are not simply isolated individuals but are always embedded in groups and 
allegiances.504 Erskine defines ethical cosmopolitanism as a position characterised 
thus: 
  
What unites these positions is an adamant denial that cultural, national, religious, 
and ideological divides can demarcate a class of ‗outsiders‘, or a group to whom 
duties are not owed, to whom considerations of justice are not extended, and with 




According to Erskine, commitment to ethical cosmopolitanism necessitates an 
account of moral agents that is both detached and dispassionate. In contrast, she 
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argues in favour of what she calls an embedded self which is a concept of an agent 
formed by its particular view.
506
  
Erskine borrows the concept of the embedded self from Walzer‘s 
communitarianism. While Erskine builds much of her argument on Walzer‘s theory 
of moral agency, she does not agree with the way Walzer decides to limit the borders 
of communities to geographical ones.
507
 Conversely, Erskine argues that our 
commitments to groups are often exterritorial in character and often overlap. There 
are, in her view, many types of communities that are morally constitutive. For 
example, I belong to the community of Poles, community of academics, community 
of Europeans, community of atheists and so on and so forth. All these communities 
have their own languages and customs, norms and ideas related to a good life.  
Erskine attempts to promote a middle ground between cosmopolitanism and 
IR communitarianism by claiming that it is possible to assign an equal moral 
standing to all humans while recognising that moral agency requires an embedded 
self. In other words, we can think of our commitments to universal norms through 
deliberation between individuals who are rooted in such multiple and overlapping 
communities. This, according to Erskine, would allow the inclusion of strangers 
without repression of their differences.
508
  
Instead of trying then to devise universal principles of justice in an abstract 
model, Erskine would want them to be a product of a deliberation of individuals 
representing different communities. Erskine says that, thus defined, embedded 
cosmopolitanism has the capacity to give an account of principles that grant equal 
moral standing not only to fellow nationals but also to outsiders or enemies. One 
example of such principles is that of restraint towards one‘s enemy,
509
 in particular in 
a situation of war. Ethical cosmopolitanism argues that such principles would be 
justified because we are all members of humanity. But Erskine‘s solution abandons 
this impartialist perspective as implausible. Instead, she suggests that the 
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(transnational) community of soldiers has produced its own set of practice, values 
and rules. Hence, she imagines that if soldiers came together, they could come up 
with such principles.  
While Erskine‘s idea of overlapping communities is original, it fails to 
account for the fact communities can also come into conflict with each other. An 
obvious example is that every soldier at the same time belongs to a community of 
soldiers and a state community. This may lead to conflicts of action-guiding 
principles.
510
 Unless we recognise some sort of morally and politically superior 
community, as Michael Walzer does, then it is difficult to understand how we could 
solve problems arising from conflicting values of different communities to which 
individuals belong.  
Erskine‘s perspective does not account for the special role of the nation as a 
political community (rather than just one of the other groups). However, as I have 
shown in the previous section, the mediating function of nationhood allows it to 
create a common world in which all our identities can exist on equal terms with each 
other. It is also the key framework in developing individual moral and political 
agency. While Erskine is right that it is impossible to have a viable theory of global 
citizenship without accepting that people are somehow embedded in their 
communities (an abstract view of individual agents is unintelligible), she does 
underestimate the political role of nationalism in forming a bridge between different 
types of group membership. Historically, nation-building was often associated with 
the need to abolish certain group antagonisms (such as between churches or castes).  
As I have shown in Chapter Five, nations do have an inherent ability allowing 
us to recognise norms that go beyond national borders. Having said that, while 
nations still do organise our lives, the way members of a national community can 
engage with the political extends beyond the nation. This does not in it itself 
represent a new paradigm, but rather is a natural consequence of the modern ideal of 
politics in which the universal has to be mediated by a limited political community. 
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One could argue that, to slightly rephrase Canovan‘s idea, the concept of the 
self embedded in a nation is a tacit assumption of liberal cosmopolitanism. The 
cosmopolitan outlook is individualistic in the sense that individuals are the main 
actors and bearers of rights and so on. This is because liberal cosmopolitanism is 
centred around a concept of individual autonomy which is historically conditioned by 
the development of nationhood as argued in Chapter Two. Here, I showed that the 
processes creating the modern concept of individual autonomy are also responsible 
for the development of the concept of the nation.  
As I explained earlier on in this chapter, Canovan approaches the same 
argument from a different side, showing how liberal politics require national bonds. 
This is because, as she rightly shows, politics is originally about relations between 
groups and not individuals.
511
 Thus, an attempt to create a theory of the state where 
the state mediates primarily in conflicts between individuals requires a ‗balancing 
act‘. The liberal state has to somehow ‗outweigh the bonds of kin, caste, and 
religion‘.
512
 This, according to Canovan, is done by the nation, within which all 
group identities become generalised and diffused.
513
 If not for the mediating function 
of nationhood, it would be difficult to recognise the rights and needs of individual 
citizens.  The resulting ‗self‘ is paradoxically both rooted in a bounded community 
but also gains the ability to detach itself from other identities.  
 
Conclusion 
To sum up, what I attempt to show in this chapter is that the comprehensive view of 
nationhood allows us to understand the phenomenon of nationalism and its role in 
modern politics in a better way than if we were to simply frame it terms of national 
identity or allegiance. In my conception of comprehensive nationhood, the concept of 
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nation refers to more than merely ethnic or civic bonds. The nation has the ability to 
mediate not only between individuals (Chapter One) but also different types of 
experience. As a result, the primary political value of nations is that they have the 
ability to create public worlds. The act of mediation itself is not morally neutral and 
should be subject to scrutiny as it can lead to misrepresentation and oppression.  
 By creating a world in which all fellow nationals can participate on equal 
terms, nations have the capacity to mediate between different types of experiences 
within a framework of bounded rationality and create an intelligible world in which 
moral and political agency can flourish. In that sense, nationhood is constitutive to 
modern individualism. In the last section, I showed that nationhood has the ability to 
embrace global and transnational identities and that, in fact, the only viable 
cosmopolitanism is one based on individuals who are somehow rooted in their 
communities.  
I should perhaps note that the above reflections have intentionally omitted the 
problem of the state. I do not think that a commitment to nationhood as a basis for a 
public world has to imply statehood based solely on national identity. There are new 
possibilities opened up by the European Union as well as different levels of political 
existence within national communities. My point is limited to the fact that there is a 
certain value in a national self as a basis for political community. The appropriate 
form of such a community is a matter that should be discussed separately.  
The reason why nationhood remains central in this process is that, while 
globalisation means that there are new sources of identity, the nation remains the 
primary boundary of our political world. Unless we can think of a way in which the 
‗global‘ can become ‗political‘ through a similar mediating process as the nation, it 
seems to me that the ‗global‘ exists only as an abstraction of the ‗local‘. It is also 
true, however, that nations themselves have to (and indeed do) re-orient themselves 
to address new types of identities and transnational challenges. They will however, 
for the time being, remain the primary political source of our understanding of these 
issues.
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7 
Post-National Thought: Is National Identity in 
Retreat? 
Analysis in earlier chapters has shown that the nation is both a historical and 
contingent phenomenon. This begs the question whether the form of political identity 
represented by nationhood can continue to offer the ability to construct public worlds 
(as explained in Chapter Six). The place and status of national identity has become 
problematic as a result of globalisation and the reactions to it. This chapter examines 
some non-liberal models of post-national thought. I will argue that these rest on a 
flawed deconstruction of subjectivity.  
Recent social and cultural changes have led to a new critique of the concept 
of the modern subject. Globalisation, migration, multiculturalism and the alleged 
decline of the nation-state
514
 have all led to the erosion of traditional sources of 
identity. A significant part of this was played by the recent critique of subjectivity by 
authors such as Foucault and Deleuze, who accused modern thought of constructing 
a concept of self that is ‗ahistorical‘, ‗fleshless‘, ‗male‘ and ‗oppressive‘. In this 
debate, the subject was often identified with the Cartesian Cogito which became both 
a historical reference to Descartes and a metaphor of a broader theme within modern 
philosophy where subjectivity is conceptualised as an empty, transparent space.
515
  
But this wave of criticism had its sources in the intellectual movements at the 
turn of the 20
th
 century. The end of modernity saw a sudden retreat of some of its 









identified the same paradox of modernity: that the concept of the autonomous self 
coexists with increasingly stronger frameworks of moral, social and political 
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institutions. The above-mentioned philosophers used varying resources of modern 
thought to criticise this contradiction in the name of the same core values of 
modernity that produced it.  
By this I mean that they did not discard the concept of the ‗subject‘ or self all 
together; in fact one could argue that the idea of selfhood was of central concern for 
these philosophers. Nietzsche tried to defend the idea of the self from the unifying 
forces of Christian Middle Class morality.
520
 Freud described the oppressive 
influence of culture on the self.
521
 Heidegger identified ‗Man-selbst’ as the greatest 
enemy of the self – because ‗man‘ stands for what ‗one does‘.
522
 Finally, Marx‘s 
criticism of capitalism was written equally in the language of exploitation as well as 
dehumanisation through alienation.
523
 These authors argue that the concept of the 
‗subject‘ is both in a submissive and oppressive position because it relies on the 
assumption that human beings are purely rational agents and it puts us in conflict 
with what romanticism calls ‗nature‘. In other words, they saw a rift between the 
concepts of individual freedom on one hand and family, nation, class and mass 
culture on the other.  
 What these two waves of critique of the modern ‗subject‘ have in common is 
that they both see the modern self as entangled in a struggle between two opposite 
cultural forces: universalism and individuation.
524
 The former represents an 
intellectual attempt to establish norms and rules reflecting the universal laws of 
reason. The latter mirrors the desire to strengthen and develop personal and 
collective identities. Rationalisation ultimately leads to sameness and a state of 
normality, while individuation is guided by difference and exception. While at the 
turn of the 20
th
 century, criticism was mainly directed at the concept of reason and 
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rationality, late 20
th
 century philosophy sees the concept of the self as equally 
deceptive. 
As a reaction to these intellectual transformations there seem to exist at least 
three theoretical positions: 1) traditional particularism, 2) progressive universalism 
and 3) post-modern particularism. Traditional particularism encompasses those 
theories which oppose the diffusion of strong, substantive identities, personal and 
collective, and believe that we should protect them. Progressive universalists believe 
that the process of rationalisation will finally overcome our attachment to identity; 
they celebrate the decline of nation-state, family and other traditional sources of 
social roles and identities.
525
 Finally, post-modern particularists (and I use the term 
post-modern very loosely here) also perceive the diffusion of traditional sources of 
identity as a process of emancipation of the individual. However, they are equally 
sceptical about the ability to adopt new universalist or cosmopolitan identities. This 
is because, according to post-modern particularists, all identities are oppressive at 
some level.  
However, I do not believe that any of these attempts to accommodate the 
modern subject are successful. In particular, the third position seems to be 
overlooking the fact that the debate between cosmopolitanism and nationalism is not 
embedded in a post-subject world but is precisely a debate about the nature of 
modern political subjectivity. In this chapter, I argue that the contemporary changes 
within subjectivity are consistent with the project of modernity and, in fact, do not 
present a new post-national world.  
To give an overview of this chapter, I will begin by reconstructing the 
critique of the subject. Drawing on a strand of Foucauldian thought, I will show how 
the emergence of the subject is conceptualised within this critique as a result of 
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specific practices, and in particular power relations within a state.
526
  This is 
important to my investigations because the post-national world is primarily one in 
which ‗the subject‘ in politics lost its ontological position of primacy. I argue that 
while Foucault himself offers a nuanced theory of the relationship between state and 
the subject, his critique of subjectivity served as a starting point of many who 
attempted to theorise about ways to ‗free ourselves‘ from the oppressiveness of such 
defined subjectivity. I claim that the attempt to free ourselves from subjectivity is an 
illusion because the void this attempt conjures cannot provide any sort of grounding 
for political action. In the second section, I discuss the emergent nature of the current 
global order in which national boundaries become diffused. I give examples of two 
post-national theories: Hard and Negri‘s ‗Empire‘ and Beck‘s ‗Cosmopolitan 
Outlook‘. In the third and final part of the chapter, I will argue that none of the above 
views are entirely persuasive as they rely on an assumption of inherent contradiction 
between nationhood as a form of political identity and individual autonomy.  
I will show that while it is true that individual identity have become less 
rooted, this is not a contradiction, but is rather a logical development within the 
modern subject. Unless we recognise this distinction, we risk misrepresenting the 
real processes within our society where national and global outlooks become 
increasingly fused and dependent on each other. Perhaps more importantly, we risk 
confusion as to how do these changes affect our reasoning about the moral 
challenges in a globalised world. Ultimately, I claim that there is nothing particularly 
new or revolutionary about the transformations described by post-national theorists. 
In fact, theories can be better described as a radicalisation of the process of 
modernity which brought about the nation. 
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7.1. Critique of Subjectivity: Foucault and his Disciples  
In his analysis of the history of punishment, Foucault offers an explanation of 
how a genealogy of political practices can lead us to an examination of the individual 
self. The study of the prison becomes a study of practices that came to be seen as a 
natural and self-evident part of the modern idea of the penal system – the most 
immediate and barest expression of state power.
527
 For Foucault, the purpose of the 
new administrative techniques used by the state to classify and document the activity 
of its citizens, such as birth registers, statistics, school exams and medical 
examinations, is to control the individual to an extent that was not possible in earlier 
times.
528
 The ultimate goal of prison, according to his argument, is no longer 
retribution but re-socialisation. Foucault‘s analysis shows how the subject was 
formed in a tension with disciplinary power expressed in the changes in penal 
practices. The originality of Foucault‘s thought lies in his claim that in this process, 
punishment is revealed as a condition of bad conscience.
529
  
Foucault extends his analysis of the subject to three types of subject-forming 
practices, specifically: language and science, power and care of the self.
530
 His work 
is then a refusal to limit the understanding of the subject to either abstract theories of 
the self or to theory of power. Instead, he attempt to trace specific modes of being a 
subject, that is to say, he discusses subjectivity with references to fundamental 
experiences of the self. These experiences include the way the self directs attention 
to itself. In particular, in Foucault‘s later work, we can find the analysis of techniques 
relating to ‗the care of the self‘, which he analysis by looking at the status of bodily 
pleasures in his History of Sexuality.
531
 For example, Foucault shows how the 
principle of restraint from excessive bodily pleasures in ancient Roman thought was 
not the result of a universal ethical principle but a particular value attached to 
practicing care of oneself. According to him, the principle of self-restraint was 
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considered here not universal (and thus did not require legal status), but one that 
differentiated oneself from those who lead a life as throngs,  
532
 
The goal of Foucault‘s genealogical work is then to, critique a metaphysical and 
ahitsorical notion of the subject, and expose techniques of subject formation in order 
to open up new possibilities of being a subject.  
 
‗The conclusion would be that the political, ethical, social, philosophical problem 
of our days is not to try to liberate the individual from the state and from the 
state's institutions but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of 
individualization which is linked to the state. We have to promote new forms of 
subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality which has been 




Foucault‘s analysis of subjectivity takes advantage of the ambiguity of the 
word subject, which, as mentioned before, can be understood either as ‗subject of 
someone‘s control‘ or ‗tied to his own identity‘.
534
 By showing these two aspects of 
subjectivity as mutually dependent, through specific practices of the state, Foucault 
argues that there is no escaping subjectivity or power.  
 
‗The relationship between power and freedom's refusal to submit cannot, 
therefore, be separated. The crucial problem of power is not that of voluntary 
servitude (how could we seek to be slaves?). At the very heart of the power 
relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the 
intransigence of freedom. Rather than speaking of an essential freedom, it would 
be better to speak of an "agonism"*--of a relationship which is at the same time 
reciprocal in-citation and struggle, less of a face-to-face confrontation which 




This final point of Foucault‘s theory has not always been fully appreciated and many 
of those, who claimed to continue or apply Foucault‘s work, have focused primarily 
on his concept of bio-power, marginalising the agonistic conception of the subject. 
This is certainly true in the case of two theorists: Michael Mahon and Michael 
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Clifford. For Mahon, the surveillance techniques of the modern state create a space 
that solidifies the modern self and allows us to perceive ourselves as subjects. This in 
turn shows the ambiguity of the epistemic revolution of modernity. According to his 
reading of Foucault, the formula of Descartes‘ cogito not only allows us to think of 
ourselves as calculating animals, but has also made us calculable.
536
 ‗They were 
reduced to thinking, inferring, reckoning, coordinating cause and effect, these 
unfortunate creatures; they were reduced to their ‗consciousness‘, their weakest and 
most fallible organ.‘537 The weakness of understanding ourselves primarily in terms 
of ‗consciousness‘ lies in the way it makes us vulnerable to the disciplinary power of 
the state. It is through analysing this type of disciplinary power we understand that it 
is not individuals who bring society together, but that society produces a totality.
538
 
According to Clifford, the ambiguity of the word subject, meaning both an 
autonomous individual and the subject of political power, is not accidental. It is not a 
paradox that the French Revolution could be at the same time perceived as an act of 
freedom and yet constitute a totality (the nation) that transformed everyone into 
subjects. Michael Clifford argues that this transformation is in fact at the heart of 
liberal political theory, where the political state is justified by the passage from the 
state of nature to a state of civil society. The state of nature in a classical Hobbesian 
model is a state of constant threat and danger. According to Clifford, it is only this 
discourse of threat that transforms the noble savage into a savage noble – an 
individual. 
 
 ‗Disciplinary‘ power – that would seize the body in its every aspect and 
transform it into a form of political subjectivity that quietly makes a mockery of 
autonomous individuality. This power is silent, quotidian, ubiquitous, and 
irresistible – moreover, it uses the political identity of the savage noble, of free 
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 Thus, for Clifford, the emergence of the subject is inseparable from the 
emergence of the modern nation-state. The meaning of ‗subject‘ (from Latin ‗to 





The nation delimits a space of political subjectivity; it gives subjects an identity 
by virtue of their identification with the nation: as an American or German, as 
Japanese or Bengali. It is a place both real and ideal: real to the extent that it 
designates fixed or disputed) geographical boundaries, ideal in that it is a place 
whose boundaries are defined less by fences, rivers, or mountains than by 





Nation appears to be then – as a result of Clifford‘s analysis – a form of the 
ideological disciplinary power that produced the modern subject.  
 To sum up, in both Mahon‘s and Clifford‘s analysis, the modern subject 
appears to be a product of either the disciplinary power of the state (Mahon) or the 
discourse of threat created by the nation (Clifford). This focus on power as the main 
factor in subject-formation goes against the intention of Foucault‘s philosophy, as I 
explained earlier. For Mahon and Clifford, the concept of the ‗subject‘ stands for a 
modern paradox where the very feeling of freedom and autonomy we experience as 
subjects equipped with rationality and individual identity is, at the same time, a 
condition of strong and oppressive group identities. By revealing this, the 
‗genealogist‘ claims to act as a revolutionary who unmasks the mechanism of 
exploitation, giving us the tools to overthrow it. Genealogy is then not simply an 
alternative history or another narrative about the past.  
However, freedom from continuity and substantive identity is a promise as 
dangerous as it is unrealistic. The idea that by deconstructing the subject we will be 
able to somehow resist the powers that form it is misleading as subjectivity is the 
only strategy of resistance available to us. One author who identified this flaw is 
Agata Bielik-Robson, who, in her book Inna Nowoczesnosc (The Other Modernity), 
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attempts to show the paradoxes of post-modern thinking about subjectivity.
542
 She 
understands subjectivity as a reflective engagement with ourselves as beings-in-time. 
In this sense, we experience ourselves as subjects especially when we feel the 
passing of time – in a special type of relationship that individuals have with history. 
We look into the past with pride or regret, experiencing guilt and melancholy. 
Melancholy, or an attempt to hold on to what is already lost, is especially 
characteristic of modern subjectivity for Bielik-Robson. Without melancholy, she 
argues, we would not feel the need to remember the dead, nor would we be able to 
fight for the honour of our ancestors.  
Nonetheless, it is precisely melancholy that presents itself as a burden to the 
modern subject. It was Nietzsche who, in On the Use and Abuse of History for Life, 
reflected that: 
 
Observe the herd which is grazing beside you. It does not know what yesterday 
or today is. It springs around, eats, rests, digests, jumps up again, and so from 
morning to night and from day to day, with its likes and dislikes closely tied to 
the peg of the moment, and thus neither melancholy nor weary. To witness this is 
hard for man, because he boasts to himself that his human race is better than the 
beast and yet looks with jealousy at its happiness. For he wishes only to live like 
the beast, neither weary nor amid pains, and he wants it in vain, because he does 
not will it as the animal does. One day the man demands of the beast: ‗Why do 
you not talk to me about your happiness and only gaze at me?‘ The beast wants 
to answer, too, and say: ‗That comes about because I always immediately forget 
what I wanted to say.‘ But by then the beast has already forgotten this reply and 




The post-modern remedy to the oppressiveness of modern subjectivity expressed in 
melancholy, or what Deleuze calls neurotic subjectivity,
544
 is, according to Bielik-
Robson, ‗ecstasy‘. Ecstasy is an escape from the monotony of being a continuous 
self, a rebellion from repetition. In this sense, post-modern identity is at constant war 
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with any type of ‗heaviness‘, seriousness or boredom.
545
 Contemporary society in 
Bielik-Robson‘s view is tired of memory, history and the concept of time in general; 
individuals within that society desire the lightness of a-historicity which offers an 
escape from the limits of ordinary existence.
546
 This is why ‗the postmodern self 
lives most intensively, when in a moment of ecstasy it places itself outside of time 
and far from herself, from her self-image, from everything that it wrongly thought to 
be a defining part of its identity – in an utopian and ephemeral imaginary place.
547
  
But for Bielik-Robson ‗ecstasy‘ – the essential desire of postmodern 
subjectivity - is a false remedy. This is because the opposition between heaviness and 
lightness is itself a misleading discrepancy. In his famous book, The Unbearable 
Lightness of Being, Kundera targets this exact problem of contemporary culture. As 
in the case of his other books, he chooses the opposition of ‗heavy‘ and ‗light‘ only 
to show that it can easily be reversed.  Initially for Kundera ‗heaviness‘ is the 
boredom of being a subject and, similar to Bielik Robson‘s work, is constituted by 
melancholy and memory.
548
 Without memory, the individual self cannot be in danger 
of carrying the weight of its history. The lightness of forgetting about being a subject 
intuitively seems to offer an escape from boredom. However, both for Kundera and 
Bielik-Robson the lightness of a-historicity is misleading. In fact, boredom is an 
inescapable feature of a post-modern society. That boredom does not result in any 
type of self-reflection, as it does in the case of melancholy. Contemporary boredom 
is not associated with an engagement with the past. For Bielik Robson boredom is 
pure negativity, the tiredness of the ordinary life. In fact, according to Bielik-Robson, 
the only time the post-modern self is not affected by boredom is in the short 
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7.2. Post-National Thought 
The recent emergence of new, hybrid forms of identity and political membership, 
multiculturalism, the lack of clear borders between political, economic and cultural 
phenomena and the non-territorial character of the new world order all have a 
bearing on contemporary political thought. The post-modern critique is an attempt to 
deal with the descriptive inadequacy of the old, state-centred political language. On a 
political level, de-ontologisation of the nation-state outlook is a result of a 
deconstruction of an essentialist view of the self.  
Beck claims that thanks to the postmodern critique of subjectivity, 
nationhood has become historicised and ‗stripped of its inner necessity‘.
550
 As a 
result, the idea of having special duties to fellow-nationals is undermined. When 
identity ceases to be a significant source of moral obligation, the cosmopolitan 
project of rationalization naturally goes forward. The relationship between the post-
modern critique of subjectivity and cosmopolitanism is ambiguous. On one hand, 
without a global, post-national outlook, we would not be able to, as Bauman says, 
dip ‗freely into the Lego set of globally available identities‘ and build ‗a 
progressively inclusive self-image‘.
551
 On the other hand, the resulting new identity 
is only passively quasi-cosmopolitan. While drawing on a number of formerly 
exclusive identities, it remains provincial in character. In that sense, even though 
living in a multi-cultural environment involves being opened up to the world in a 
broad way, it does not lead to a universalist perspective. The post-modern, post-
national outlook is, at heart, particularistic.
552
 
 Bauman describes this as part of a wider process of fragmentation of 
contemporary life
553
 by noting that 
 
The passage from ‗solid‘ to a ‗liquid‘ phase of modernity: that is, into a condition 
in which social forms (structures that limit individual choices, institutions that 
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guard repetitions of routines, patterns of acceptable behaviour) can no longer 
(and are not expected ) to keep their shape for long, because they decompose and 





 According to Bauman, there is not really any way to identify the new global 
community favourably. The processes we observe in the emergence of international 
institutions and global civic movements are simply reactions to the globalisation of 
the market that affect us.  
 
7.2.1. Post-modern Particularism: Hardt and Negri’s Empire 
The decline of the nation-state does not have to signify a beginning of the ‗road to 
freedom‘. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri are, for instance, two thinkers whose 
book Empire presents a modern alternative in the intellectual debate on 
globalisation.
555
 Hardt and Negri draw a vision of empire understood as a new, post-
national (and post-imperial) model of sovereignty. The global order that emerges 
from the UN Charter is, according to them, no longer international, but is instead 
defined as a supra-national legal and ethical order.  
 Hardt and Negri attempt to show that the supra-national order originates from 
a rationalisation of relations between states.
556
 It is perceived to be a teleological 
process perpetuated by the necessary progress of mankind. This new world order, 
which Hardt and Negri call ‗Empire‘, aims to establish global peace through unified 
legal order which becomes identified with "justice".   
 
In Empire there is peace, in Empire there is the guarantee of justice for all 
peoples. The concept of Empire is presented as a global concert under the 
direction of a single conductor, a unitary power that maintains the social peace 
and produces its ethical truths. And in order to achieve these ends, the single 
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power is given the necessary fore to conduct, when necessary, ‗just wars‘ at the 




But Hardt and Negri‘s thesis is that the opposite is true. Due to the diffusion 
of borders and democratisation of global space, power achieves its total stage. Unlike 
in modernity, it is no longer bound by the principles of sovereignty which also 
establishes the ‗ground rules‘ of legitimate power. On the contrary, the new global 
bio-power is based on the ability to determine the state of emergency, i.e. an event 
that requires intervention.
558
 In Hardt and Negri‘s view, Empire does not lead to wars 
as there is nothing external to Empire. All types of force become internal; they come 
to be understood as civil wars, humanitarian interventions, or a policing action 
against the murderers, criminals and terrorists. Ultimately, the nature of the global 
bio-power of the new Empire is not so different to that of the modern state. Like the 
modern state, Empire still retains the power to identify an enemy, though all enemies 
become internal enemies. This new form of order can take political, social, or even 
cultural forms as Empire is an order that administers the production of identity and 
difference.
559
 This pessimistic diagnosis seems to leave little hope of resistance. 
Because of the total nature of bio-power, any opposition against the Empire is 
doomed to fail, as Empire automatically consumes any type of difference and 
opposition represented by any of the identities within.
560
 According to Negri and 
Hardt, so far, the only successful resistance to the Empire has been individual: 
activities such as ‗radical mutation‘ of our bodies through piercings, tattoos
561
 have 
served as way of "fighting back" against the homogenising force of the emerging 
global order.  
Hardt and Negri‘s work represents a warning against a world without 
subjectivity. The new political order exists in a vacuum where there is no recognised 
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political leadership and, consequently no authority able to grant citizenship.
562
 The 
oppressiveness of the Empire is then inherent in its structure. It signifies political 
authority and a system of redistribution without a recognised class of right-bearers.  
The goal of the authors of Empire is then to promote new ways of resisting by 
promoting citizenship.
563
 As there is no global state, Hardt and Negri introduce the 
concept of the ‗Multitude‘
564
 which represents the global class of subjects. The 
multitude does not have a legal status but it has been recognised through a series of 
revolutions and solidarity of those revolutionary groups against the Market.
565
 The 
empowerment of the multitude, according to Hardt and Negri, requires three 
postulates to be met: recognition of global citizenship, the right to free movement of 
people, and a global social wage.  
It is not my goal here to assess the validity of Hardt and Negri's model of 
global citizenship. However, their analysis of the global order or subjectivity does 
not seem to rest on firm enough ground. While Hardt and Negri try to convince us 
that they are describing a substantially new type of exploitation, take away bio-
power, and their analysis seems to be using a language we know all too well.
566
 Even 
the account of bio-power in Empire seems to be problematic as by losing the 
distinction between state and economy, the Marxist categories of production 
suddenly seem blurred.
567
  However, surely the way we perceive and understand the 
global order depends on the linguistic toolkit we decide to apply. While Hardt and 
Negri‘s toolkit is certainly an interesting one, it lacks the kind of detail that would 
allow us to assess the usefulness of their model. It seems to me that precisely at a 
time when the nature of contemporary political subjectivity is being heavily debated, 
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Hardt and Negri‘s is too reductionist. I tend to agree with Beck that the new global 
(or as he calls it, cosmopolitan) order requires a new syntax
568
 or, to put it in other 
words, new political categories. However, the search for these is immensely difficult, 
especially as there is still little clarity and much confusion as to our relationship with 
modernity. I will now examine an alternative ‗narrative‘ to that offered by Hardt and 
Negri.  
 
7.2.2. Postmodern Particularism: Beck’s Cosmopolitan Outlook  
The assault on the World Trade Centre in 2001 represents a change to intellectual 
discourse. The idea of a ‗War on Terror‘ has undermined the classical understanding 
of conflict. At the same time, we observe new ways of thinking about the ‗national‘ 
and the ‗global‘. One such example is Beck‘s theory of ‗global risk society‘. In 
Beck‘s own terminology, the adjectives ‗global‘ and ‗cosmopolitan‘ are closely 
linked and in this section I will use these in the above meaning, rather than in the 
philosophical one. Beck‘s approach to cosmopolitanism is closely related to his work 
on risk. As a social theorist, Beck is largely focused on the distinction between 
cosmopolitanisation (a dimension of globalisation) and cosmopolitanism. 
 
The globalization of politics, economic relations, law, culture, and 
communication, and interaction, networks, spurs controversy; indeed, the shock 
generated by global risks continually gives rise to worldwide political publics...In 
world risk society – this is my thesis, at least – the question concerning the 
causes and agencies of global threats sparks new political conflicts, which in turn 





Beck sees the emergent nature of global risk as a key factor in constructing a 
global public sphere which in turns leads to a process he calls cosmopolitanisation. It 
is thanks to these changes that the ‗human condition has itself become 
cosmopolitan‘.
570
 Naturally, Beck is aware of the recent revitalisation of nationalism 
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and sub-state nationalism in Eastern Europe, Canada, Scotland and elsewhere. 
Nonetheless, he claims that there is a significant difference between modern 
nationalism and its current post-modern form. Whilst in modernity, political identity 
is formed in opposition to that which is ‗alien‘ or ‗other‘, contemporary national 
identities do not seem to be necessarily exclusive in the same way.
571
 Thus, it is 
possible to be both Polish and German. Moreover, Beck claims that these new forms 
of nationalism develop in response to (and perhaps even opposition to) the globalised 
world. For Beck, the era of xenophobic, particularistic nationalism is over.  
 
[...] identities which are perhaps too quickly labelled as ‗neonational‘ but which, 
in contrast to the explosive fascistic nationalisms of the twentieth century, do not 
aim at ideological and military conquest beyond their own borders. These are 
introverted forms of nationalism which oppose the ‗invasion‘ of the global world 





 In that sense, contemporary nationalism develops in an already globalised, 
cosmopolitan world. However, unlike the old cosmopolitanisms of Marcus 
Aurelius
573
 and Immanuel Kant,
574
 cosmopolitan life is no longer a matter of ‗cold‘ 




 So why is this link between emergent global factors such as risk (or perceived 
risk) and the cosmopolitanisation of contemporary life important for a political 
theorist? The answer is twofold. On a philosophical level, Beck‘s analysis is critical 
because, firstly, it implies that the opposition between normative cosmopolitanism 
and nationalism is historical, rather than theoretical; while recognising that society 
becomes increasingly cosmopolitan, Beck‘s argument avoids a naive model of 
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cosmopolitanism.
576
 Secondly, as far as social theory is concerned, the distinction 
that Beck makes between cosmopolitanism as a normative view and the empirically 
observable cosmopolitanisation is useful as it provides an alternative understanding 
of the relationship between increasing internationalisation and cosmopolitanism. It 
also avoids antagonism between cosmopolitanism and nationalism. The problem of 
subjectivity is only hinted at in Beck‘s writing and mostly in so far as he discusses 
the notion of identity.  
  However, let me first briefly reconstruct what Beck calls the cosmopolitan 
outlook. He focuses not on the institutional aspect of globalisation nor the increasing 
need for international cooperation in policy-making. He lists five principles of the 
cosmopolitan outlook. These are 1) the experience of crisis in world society, 2) 
recognition of cosmopolitan differences, 3) cosmopolitan empathy, 4) the 
impossibility of living in a world society without borders and 5) the melange 
principle.
577
 The first principle refers to the perception of global risks and threats 
which, thanks to the widening of international public opinion, help shape our 
understanding of a common ‗human‘ fate. The second and third principles are related 
in the sense that they represent the idea that since we recognise that we think in the 
same way and know how others think,
578
 we are capable of respecting difference 
without defining it in terms of otherness or exclusion. Finally the melange principle 
refers to the liquidity of contemporary identities and the increasing multiculturalism 
of our societies, both of which result in the world being much more ‗colourful‘. The 
melange principle means in practice that we perceive mixings of cultures, races and 
cultures as inevitable elements of contemporary societies.  
All of these principles are defined in terms of social perception rather than 
immediate political phenomena. Arguably, however, these cannot be so easily 
separated. In Beck‘s view, the transformations of our perceptions of national and 
transnational forms of life does, in fact, affect both policy and normative thinking. 
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One example Beck gives is one of a Brazilian footballer playing for a Bavarian team. 
Even thought we recognise the player as being Brazilian, he still manages to ignite a 
patriotic spirit among Germans.
579
 Beck takes this as evidence that the cosmopolitan 
outlook does not replace national sentiment but can co-exist with and in fact 
strengthen it.  
Beck‘s account is contestable. While we observe a variety of processes which 
could loosely be termed ‗globalisation‘, ‗internationalisation‘, ‗cosmopolitanisation‘ 
or the diffusion or de-aggregation of identity, these are accompanied by a counter-
force of reignited nationalism, anti-globalisation movements and the intent to defend 
or even create strong local, and specifically national communities. The allegedly 
cosmopolitan world is not equally hospitable to everyone. While high profile 
professionals may find it easy to move and find their places in various communities, 
most migrants feel up-rooted and homeless.
580
 So is Beck‘s diagnosis one-sided?  
 This is where Beck‘s distinction between normative cosmopolitanism and 
cosmopolitanisation (or the cosmopolitan outlook) becomes crucial. While normative 
cosmopolitanism requires active participation through the recognition of 
cosmopolitan norms, a cosmopolitan outlook represents the passive self-awareness of 
the global masses of an emergent world cosmopolitan order.
581
 Beck claims that even 
though forms of life become increasingly cosmopolitan, our understanding of them is 
limited by a nation-centred worldview. Methodological nationalism, says Beck, 
implies societies in plural
582
 and, consequently, forces us to make choices that 
become less and less meaningful. If cosmopolitanisation is only passive then as such 




Really existing cosmopolitanism is deformed cosmopolitanism. As Scott L. 
Malcomson argues, it is sustained by individuals who have very few 
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opportunities to identify with something greater than what is dictated by their 
circumstances...A non-deformed cosmopolitanism, by contrast, results from the 
sense of partaking in the great human experiment in civilization – with one‘s own 
language and cultural symbols and the means to counter global threats – and 




This opposition between deformed and non-deformed cosmopolitanism is, in 
my view, very weak. First of all, if we understand non-deformed cosmopolitanism in 
terms of participation in the ‗great human experiment‘ and the ‗ability to contribute 
to the world culture‘, then there are very few of us who could potentially fit in that 
image. Beck‘s view of ‗non-deformed‘ cosmopolitanism is highly idealised and 
vague just as his definition of nation not always consistent. For instance, when Beck 
says that, in a cosmopolitan model, recognition of difference should not imply 
sameness or affirmation of difference,
585
 he does not provide the reader with a 
positive definition or guidelines on how this could be achieved. While it is true that, 
as Beck says, the nationalistic outlook is essentialist,
586
 there is not enough in Beck‘s 
theory of cosmopolitanism to show that this essentialism could not be part of the 
cosmopolitan outlook.  
 
7.3. Analysis: The Not-So-New Modernity  
While the two examples of post-national thought I describe in the above sections 
offer alternative visions of the world order, Beck, Negri and Hardt claim that 
individual autonomy and national belonging are a contradiction which should be 
resolved through recognising the larger community of humanity or through 
depoliticizing difference. However, I think that their diagnosis is only partially true. 
The contradiction between individual autonomy on the one hand and national 
belonging on the other is a historical, not a logical, contradiction as I have shown in 
previous chapters.  
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Furthermore, neither of these examples offers a coherent and plausible 
account of the contemporary self. In the last section of this chapter I want to explain 
why I think Beck, Hardt and Negri are wrong. My reasons are 1) that there is a 
contradiction between nationhood and individual autonomy and 2) that we live in a 
time when that contradiction is being diffused by history. I will draw on two 
accounts I found especially convincing, those of Kate Nash and Cornelia Klinger.  
 The first claim is indeed quite awkward because either it puts too much strain 
on the notion of individual autonomy or it relies on a narrow understanding of 
national identity. Cornelia Klinger argues that the idea of an autonomous self 
developed largely thanks to the way in which the subject had to maintain an alterity 
towards the rules and mechanisms of modern society (see Chapter Two). The inner 
depth that we perceive as fundamental to our understanding of what a self (as 
discussed in Chapter Two through the engagement with the work of Taylor, Klinger, 
and Siegel) is not a product of un-embedded self-affirmation.
587
 While the modern 
subject embraces the ideals of autonomy and self determination, it also seeks to give 
direction to this idea in the idea of a community of fate. In fact, according to Klinger, 




Nietzsche is well aware of the fact that the modern self experiences both the 
burden of identity as well as the desire to get rid of its own individuality.
589
 This 
explains why the diffusion of the nation-state as a source of substantive identities is 
accompanied by ambiguous feelings of both freedom and melancholy:
590
 ‗Modern 
subjectivity is torn between the impulse to rejoice at the loss of the fetters of origin, 
tradition, and conventional wisdom of all kinds on the one hand, and the urge to re-
establish certainty, orientation, and solidarity on the other‘.
591
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 The second claim, that contemporary life deconstructs modern sources of 
identity, is only partly true. While it is true that contemporary identities are hybrid 
and that politically we do live in much less homogenous societies than before, to a 
philosopher these changes do not have the characteristics of a revolution similar to 
those which led to modernity. On the contrary, national identity has always had both 
exclusive and inclusive components. The modern outlook is neither essentialist nor 
particularistic.  
Cornelia Klinger claims that due to the decline of family, class and nation, 
traditional sources of identity became weak and this, in turn, led to a paradoxical 
crisis of a self that is on one hand free to define itself and lacks the resources to do 
so. According to Klinger, this leads to a no-win situation, as the very subject that was 
supposed to enjoy the newly achieved freedom to shape life disappears.
592
 Klinger‘s 
argument refers to a problem where identity itself becomes a product, both because it 
can be manufactured and because it can be acquired. This leads to the dilemma 
where the subject is neither beyond its choices nor can it find itself in them:
593
 ‗When 
the production of meaning is commercialised the division of functions between the 
sphere of subjectivised meaning and the rationalized sphere of instrumental reason as 
the sphere of means is abolished.‘
594
 Subjectivity cannot be separated from 
rationalization. All modern political notions contain this ambiguity inherent in their 
modality; thus, the word ‗subject‘ has both an active (agent) and passive (subject to) 
meaning.  
 If Klinger is right, then there is nothing inherently exclusive about the idea of 
nation. Kate Nash makes a similar point when she states that national identity can 
and often does have a universalist dimension. The old opposition between ‗hot‘ 
national sentiment and ‗cold‘ rationalist cosmopolitanism is now becoming 
obsolete.
595
 Nash argues that national feelings are based on personal emotions and 
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understood as common to all humans.
596
 Hence, we are able to sympathise with 
foreigners in times of crisis. Nash gives the example of the 9/11 attacks . She claims 
that the global response was so strong because ‗In some significant cases at least, 






To sum up, in this final Chapter I have shown why it is too early to talk about a post-
subjective or post-national world. The alleged transformations within the 
contemporary self are indeed significant, but they are not revolutionary. There is no 
thick line separating modernity from the contemporary, post-modern society. In fact, 
it can be argued that the contemporary self is a radicalised version of its original 
project, what Klinger calls ‗radicalisation of modernity‘. 
The conceptual place of nations within this framework has certainly changed. 
It does not mean that nations are becoming weaker, but that they are adjusting to the 
transformation within our own conception of the political self. Because we 
increasingly have the ability to recognise ourselves through abstract features rather 
than particular ethnic or cultural differences, national identity itself becomes 
universalised. 
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Conclusion 
I began this project by laying out a view of nationhood which linked nationhood with 
the modern self, showing that the nation plays a key role in forming the boundaries 
crucial to the forming of the political world.  I also defended national identity from 
three critiques laid out in the Introduction. Each of the resulting three analyses 
focused on a different element of nationhood and its relationship with the self, 
identity and political community. This chapter concludes my overall argument by 
summarising the key findings of my defence of a comprehensive view of nationhood, 
assesses the contribution of my argument to the broader literature on national identity 
and cosmopolitanism and highlights the relevance of my analysis for future research.  
 
Findings 
While each individual chapter has its own conclusions, I will now draw out the key 
findings present over the entirety of this work. In this thesis, I argue that one of the 
key reasons for a superficial treatment of nationhood by political theorists is that 
nationhood is primarily conceptualised as a type of identity. However, this does not 
allow us to account either for the central role of nationalism in the processes of 
modernisation, or the fact that nations themselves play a role in the development of 
our concept of the self (Chapters Two and Six). 
Instead of focusing merely on national identity, this thesis introduces the 
development of what we can now call the national self. The three main features of 
the national self are that it is modern in the sense that it originates from the decline of 
the theistic order, it exists in a tension between its passive and active elements and it 
supports a type of identity which is both individual and collective at the same time.   
This being the case, it was important that Chapter One offer an alternative 
understanding of the nation as a unique form of political experience. This makes 
nations both historically contingent and politically valuable for the modern liberal 
state. In the final two chapters, Chapters Six and Seven, I address the changing role 
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of nations in an increasingly global world which often contests national limits of 
political or moral duties in favour of cosmopolitan norms. 
My aim is to expose the superficial way in which the concept of the nation is 
often opposed by theorists, primarily, but not only, of liberal cosmopolitanism, based 
on the notion of individual autonomy. While much of liberal political theory has 
traditionally viewed the nation as an obstacle on the road to modernisation, my 
analysis of nationalism has shown that nationhood and the moral value of nation-ness 
is at the heart of the modern self. Therefore, the first macro finding is that the 
boundedness of the modern self shapes the way we perceive political community and 
that the nation represents a politically meaningful boundary to the self.  
 The second key finding is that the nation is not only a boundary for the self, 
but it is the primary political boundary for the self. This thesis examined how nations 
have the capacity to mediate individual experience within a framework of bounded 
rationality (Chapters One and Six) and consequently have ability to provide the self 
with the means to participate in a common world. Through offering a model of 
bounded rationality in virtue of a shared relationship to a national non-thing, nations 
allow individuals to recognise others as moral and political agents. They offer access 
to a common space in which all co-nationals are recognised in such a way that they 
can relate to each other; this explains why nations permit the formation and support 
of individual autonomy.  Through nationhood, political agency is derived from an 
inclusion in the nation rather than in a ‗mere‘ state, where citizenship is derived from 
cultural norms. 
The third finding is that nations can promote solidarity not only amongst 
fellow nationals but also beyond the borders of the particular national community. I 
argue in Chapter One that nations provide a source of solidarity which allows us to 
engage with others in building common institutions. This is also a moral principle in 
the sense that in order to show solidarity with others, we have to commit to the 
principle that we will not leave them to fend for themselves in time of need.  
 Another question arising in my thesis is whether the type of social cohesion 
and unity that nationhood brings is desirable. It is true that national unity is at the 
heart of some of the most corrupt and malicious totalitarian policies and ideologies of 
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the modern world. While I accept that members of political communities need a 
notion of a common world, it seems that nations provide more than just that. The 
sense of unity created by belonging to a national community is often portrayed in 
terms of natural features (ethnical, cultural, and physical). The naturalising of 
identity and difference can lead to dangerous forms of exclusion.  
 However, one could additionally argue, as I show further in Chapter Four, 
that the nature of the political world is such that we need a certain degree of 
solidarity and unity. Political decisions are not merely immediate administrative 
corrections, but have long term consequences. This is why the concept of political 
community has to extend to those future generations which will be affected by our 
decisions. Nations provide the idea of a community of fate that allows their members 
to mobilise themselves towards a perceived common good and look after current and 
future generations. Unlike Oakeshott‘s enterprise association presented in Chapter 
Three, the nation is not a co-operative and does not cease to exist once a task is 
completed. Nevertheless, the nation provides a bounded space for co-operation.  
Lastly, and critically, my work illuminates the fact that, while global 
identities are increasingly important, the nation remains the primary political 
boundary for the self. In Chapters Five and Seven, I show that the borders of both 
states and nations are already challenged by new forms of post-national identity and 
global politics. However, this does not necessarily undermine the political role of the 
nation, as we are increasingly able to define ourselves as subjects in terms of abstract 
features rather than ethnic differences (Chapter Seven). This universalisation of 
national identity does not represent a completely new paradigm, but should be 
perceived as a radicalisation of the modern ideal of politics in which the universal is 
mediated by a limited political community (Chapter Four). 
 
Relevance of Findings and Avenues for Future Research 
The advantage and the challenge of this research project is that it accommodates two 
different approaches: normative political theory and nationalism theory. The 
advantage of this kind of analysis is that it highlights gaps in both literatures and 
identifies areas in which they could be mutually beneficial to each other.  
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In particular, while most nationalism scholars discuss nationality as a mass 
function, my approach shows that nationalism is inherently linked to the individual. I 
also highlight the value of an in-depth understanding of the nation for normative 
political theory by showing it to be both different from an ethnic identity and a civic 
community.  
My work contributes to the debate on cosmopolitanism in two ways. The first 
is that it shows how the normative debate on the value of national boundaries is 
significantly affected by the underlying conceptions of nationhood. Political theorists 
who want to write about the significance of national boundaries should investigate 
the complex role the nation plays, not only as a type of identity but also as a way of 
organising the experience of individuals. The second is that my work provides 
further evidence to those who believe that the defence of nationhood does not have to 
be formulated on particularist grounds, but are simultaneously sceptical about an 
abstract model of an up-rooted self. The view of nationhood presented in this thesis 
presents such a middle ground.  
Given the breadth of this thesis, future research could focus on any of the 
various aspects of my work. It is however especially important to further evaluate the 
consequences of my analysis of nationhood to the normative debate on the status of 
non-nationals. Does the comprehensive view of nationhood which I developed in 
Chapter Six commit us to a particular normative theory of the nation? This is 
certainly an issue that should be addressed in a separate book project. There are 
further issues to consider. One of these is the relationship between nationhood and 
citizenship, to which I could not devote enough space here. It would also be 
interesting to see what implication does my view of the national self have for 
nationalism studies.  
 
* 
Nations have the capacity to create bonds of solidarity based on a perceived 
shared history and heritage rather than short or medium term goals. However, the 
ability of nations to create those bonds is not necessarily limited to the boundaries of 
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the state. This gives us hope that as the processes of globalisation becomes stronger, 
nations will be able to embrace and provide the basis for global solidarity.  
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